臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

如何將創辦人辛苦創建的江山順利且明智地傳承下去是不容忽視且值得深思的議題。本研究探討政商關係對家族企業接班人之選擇與接班初期績效的影響，一窺具政商關係之家族企業的世界。
本研究以2003年至2019年間之台灣上市上櫃家族企業中，歷經接班之企業為研究樣本。研究期間為接班時點之前後年度，另延伸觀察至接班後3年。採用選任模型與績效模型分別檢驗政商關係對家族企業接班人之選擇的影響，以及於良好政商關係條件下，家族企業接班人之選任對企業績效的影響。
研究結果發現，在退位者具有良好之政治關聯而接班人未具備時，選擇交由家族成員繼任的可能性較專業經理人高。而在接班人有政治關聯且退位者不具備時，則由專業經理人擔任繼承人的機率較高。此外，觀察退位者政商關係對接班人績效的影響，未發現兩者明顯有關。然而，在政商關係僅存在於接班人的情況下，觀察期間延長，政商關係則能對接班初期績效產生正面的影響。

How to handle the succession of the enterprise that is established devotionally by the founder successfully and wisely has become a more and more significant and worth pondering issue. This study explores the influence of political connections on the choice of the successors and their initial performances, and provides a chance to get a glimpse of the world of the family firms with political connections.
The samples are selected from the listed family firms which have experienced the succession in Taiwan during 2003 to 2019. The study period is one year before to one year after the succession year, a total of three years. Moreover, we extend the observation period to three years after the succession year. The selection model and the performance model are used to test the influence of political connections on the choice of the successors, and the different selection of the successors on the initial performances in family firms.
The results indicate that if the chairman of the board has political connections while the successor doesn’t, there is a higher chance for family members to be the successor. However, if the successor has political connections while the chairman of the board doesn’t, there is a higher chance for non-family competent professionals to be the successor. Furthermore, observing the influence of the political connections on the initial performance, it is not found that the political connections of the chairman of the board are significantly related to the successors’ performances. However, if the political connections only exist in the successor, it can make a positive impact on the initial performance while extending the observation period to three years after the succession year.

目錄

謝辭 ---I
中文摘要 ---II
英文摘要 ---III
目錄 ---IV
圖目錄 ---V
表目錄 ---VI
第壹章、緒論 ---1
第一節 研究背景與動機 ---1
第二節 研究目的 ---3
第三節 研究架構 ---4
第貳章、文獻探討 ---6
第一節 家族企業接班人選 ---6
第二節 政商關係與企業績效 ---8
第三節 CEO更換與企業績效 ---11
第參章、研究設計 ---13
第一節 研究假說 ---13
第二節 實證模型 ---14
第三節 變數衡量 ---16
第四節 研究期間與樣本選取 ---21
第肆章、實證結果分析 ---22
第一節 敘述性統計 ---22
第二節 迴歸結果分析 ---27
第三節 額外測試 ---32
第四節 敏感性測試 ---36
第伍章、結論與建議 ---38
第一節 研究結論 ---38
第二節 管理意涵與研究貢獻 ---39
第三節 研究限制與建議 ---40
參考文獻 ---41

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