臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討了政治關聯對企業取得之聯合貸款條款和結構的影響。選取從2004年至2019年共計219筆中國A股上市公司的聯合貸款作爲研究樣本。研究結果顯示，政治關聯能幫助企業取得較優惠的聯合貸款條件。同時政治關聯會對外國銀行參與聯合貸款比例產生顯著影響。除此之外，在額外測試中，董事會具有政治背景執行董事比例和選舉都會影響聯合貸款條款和結構。董事會具有政治背景執行董事比例越高企業取得之貸款金額越多，並且能提高外國銀行參與聯合貸款比例。而選舉會促進與中央政府有關聯的企業取得較低成本的貸款，並且對外國銀行參與地方政府有關聯之企業作爲借款人的聯合貸款比例造成負面影響。整體而言，政治關聯會對企業取得之聯合貸款條款和結構產生影響。

This study examines the impact of political connections on syndicated loans' terms and structure obtained by firms. The sample consists of 219 syndicated loans of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019. The results indicate that political connections can help firms obtain more favorable syndicated loan terms. Political connections also significantly impact the participation proportion of foreign banks in syndicated loans. In additional analyses, I show that the proportion of politically connected executive directors on the board of directors and elections both affect the syndicated loans' terms and structure. The higher the proportion of politically connected executive directors on the board of directors, the higher the amount of loans obtained by the firms, and the higher the proportion of foreign banks participating in the syndicated loans. Meanwhile, elections facilitate lower-cost loans for firms with connections to the central government and negatively impact the proportion of foreign banks participating in syndicated loans to firms with connections to local governments as borrowers. Overall, political connections impact syndicated loans' terms and structure.

1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 6
2.1. External Financing of Firms in China 6
2.2. Definitions of Political Connection 7
2.3. State-owned Enterprises 11
2.4. Structure and Composition of Syndicated Loans 13
3. Hypotheses Development 15
4. Data and Research Design 20
4.1. Sample Selection 20
4.3. Empirical Model 22
5. Empirical Results 25
5.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Analysis 25
5.2. Test of Hypotheses H1 & H2 34
5.3. Test of Hypothesis H3 40
5.4. Test of Hypothesis H4a 43
5.5. Test of Hypothesis H4b 45
6. Additional Analyses 47
6.1. Alternative Measures of Political Connections 47
6.2. The Election Effect on the Relation Between Political Connections and Syndicated Loan Terms 50
7. Conclusions 56
7.1. Conclusions 56
7.2. Limitations and Suggestions 58
References 60

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