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研究生:陳文豪
研究生(外文):Chen, Wen-Hao
論文名稱:友善董事、董事會多樣性與企業創新之關聯性:以台灣資訊電子產業為例
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship among Friendly Directors,Board Diversity and Innovation: An Empirical Analysis of the Electronic Industry in Taiwan
指導教授:蕭莉芃蕭莉芃引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiao, Li-Peng
口試委員:鄭哲惠葛俊佑
口試委員(外文):ZHENG, ZHE-HUIGE, JUN-YOU
口試日期:2022-06-29
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2022
畢業學年度:110
語文別:中文
論文頁數:86
中文關鍵詞:友善董事董事會特性企業創新
外文關鍵詞:Friendly BoardBoard CharacteristicsInnovation
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
從代理理論的角度,董事會主要職能分為監督與諮詢兩大功能,過去公司治理改革著重於提升董事會之監督效果,而忽略諮詢效果可能會使得獨立董事,因管理階層提供特定資訊,而干預管理決策,進而阻礙資訊傳遞。友善董事會經常被視為是軟弱且對管理階層過於友好,然而Kang et al. (2018)之研究結果指出友善董事會提高了董事會的諮詢效果,進而提高企業創新及企業價值。董事會特性有助於監督管理層的決策制訂過程,確保決策的執行效果,因此董事會特性亦會影響企業之創新活動。
本研究以2006年至2020年台灣上市上櫃之資訊電子業公司為研究對象,以公司研發費用率作為企業創新之代理變數,資料來源取自台灣經濟新報社資料庫及年報資訊。實證結果發現,電子業之董事會友善性代理變數董事長與總經理兼任比例愈高,能有助於企業間資訊的流通,促進企業創新;電子業之董事其獨立性較高,能有效提升管理監督之職責,提升企業創新;電子業董事會專業性愈高,企業創新愈低;電子業之董事其任期若高於平均值會使企業創新提高;電子業之董事具有高知識學歷,能輔佐企業在諮詢及想法方面,能增進企業創新之活動。

From the perspective of agency theory, the main functions of the board of directors are divided into two major functions: supervision and consultation. In the past, corporate governance reforms focused on improving the supervision effect of the board of directors, while ignoring the effect of consultation may cause independent directors to interfere with management decision-making because the specific information provided by management, thereby hindering the transfer of information. Friendly boards are often seen as weak and too friendly to management, however, Kang et al. (2018) found that friendly boards improved board advisory effectiveness, which in turn to increase corporate innovation and corporate value. The characteristics of the board of directors can help supervise the decision-making process of the management and ensure the implementation of the decision-making effect. Therefore, the characteristics of the board of directors will also affect the innovation activities of the enterprise.
This research takes the listed electronic companies in Taiwan from 2006 to 2020 as the research object and uses the company's R&D expense rate as the proxy variable for corporate innovation. The empirical results show that the higher the proportion of the chairman of the board of directors who is also the general manager can help the circulation of information among enterprises and promote enterprise innovation; the independence of directors in the electronic industry is higher, which can effectively improve management supervision. The higher the professionalism of the board of directors in the electronic industry, the lower the innovation of the enterprise; the tenure of directors in the electronic industry is higher than the average, the innovation of the enterprise will be improved; the higher the education of the board of directors in the electronic industry, the higher the innovation of the enterprise.

內容目錄
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
誌謝辭 v
內容目錄 vi
表目錄 viii
圖目錄 ix
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 5
第三節 研究流程 5
第四節 論文架構 7
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 企業創新 8
第二節 友善董事與企業創新 9
第三節 董事會特性與企業創新 11
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究架構 24
第二節 研究假說 24
第三節 實證模型及變數定義 30
第四節 樣本選取與資料來源 36
第五節 資料分析方法 37
第四章 實證結果與分析 38
第一節 敘述性統計分析 38
第二節 相關係數分析 40
第三節 多元線性迴歸結果分析 43
第四節 敏感性分析 46
第五章 結論與建議 55
第一節 研究結論 55
第二節 研究限制與建議 57
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