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研究生:詹前恩
研究生(外文):CHAN, CHIEN-EN
論文名稱:抵禦布林滿足性攻擊並最小化稀有信號的邏輯加密技術
論文名稱(外文):Logic locking for mitigating SAT attack and minimizing rare signals
指導教授:陳勇志陳勇志引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN, YUNG-CHIH
口試委員:劉一宇曾王道
口試委員(外文):LIU, YI-YUTSENG, WANG-DAUH
口試日期:2021-01-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:資訊工程學系
學門:工程學門
學類:電資工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:邏輯加密硬體木馬布林滿足性攻擊多目標加密
外文關鍵詞:Logic encryptionHardware TrojanSAT attackmultiple-objectives logic encryption
相關次數:
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  • 下載下載:26
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邏輯加密是防止IP盜版、硬體木馬、逆向工程和IC過度生產的知識產權(IPs)保護
技術,藉由加入額外的邏輯閘或是加密區塊,以隱藏電路的功能。過去幾年之中,研
究人員提出多種防禦上述問題的邏輯加密方式,各個加密技術皆能對IC設計提供良好
的防護,但大多數的研究都是專注於單一目標的防禦技術,現有的多目標防禦技術大
多是採取結合兩項不同的加密方式或是對加密電路進行二次加密,而非在加密階段同
時考慮多個目標對IC設計進行保護。
我們的研究目標是開發一個可以在邏輯加密階段同時考慮多目標對IC設計進行保
護的邏輯加密技術,在現有的攻擊技術中我們選擇基於布林滿足性的攻擊(Satisfiability
attack, SAT attack)以及硬體木馬作為主要的防禦目標,並基於模擬退火(Simulated
annealing, SA)演算法來實現我們的多目標邏輯加密技術。
我們的實驗將加密開銷全分給防禦SAT attack、全分給防禦硬體木馬以及分別分配
給兩者三種加密模式去做比較,並觀察各個電路中稀有訊號所占的比例以及SAT attack
解密各個電路所需的時間以及迭代次數來進行比較。實驗結果表明,我們的加密技術
可以在加密階段同時滿足兩種防禦目標,加密結果可以在兩個目標之間取得平衡,使
得加密開銷可以被有效的利用。
Logic encryption is an Intellectual Property (IP) protection technique that thwarts
IP piracy, Hardware Trojans, reverse engineering attack and IC overproduction by
inserting key gates or logic blocks controlled by key inputs to hide a circuit’s
functionally. In the past, researchers had proposed several logic encryption techniques
which can protect IC design from the above problems. However, most of research
focused on only one protection objective. Most of existing multi-objective protection
techniques combine two logic encryption techniques or perform encryption two times
on the encrypted circuit rather than considering the multiple objectives during the
encryption phase.
The goal of this research is to develop a logic encryption technique which can
consider multiple objectives during the encrypting phase. In this paper, we develop a
Simulated annealing-based encryption algorithm to resist against Boolean Satisfiability attack (SAT attack) and Hardware Trojans.
In the experiment, we encrypt IC in three modes: all encryption cost is applied to
defend SAT attack, all encryption cost is applied to defend Hardware Trojan, and all
encryption cost is applied to defend SAT attack and Hardware Trojan simultaneously.
The experimental results show that our method can consider the two defense
objectives during the encryption phrase and use the encryption cost effectively.
摘要...............................................................................................................................V
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................VI
誌謝............................................................................................................................VII
目錄...........................................................................................................................VIII
圖目錄..........................................................................................................................IX
表目錄...........................................................................................................................X
第一章、緒論................................................................................................................1
1.1研究背景與動機...................................................................................................1
第二章、文獻探討........................................................................................................4
2.1邏輯加密的技術演進...........................................................................................4
2.2稀有訊號...............................................................................................................5
2.3 SAT attack [8] .....................................................................................................7
2.4 Tree-Based logic encryption [24].......................................................................10
2.5模擬退火演算法[25] .........................................................................................10
第三章、研究方法......................................................................................................12
3.1 Flow chart...........................................................................................................12
3.2 Rare signal candidates........................................................................................13
3.3 SAT candidates...................................................................................................15
3.4 SA initial solution and SA move........................................................................16
3.5 Cost function......................................................................................................18
第四章、實驗結果......................................................................................................20
4.1實驗結果.............................................................................................................20
第五章、結論..............................................................................................................23
參考文獻......................................................................................................................24
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