臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

證言在信念形成及知識獲取的過程中，具備什麼知態地位？針對這個問題，有兩個互相對立的觀點：傳遞觀點與非傳遞觀點。作為傳統以來的主流想法，傳遞觀點主張：聽者的證言信念之知態證成，只能經由說者的信念之證成傳遞而來，證言傳遞的過程本身並不能為信念生成新的證成。然而，Jennifer Lackey (1999, 2008)提出數個反例來挑戰這個傳統的傳遞觀點。Lackey同時也藉此進一步指出證言本身能夠為信念生成新的證成。本文的目的在於詳細討論與深入檢視傳遞觀點與非傳遞觀點各自的理論預設，並分析兩方提出之論證與案例，進一步評價這兩個觀點。

What is the epistemic status of testimony in the process of belief-forming and knowledge-acquiring? The transmission view of testimony, a traditionally well-received view, maintains that testimonial beliefs formed by hearer are epistemically justified only if the original belief from the speaker has already been epistemically justified. That is to say, testimonial justification is transmitted from speaker rather than generated by testimony itself. However, Jennifer Lackey (1999, 2008) argues against the transmission view of testimony based on several counter-examples, and further proposes a non-traditional view by claiming the generative feature of testimony. In this thesis, I discuss the presumptions, arguments, and examples raised by the transmission view and the non-transmission view respectively. In the end, I also intend to evaluate the two different views, by carefully analyzing their accounts, and to show what exactly the epistemic status of testimony is.

緒論 1
第一章 研究動機與問題意識 3
第一節 證言是什麼？ 3
第二節 證言的知識論議題 17
第三節 「證言的知態地位」問題 24
第二章 傳統的證言知識論問題 32
第一節 證言知識的還原論 33
第二節 證言知識的非還原論 41
第三節 證言知識論問題的當代轉向 48
第三章 證言的傳遞觀點 55
第一節 「證言的知態地位」有什麼問題？ 56
第二節 證言的知態地位：傳統的傳遞觀點 58
第三節 證言的傳遞觀點之論題重構 61
第四章 證言的非傳遞觀點 72
第一節 說者不具備信念的反例 72
第二節 說者的信念不具備證成的反例 75
第三節 傳遞觀點的回應及其討論 78
結論 96
參考書目 99

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