臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年在快速變遷的經濟環境中，國內企業的公司治理評鑑及信用風險逐漸受到重視，也被當作為外界評價一家企業的參考，而除了參考公正客觀之衡量依據外，在企業中高階管理者因扮演著營運發展決策的重要人物，對於董事長的異動亦受關注，且台灣傳統華人社會也存在多數的家族企業或董事長兼任總經理(簡稱CEO雙重性)掌握控制權之情形，故本研究探討董事長異動、公司治理評鑑及信用評等三者之關連性，透過實證結果顯示，企業的公司治理評鑑結果愈佳，其信用評等結果就愈好，而家族企業在CEO雙重性下，董事長異動與信用評等呈現負相關，表示兼任總經理的董事長異動後，信用評等等級下降，會有較佳的信用評等結果。

In recent years, in the rapidly changing economic environment, corporate governance evaluation and credit rating of domestic enterprises are gradually being emphasized and used as a reference for external evaluation of an enterprise. In addition, corporate governance evaluation and credit rating were regarded as a fair and objective measurement basis, the senior management of an enterprise plays an important role in operational development decisions and the change of the chairman of the board of directors is also a concern. In Taiwan, there are many family businesses or CEO duality (Doubled chairman and General Manager) who be hold the control.
Therefore, this study investigate the correlation between chairperson turnover, corporate governance evaluation, and credit rating.
The empirical results of this study show that : The better the results of corporate governance evaluation, the better the results of its credit rating. In family business, turnover of CEO duality is negatively correlated with the credit rating. The chairman who is the CEO duality changes, and the credit rating code declines.

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
圖次 V
表次 VI
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構及流程 4
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 信用評等 6
第二節 公司治理 8
第三節 公司治理與信用評等 13
第四節 董事長異動與信用評等 16
第參章 研究方法 20
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 20
第二節 研究變數 20
第三節 研究模型 22
第肆章 實證結果與分析 23
第一節 敘述性統計 23
第二節 Pearson及Spearman相關係數分析 25
第三節 迴歸估計結果分析 28
第伍章 結論與建議 35
參考文獻 37
一、中文部分 37
二、英文部份 38

圖1-1研究流程圖 5

表2-1 信用評等對照表 7
表2-2 OECD 公司治理原則 8
表2-3 2022年公司治理評鑑指標及各構面的權重 12
表4-1敘述性統計 24
表4-2 Pearson相關係數 26
表4-3 Spearman相關係數 27
表4-4 迴歸估計表(不分組) 28
表4-5 迴歸估計表(非家族企業，CEO雙重性) 29
表4-6 迴歸估計表(非家族企業，非CEO雙重性) 30
表4-7 迴歸估計表(家族企業，CEO雙重性) 31
表4-8 迴歸估計表(家族企業，非CEO雙重性) 32

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