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研究生:陳玉配
研究生(外文):Yu-Pei Chen
論文名稱:公投綁大選會提高投票率嗎?一個遊戲化的實驗研究
論文名稱(外文):Does combining general election and electoral referendum increase the voter turnout? A gamified experimental study
指導教授:陳暐陳暐引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wei Chen
口試委員:何率慈陳儀沈智新
口試委員(外文):Shuay-Tsyr HoJI ChenChih-Hsin Sheen
口試日期:2022-01-14
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:農業經濟學研究所
學門:農業科學學門
學類:農業經濟及推廣學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2022
畢業學年度:110
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:公投綁大選投票率參加門檻遊戲化
外文關鍵詞:Combining general election and electoral referendumvoting rateparticipation quorumgamification
DOI:10.6342/NTU202200105
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:25
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  • 下載下載:5
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
公投機制中的門檻制度會使選民投票率下降。為了解決公投投票率低的問題,有些國家會合併舉行公投與其他選舉來提升投票率,不過關於此作法能否提升投票率的證據仍相當稀少。過去的研究皆為自然實驗或準實驗,不是隨機對照試驗,也無法探討其他影響投票率的因素與合併投票的交互作用。本研究以實驗室實驗的方式,探討公投綁大選是否會提高投票率,並同時討論門檻的存在、政治立場相同的人數多寡對於投票率的影響,並以遊戲化語言進行實驗說明,使用 BDM (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak) 法為核心方式蒐集受試者的願付價格,以多元線性迴歸模型分析投票意願。實驗結果顯示,公投綁大選能有效提升選民投票率,且至少能增加公投或大選其中一場的投票率,不過,公投綁大選也降低了社會福利程度,使多數方選民的獲勝率降低;結果同時也顯示參加門檻確實會降低選民投票率、相對多數方選民的投票意願較少數方更高,但門檻只會降低相對少數方選民的投票意願,對相對多數方選民並無影響。
Participation quorum, a common quorum rule to justify representativeness in modern referenda, has been shown to discourage turnout rate. To offset the discouragement, concurrent elections are widely used in some democratic institutions to increase the turnout of a referendum. Although some research have estimated how the concurrent elections could increase turnout rate by natural experiments or quasi-experiments, few efforts have been devoted to randomized controlled trial, not to mention the effect of extraneous factors. In this study, we conduct a gamified laboratory experiment to verify the influence on turnout between two concurrent elections, or more specifically, between a general election (without quorum) and a referendum (with quorum). Our results confirm that concurrent elections promote turnout in at least one election but lower social welfare. We also observe that participation quorum only decreases the turnout for minority group instead of majority group.
致謝i
摘要ii
Abstract iii
目錄iv
圖目錄vi
表目錄vii
第一章緒論1
第二章研究方法5
2.1 實驗設計. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 實驗過程. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
第三章假說11
3.1 參加門檻的存在與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 政治傾向相同的選民人數多寡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 兩場選舉同時舉辦與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
第四章實驗結果14
4.1 參加門檻的存在與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 政治傾向相同的選民人數多寡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 公投綁大選與否. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1 同時提升大選與公投的投票率. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.2 至少促進公投或大選其中一場選舉. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3.3 單獨增加公投(大選) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4 個別受試者分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5 社會福利分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
第五章結論與建議26
參考文獻28
附錄A — 設計參數33
A.1 分組配置. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
附錄B — 實驗說明、小測驗題目以及試後問卷35
B.1 實驗說明– 以下範例為控制組. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B.2 實驗小測驗題目– 以下範例為綁大選組. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
B.3 試後問卷. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
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