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研究生:黃任斈
研究生(外文):HUANG, REN-XUE
論文名稱:公司法173條之1對於控制股東持股與公司績效關聯性之影響
論文名稱(外文):The impact of Article 173-1 of the Company Law on the relevance of controlling shareholders’ shareholding and company performance
指導教授:戴怡蕙戴怡蕙引用關係
指導教授(外文):TAI, YI-HUI
口試委員:官月緞李德冠
口試委員(外文):GUAN, YUE-DUANLEE, TE-KUAN
口試日期:2022-05-04
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:銘傳大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2022
畢業學年度:110
語文別:中文
論文頁數:32
中文關鍵詞:公司法第173條之1公司績效控制股東家族經理人外聘經理人
外文關鍵詞:Article 173-1 of the Company LawFirm PerformanceControlling ShareholdersFamily ManagersExternal managers
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我國於2018年11月1日正式施行新制公司法,本次修法是我國第二十六次修正,也是自2001年以來變化最巨大的一次。其中有關於保障股東權益的公司法第173條之1又稱為「大同條款」,備受各界關注。本研究目的旨在探討公司法第173條之1修正後控制股東監督能力的改變對公司績效的影響,並進一步將樣本分為家族經理人與外聘經理人,檢視不同類型的經理人的調節效果,以2016年至2019年台灣上市上櫃公司為樣本。實證結果發現公司法第173條之1實施後控制股東並沒有如主管機關預期的發揮較佳的監督能力,進而改善公司績效,控制股東在獲得了更強的權力後反而會發生剝削小股東的狀況,造成公司績效下降。

Our country officially implemented the new company law on November 1, 2018. This amendment is the twenty-sixth in our country and the most significant change since 2001. Among them, Article 173-1 of the Company Law concerning the protection of shareholders' rights and interests is also known as the "Datong Clause", which has attracted attention from all walks of life. The purpose of this research is to explore the impact of the amendment of Article 173-1 of the Company Law on the changes in the supervisory ability of controlling shareholders and the firm performance, and further divide the sample into family managers and external managers, based on Taiwan from 2016 to 2019 Listed companies are a sample to examine the adjustment effects of different types of managers. The empirical results found that after the implementation of Article 173-1 of the Company Law, the controlling shareholders did not have better supervisory capabilities as expected by the competent authority to improve company performance. On the contrary, the controlling shareholders exploited the rights and interests of small shareholders after gaining stronger power, which led to the decline of the firm performance.

目錄 Ⅰ
表目錄 Ⅱ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機 1
第三節 研究貢獻 3
第二章 研究假說與文獻回顧 4
第三章 研究方法 9
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 9
第二節 變數定義 12
第三節 研究模型 14
第四章 實證結果 14
第一節 敘述性統計 14
第二節 迴歸分析 15
第三節 額外分析 19
第五章 結論與限制 22
第一節 研究結論 22
第二節 研究貢獻 22
第三節 研究限制 22
第四節 研究建議 23
參考文獻 24

表 目 錄
表1 家族持股篩選範例 9
表2 家族經理人、外聘經理人篩選範例 10
表3 樣本篩選過程 10
表4 樣本產業分布表 11
表5 模型變數之敘述統計值 15
表6 模型各變數之Pearson相關係數 16
表7 公司績效TobinsQ之實證結果 18
表8 將公司績效指標改為ROA之實證結果 20
表9 將公司績效指標改為ROE之實證結果 21

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