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研究生:李承翰
研究生(外文):Lee, Chen-Han
論文名稱:獨立董事聲譽誘因是否能抑制公司欺詐風險?
論文名稱(外文):Do Reputation Incentives for Independent Directors Reduce the Risk of Corporate Fraud ?
指導教授:楊朝旭楊朝旭引用關係
指導教授(外文):Young, Chaur-Shiuh
口試委員:黃炳勳周庭楷
口試委員(外文):Huang, Ping-HsunChou, Ting-Kai
口試日期:2023-05-30
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2023
畢業學年度:111
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:獨立董事聲譽誘因欺詐風險
外文關鍵詞:independent directorreputation incentivefraud risk
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:47
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  • 下載下載:9
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本研究藉由衡量財務指標與非財務指標之間的偏離(DIFF)以探討獨立董事聲譽誘因如何影響公司的欺詐風險。本研究認為獨立董事會根據每個董事職位的聲譽誘因,不平等地分配時間和精力給多個董事職位。因此,本研究假設獨立董事會根據聲譽誘因的高低將他們的時間和精力分配給多個董事職位。研究結果顯示:獨立董事會優先將努力分配給具有較高聲譽誘因的董事職位以抑制公司欺詐風險。整體而言,聲譽誘因對於獨立董事如何抑制公司欺詐風險,扮演了一個重要的角色。
The purpose of this research is to determine if decreasing corporate fraud risk is associated with increasing reputational incentives for independent directors. Differences between financial and non-financial performance indicators are used to assess the likelihood of corporate fraud (DIFF). Independent directors will give preference to one directorship over another because of the reputation incentives it offers, I argue. My hypothesis is that corporate fraud risk is lower (higher) in companies where the independent directors receive a high (low) reputation incentive. Based on my findings, corporate fraud risk is typically lower in businesses with independent directors who have strong reputation incentive structures in place. My research adds to the body of knowledge by demonstrating that the firm benefits greatly from the reduced likelihood of corporate fraud brought about by the reputation incentives inherent in the directorships of independent directors.
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 3
2.1 財務指標和非財務指標(NFM)的偏離與欺詐風險的相關文獻 3
2.2 獨立董事聲譽誘因相關文獻 4
2.3 假說發展‐獨立董事聲譽誘因可以抑制公司欺詐風險嗎? 6
第三章 樣本選擇與研究設計 7
3.1 樣本選擇與資料來源 7
3.2 實證模型 9
3.3.1 公司欺詐風險衡量 11
3.3.2 獨立董事聲譽誘因衡量 12
3.3.3 控制變數衡量 13
第四章 實證結果分析 17
4.1 敘述性統計和相關性 17
4.2 迴歸結果 20
第五章 額外測試 21
5.1 使用羅吉斯迴歸進行欺詐風險的實證分析 21
5.2 刪除具有較大欺詐風險的產業別 23
5.3 獨立董事聲譽誘因的替代臨界值 26
5.4 傾向得分匹配 28
5.5 審計委員會與公司欺詐風險 31
5.6 獨立董事成員專業背景 33
第六章 結論與建議 35
參考文獻 38
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