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研究生:謝劭偉
研究生(外文):Hsieh, Shao-Wei
論文名稱:綠色商標與銀行貸款合約:以美國公司為例
論文名稱(外文):Green Trademark and the Cost of Bank Loans: Evidence on U.S. Public Firms
指導教授:邱婉茜
指導教授(外文):Chiu, Wan-Chien
口試委員:潘虹華林瑞嘉
口試委員(外文):Pan, Huang-HuaLin, Jui-Chia
口試日期:2022-06-30
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立清華大學
系所名稱:計量財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2022
畢業學年度:110
語文別:英文
論文頁數:41
中文關鍵詞:綠色商標銀行借貸決策銀行貸款成本綠色營運政策
外文關鍵詞:Green trademarkBank lending decisionBank loan costGreen policy
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  • 下載下載:24
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此篇論文使用2013至2016年間的美國經營上市非金融產業之企業作為樣本,研究綠色商標申請對企業之銀行貸款成本的影響。現有研究表明銀行的貸款決策與環境議題息息相關,因為銀行可能面對至少三個與借款人對環境議題持有的態度所相關的風險來源。然而多數文獻並非使用經過認證對環境有益的綠色活動,而是使用來自企業對 CSR 活動自我揭露的 ESG 評級來衡量企業綠色環境保護政策的執行進度 (即企業對環境議題持有的態度)。此篇研究新穎之處在於透過辨識綠色商標用以衡量企業的綠化程度,特別是在處理環境議題的綠色形象和綠色活動方面。我假設銀行可以為具有對綠色營運政策更有利的企業提供更好的貸款條件,並進一步假設《巴黎協定》可能會影響銀行在評估貸款時面對企業借款人與環境議題相關風險所做出的回應。實證結果提供薄弱的證據支持企業因有實際的綠色作為(以綠色商標來衡量)才獲得更便宜之貸款成本的獎勵,然而在 2015 年《巴黎協定》批准後,銀行卻沒有在評估貸款時面對企業借款人與環境議題相關風險做出回應。
This study examines the impact of green trademark applications on the bank loan cost for non-financial and public-listed firms operated in U.S. from 2013 to 2016. The extant studies have documented that banks’ lending decisions are environmentally sensitive due to their exposure to at least three sources of risks associated with borrowers’ environmental attitudes. However, most literature typically use ESG rating sourced from a firm’s self-disclosure of CSR activities to assess a firm’s progress of implementing green policies (e.g., environmental attitudes) instead of using verified green activities. In my study, the novelty is to identify green trademarks to capture a firm’s greenness, particularly on green image and green activities that tackle environmental problems. I then hypothesize that banks may provide better terms for a firm with more favorable green policies and that the Paris Agreement may affect the response from banks to their borrowers’ environmental risk in pricing loans. My empirical finding provides some evidence that firms are indeed rewarded for being green (proxied by green trademarks) in the form of cheaper loans; however, after the Paris Agreement, banks do not respond their borrowers’ environmental risk in pricing loans.
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 5
2.1 Why would banks care about greenness? 5
2.1.1 Credit risk to lenders 5
2.1.2 Reputation risk to lenders 6
2.1.3 Lender Liability Laws 6
2.1.4 Transition risk 7
2.2 Bank loan contracts and borrower greenness 9
2.3 The Paris Agreement 10
3. Data Description 12
3.1 Data source 12
3.2 Trademark data 12
3.3 Green trademark 13
3.3.1. Procedure of identifying a green trademark 13
3.3.2. Example green trademark: SPACE HIPPIE (owner: Nike Inc.) 14
3.3.3. Green trademark measure at firm-year level 15
3.4 Bank loan data 15
3.5 Summary statistics 16
4. Empirical Analysis 17
4.1 Baseline regression 17
4.2 The Paris Agreement: Difference-in-differences tests 19
5. Conclusion and future research 20
5.1 Summary 20
5.2 Future research 21
References 22
Appendix A. Green Dictionary 24
Appendix B. Procedure for the Identification of Green Trademark 25
Appendix C. Variable Description 32
Bellon, A. (2021). Fresh start or fresh water: Collateral, lender environmental liability and the pollution-employment tradeoff. Lender Environmental Liability and The Pollution-Employment Tradeoff (June 30, 2021).

Carney, M. (2015). Breaking the tragedy of the horizon–climate change and financial stability. Speech given at Lloyd’s of London, 29, 220-230.

Chava, S. (2014). Environmental externalities and cost of capital. Management science, 60(9), 2223-2247.

Choy, S., Jiang, S., Liao, S., & Wang, E. (2021). Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants. Emma, Public Environmental Enforcement and Private Lender Monitoring: Evidence from Environmental Covenants (May 30, 2021).

Degryse, H., Goncharenko, R., Theunisz, C., & Vadasz, T. (2021). When green meets green. Available at SSRN 3724237.

Delis, M. D., De Greiff, K., & Ongena, S. (2019). Being stranded with fossil fuel reserves? Climate policy risk and the pricing of bank loans. Climate Policy Risk and the Pricing of Bank loans (September 10, 2019). EBRD Working Paper, (231).

EUIPO (2021), Green EU trade marks. Accessible at:
https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnelweb/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2021_Green_EU_trade_marks/2021_Green_EU_trade_marks_FullR_en.pdf

Fatica, S., Panzica, R., & Rancan, M. (2021). The pricing of green bonds: are financial institutions special?. Journal of Financial Stability, 54, 100873.

Fink, C., Smarzynska Javorcik, B., & Spatareanu, M. (2005). Income-related biases in international trade: what do trademark registration data tell us?. Review of World Economics, 141(1), 79-103.

Ghisetti, C., Montresor, S., & Vezzani, A. (2021). Design and environmental technologies: Does ‘green-matching’ actually help?. Research Policy, 50(5), 104208.

Ivanov, I., Kruttli, M. S., & Watugala, S. W. (2021). Banking on carbon: Corporate lending and cap-and-trade policy. Available at SSRN 3650447.

Kacperczyk, M. T., & Peydró, J. L. (2021). Carbon emissions and the bank-lending channel. Available at SSRN 3974987.

Mueller, I., & Sfrappini, E. (2021). Climate Change-Related Regulatory Risks and Bank Lending. IWH-Halle Working paper.

Reghezza, A., Altunbas, Y., Marques-Ibanez, D., d’Acri, C. R., & Spaggiari, M. (2021). Do banks fuel climate change?.

Sufi, A. (2007). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 629-668.
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