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研究生:高梓鈞
研究生(外文):KAO, TZU-CHUN
論文名稱:論我國ESG揭露相關法制─以自願揭露及強制揭露之論辯為中心
論文名稱(外文):A Critic Research on Disclosure of ESG Focusing on the Debate of Voluntary Disclosure Versus Mandatary Disclosure
指導教授:莊永丞莊永丞引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHUANG, YUNG-CHENG
口試委員:張心悌郭大維
口試委員(外文):Chang, Hsin-TiKuo, Ta-Wei
口試日期:2023-06-19
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:法律學系
學門:法律學門
學類:一般法律學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2023
畢業學年度:111
語文別:中文
論文頁數:144
中文關鍵詞:ESG強制揭露自願揭露氣候揭露提案證券市場機制重大性硬資訊軟資訊前瞻性陳述永續報告書
外文關鍵詞:ESGMandatory DisclosureVoluntary DisclosureEnhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for InvestorsSecurity Market MechanismMaterialityHard InformationSoft InformationForward Looking StatementsSustainability Reports
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要求強制揭露ESG資訊之呼聲此起彼落,態度相對保守之SEC亦已於2022年3月提出強制揭露氣候變遷資訊之氣候揭露提案,ESG資訊之強制揭露似已箭在弦上,不得不發,引發本文探討ESG資訊應否強制揭露之興趣,即自證券交易法下資訊揭露法制出發,ESG資訊應否採行強制揭露?然,探討本文之議題前必先確定ESG所指為何,雖目前仍眾說紛紜而無明確定義,惟本文認為ESG應係投資人進行投資分析之因子、識別與管理風險之工具。隨後本文分析SEC氣候揭露提案,整理並歸納氣候揭露提案要求公司揭露之資訊約為7大類資訊:氣候相關風險;氣候相關資訊對公司之策略、商業模式及前景之影響;因應氣候變遷之公司治理;因應氣候變遷之風險管理;財務報表指標;溫室氣體排放指標;氣候相關目標,又可再細分為21小類資訊。
其次,本文自資訊揭露法制出發,從效率資本市場假說、詐欺市場理論可知,證券市場係反映過去歷史資訊與現在已公開之資訊,然未包含現在未公開之資訊。自證券價格反映資訊之機制可知,證券市場係仰賴資訊交易者作為證券價格之糾正機制,資訊揭露法制應著重於降低資訊交易者之成本與風險,藉此提升市場效率,達資源有效分配之最終目的。又,重大性係為降低公司揭露成本,平衡強制揭露之效益與成本所設,重大性之判斷上將資訊區分為硬資訊、軟資訊二者,然,前瞻性陳述其性質與硬資訊、軟資訊截然不同,且不具重大性,是故,法律上資訊類型應區分為前瞻性陳述、硬資訊、軟資訊三者。
再者,談及ESG資訊,自然不能忽視最早建構ESG資訊揭露之歐盟法制,自2003年要求公司揭露非財務資訊以來,2014年再度擴張適用主體至大型企業,至2022年底,甚至再度擴張適用主體,僅排除微型企業,同時以永續發展資訊取代原有之非財務資訊,並決定自行發展永續報告標準並統一採行之。揭露ESG資訊相對保守之美國其發展歷史則相對不同,針對ESG資訊,其多以不同之行政命令要求揭露個別資訊,如透過Regulation S-K要求公司揭露董事會構成員、經營階層薪酬及審計委員會之結構等資訊,雖曾於2010年發布氣候風險揭露指南,惟遲至2022年3月方才發布氣候揭露提案,內容亦僅包含氣候變遷相關資訊而不含其餘環境領域、社會領域資訊。而我國自2014年起要求食品工業、化學工業及金融保險業編製企業社會責任報告書,並逐年擴大適用範圍,並於2021年更名為永續報告書,2022年甚將永續揭露指標從3項擴張至14項產業,同時要求專章揭露氣候變遷相關資訊。
此外,揭露法制上自願揭露與強制揭露之論辯早已於20世紀中期至末期掀起浪潮,其中,自願揭露法制之理論基礎在於透過投資人最壞假設與誘導自我揭露原則,市場即可賦予公司自願揭露之動機,無須強制揭露之介入。反之,強制揭露則自資訊公共財角度出發,認為強制揭露制度能有效避免社會浪費、補充反詐欺條款之不足,並可達資源有效分配之最終目標,並指出自願揭露之基礎──最壞假設與誘導自我揭露原則難以實現。
最後,本文認為,自願揭露與強制揭露制度並非不能並存,僅能擇一之關係,反之,自願揭露有其彈性高、具可取得性且適應力強之特點,強制揭露則有資訊準確性高、具高可比性之特點,二者應予並存,方可相互截長補短。具體並存之方式除單純同時採用外,亦應針對資訊之類型區別論之,前瞻性陳述因不具重大性且與資源有效分配、保護投資人之目的無直接關係而應採自願揭露模式,硬、軟資訊則應視是否具重大性而有不同,就通常該當重大性者採行規範性強制揭露,就可能該當重大性者則採行原則性強制揭露,通常不具重大性或是否該當重大性仍存在相當不確定性者亦不應強制揭露。
The call for mandatory disclosure of ESG information has been growing louder, with even the relatively conservative Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposing mandatory climate disclosure in March 2022. The disclosure of ESG information seems imminent and has sparked interest in whether ESG information should be mandatorily disclosed. Starting from the perspective of information disclosure regulations under securities laws, this article explores whether ESG information should be subject to mandatory disclosure. However, before discussing the issue at hand, it is necessary to determine what ESG refers to. Although there is still no clear definition, this article considers ESG as factors for investment analysis and tools for identifying and managing risks. The article then analyzes the SEC's climate disclosure proposal, which outlines seven categories of information that companies should disclose: Climate-related risks, Climate-related impacts on strategy, business model, and outlook, Governance, Risk management, Financial statement metrics, Greenhouse gas emissions metrics, and Targets and goals. These categories can be further divided into 21 subcategories of information.
Next, starting from information disclosure regulations, and based on the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and Fraud on the Market Theory, it is understood that the securities market reflects past historical information and currently publicly available information, excluding non-public information. It is also known that the securities market relies on information traders as a corrective mechanism for security prices. Information disclosure regulations should focus on reducing the costs and risks of information traders, thereby enhancing market efficiency and achieving the ultimate goal of efficient resource allocation. Materiality is used to balance the benefits and costs of mandatory disclosure and reduce the disclosure costs for companies. Information shall be classified into three types: forward-looking statements, hard information, and soft information. Forward-looking statements differ in nature from hard and soft information and are not considered material. Therefore, the types of information in legal terms should be classified into forward-looking statements, hard information, and soft information.
Furthermore, when discussing ESG information, it is essential to consider the EU legislation that was the earliest to establish ESG information disclosure. Since 2003, companies have been required to disclose non-financial information, and in 2014, the scope was expanded to include large undertaking. By the end of 2022, the scope was further expanded, excluding only micro-undertaking. The EU has also developed its sustainability reporting standards and implemented them uniformly. In contrast, the relatively conservative United States has taken a different approach to disclosing ESG information. Various executive orders have required the disclosure of specific information, such as board composition, executive compensation, and audit committee structure through Regulation S-K. Although climate risk disclosure guidelines were issued in 2010, it was not until March 2022 that the climate disclosure proposal was released, focusing only on climate change-related information and excluding other environmental and social information. In Taiwan, since 2014, the food industry, chemical industry, and financial and insurance industry have been required to prepare Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports, which have expanded in scope over the years. In 2021, they were renamed Sustainability Reports, and in 2022, the sustainability disclosure indicators were expanded from three to fourteen industries, including a specific chapter on climate change-related information.

In addition, the debate between voluntary and mandatory disclosure in the information disclosure regulations has been raging since the mid to late 20th century. The theoretical basis of voluntary disclosure is rooted in the Investors would assume the worst and the principle of self-induced disclosure, suggesting that market forces can motivate companies to disclose voluntarily without the need for mandatory intervention. On the other hand, mandatory disclosure is based on the perspective of information being a public good. It argues that mandatory disclosure can effectively prevent social waste, address the shortcomings of anti-fraud provisions, and achieve the ultimate goal of efficient resource allocation. It also points out that the foundation of voluntary disclosure—Investors would assume the worst and the principle of self-induced disclosure—is difficult to realize.
Finally, this article believes that voluntary and mandatory disclosure systems can coexist, and it is not a mutually exclusive relationship where only one can be chosen. Voluntary disclosure has the characteristics of flexibility, accessibility, and adaptability, while mandatory disclosure has the characteristics of high information accuracy and comparability. Both should be allowed to coexist to complement each other's strengths and weaknesses. In addition to simultaneously adopting both systems, differentiation based on the type of information should be considered. Forward-looking statements, which are not material and do not have a direct relationship with efficient resource allocation and investor protection, can be handled through voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, hard and soft information should be treated differently based on their materiality. Prescriptive disclosure requirements should be adopted for information deemed material, while principle-based disclosure can be used for information that may be material. Information that is generally not material or is subject to considerable uncertainty regarding its materiality should not be subject to mandatory disclosure.
目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究範圍限制與論文章節架構 2
第三節 研究目的 3
第四節 研究方法 4
第二章 ESG之概述 6
第一節 ESG之起源 6
第二節 ESG之內涵 7
第一項 投資分析因子 8
第二項 識別及管理風險之工具 8
第三項 企業社會責任(Corporate Social Responsibility)之同義詞? 9
第四項 意識形態偏好(Ideological Preference)? 10
第五項 小結 11
第三節 SEC之氣候揭露提案 12
第一項 氣候相關風險 13
第二項 氣候相關資訊對公司之策略、商業模式及前景之影響 15
第三項 公司治理 16
第四項 風險管理 17
第五項 財務報表指標 17
第六項 溫室氣體排放指標 19
第一款 溫室氣體排放之相關概念 19
第二款 溫室氣體排放指標之方法論及相關說明 21
第三款 範疇三排放之安全港及其他調整 22
第七項 氣候相關目標 22
第八項 小結 23
第四節 本章小結 26
第三章 揭露法制之探討 29
第一節 資訊揭露法制之初探 29
第一項 基礎理論概述 29
第一款 證券價格反映資訊之機制 31
第一目 證券市場參與者 31
第二目 市場參與者之行為模式與市場效率 33
第三目 應由資訊交易者擔任糾正機制之角色 34
第四目 資訊揭露法制降低成本及風險之機制 35
第二款 重大性 37
第三款 前瞻性陳述(Forward Looking Statement) 41
第二項 資訊類型及ESG資訊再剖析 47
第二節 各國現行ESG揭露法制現況 51
第一項 歐盟 51
第一款 第2003/51號指令 52
第二款 第2014/95號指令 53
第三款 第2022/2464號指令 56
第四款 小結 62
第二項 美國 64
第三項 臺灣 67
第一款 上市或上櫃公司編製與申報永續報告書作業辦法 67
第一目 2014年版本 68
第二目 2015年版本 69
第三目 2019年版本 69
第四目 2020年版本 70
第五目 2021年版本 70
第六目 2022年版本 70
第七目 小結 72
第二款 公司募集發行有價證券公開說明書應行記載事項準則 74
第三款 公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則 76
第四款 永續報告書是否為發行人依證券交易法規定申報或公告之財務報告及財務業務文件? 76
第三節 自願揭露與強制揭露之理論基礎 79
第一項 自願揭露之理論基礎 79
第二項 強制揭露之理論基礎 81
第四節 本章小結 86
第四章 ESG資訊與揭露法制之交錯 89
第一節 自願揭露與強制揭露並存之可能及價值 89
第一項 自願揭露與強制揭露並存之可能 89
第二項 自願揭露與強制揭露並存之價值 91
第一款 自願揭露之優勢 91
第一目 彈性 91
第二目 可取得性 93
第三目 適應力強 94
第四目 揭露制度之實驗室 95
第二款 強制揭露之優勢 97
第三款 動態揭露制度之質疑與回應 99
第四款 小結 100
第二節 揭露法制上之類型化處理 101
第一項 ESG中前瞻性資訊應採取自願揭露模式 101
第二項 硬、軟資訊應圍繞重大性採強制揭露模式 104
第三節 本章小結 110
第五章 結論 111
參考文獻 113
一、中文部分 113
二、外文部分 116


參考文獻
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13. 聯華電子,企業永續總覽,UMC,https://www.umc.com/zh-TW/CSR/sustainability_overview。
14. 謝方娪,綠色金融3.0 公司治理評鑑擬擴大為ESG評鑑,經濟日報,2022年9月26日,https://money.udn.com/money/story/5613/6641862。
15. 職場柑仔店,一次看懂2050淨零排放路徑及策略,影響台灣未來30年關鍵行動,就享知digiknow,2022年4月15日,https://www.digiknow.com.tw/knowledge/6258ee0d906b1。
16. 臺灣證券交易所,附表二-上市上櫃公司氣候相關資訊,證券暨期貨法令判解查詢系統,2022年9月22日,http://www.selaw.com.tw/Attach/Law/G0100517/18999/附表二-上市上櫃公司氣候相關資訊.pdf。
二、外文部分
(一)書籍
1. CALABRESI, GUIDO, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION, YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, LONDON, UK. (2016).
(二)期刊論文
1. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul C., Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479, 479-519 (2000).
2. Amir Amel-Zadeh, The Financial Materiality of Climate Change: Evidence from a Global Survey 1-34, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295184.
3. Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 499-572 (2020).
4. Armoura, John & Cheffins, Brian, Stock Market Prices and the Market for Corporate Control, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 761-820 (2016);
5. Bainbridge, Stephen M., Don't Compound the Caremark Mistake by Extending It to ESG Oversight, 77 BUS. LAW. 651, 651-77 (2022).
6. Beck, Hugh, Determining the Materiality of Earnings Forecasts Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in Helwig v. Vencor, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 111, 111-36 (2002).
7. Berg, Florian, Kölbel, Julian F & Rigobon, Roberto, Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings, 26 REVIEW OF FINANCE 1315, 1315-44 (2022).
8. Boot, Arnoud W.A. & Macey, Jonathan R., Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 356-93 (1990).
9. Case, David W., Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 379-442 (2005).
10. Cherry, Miriam A., The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 281-303 (2014).
11. Coffee, John C., Jr. & Sale, Hillary A., Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 707-83 (2009).
12. Coffee, John C., Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 717-53 (1984).
13. Cunningham, Lawrence A., Bainbridge, Stephen M., Berk, Jonathan, Bhagat, Sanjai & Black, Bernard S., The SEC's Misguided Climate Disclosure Rule Proposal, 41 BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY REPORT 1, 1-9 (2022).
14. Curtis, Quinn, Fisch, Jill & Robertson, Adriana Z., Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises?, 120 MICH. L. REV. 393, 393-450 (2021).
15. Diamond, Douglas W., Optimal Release of Information By Firms, 40 J. FIN. 1071, 1071-94 (1985).
16. Easterbrook, Frank H. & Fischel, Daniel R., Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669-715 (1984).
17. Eccles, Robert G. & Stroehle, Judith C., Exploring Social Origins in the Construction of ESG Measures 1-36, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3212685.
18. Estlund, Cynthia, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 351-407 (2011).
19. Fairfax, Lisa M., Dynamic Disclosure: An Exposé on the Mythical Divide Between Voluntary and Mandatory ESG Disclosure, 101 TEX. L. REV. 273, 273-337 (2022).
20. Fama, Eugene F., Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383-417 (1970).
21. Fisch, Jill E., Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 923-66 (2019).
22. Fischel, Daniel R. & Ross, David J., Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 503-53 (1992).
23. Fishman, Michael J. & Hagerty, Kathleen M., The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure, 105 Q.J. ECON. 427, 427-44 (1990).
24. Fox, Merritt B., Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335-1419 (1999).
25. Frankel, Richard M. & Li, Xu, Characteristics of a Firm's Information Environment and the Information Asymmetry between Insiders and Outsiders, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 229, 229-59 (2004).
26. Frey, John D., Updates to Regulation S-K Items 101 and 105, 81 LA. L. REV. 999, 999-1035 (2021).
27. Gadinisa, Stavros & Miazad, Amelia, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1401-77 (2020).
28. Georgiev, George S., The SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rule: Critiquing the Critics, 50 RUTGERS L. REC. 101, 101-30 (2022).
29. Georgiev, George S., Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 602-82 (2017).
30. Gilson, Ronald J. & Kraakman, Reinier, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 715-42 (2003).
31. Goshend, Zohar & Parchomovsky, Gideon, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 711-82 (2006).
32. Guttentag, Michael D., Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 207-58 (2013).
33. Hazen, Thomas Lee, Social Issues in the Spotlight: The Increasing Need to Improve Publicly-Held Companies’ CSR and ESG Disclosures, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 740, 740-96 (2021).
34. Ho, Virginia Harper & Park, Stephen Kim, ESG Disclosure in Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 249, 249-326 (2019).
35. Ho, Virginia Harper, "Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 59-112 (2010).
36. Ho, Virginia Harper, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 67-155 (2020).
37. Honigsberg, Colleen, Jackson, Robert J., Jr. & Wong, Yu-Ting Forester, Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence From the Jobs Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 293-334 (2015).
38. Jebe, Ruth, Corporate Sustainability Reporting and Material Information: An Empirical Study of Materiality under the GRI and Frameworks, 33 CONN. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-134 (2017).
39. Jebe, Ruth, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 645-702 (2019).
40. Kim, Sok Tae, Lin, Ji-Chai & Slovin, Myron B., Market Structure, Informed Trading, and Analysts' Recommendations, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 507, 507-24 (1997).
41. Kothari, S.P., Zhang, Liandong & Zuo, Luo, Disclosure Regulation: Past, Present, and Future 1-31, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4122664.
42. Leland, Hayne E., Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, 100 J. PUB. ECON. 859, 859-887 (1992).
43. LoPucki, Lynn M., Repurposing the Corporation Through Stakeholder Markets, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1445, 1445-1512 (2022).
44. Macey, Jonathan R. & Miller, Geoffrey P., Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1059-92 (1990).
45. Macey, Jonathan R., ESG Investing: Why Here? Why Now?, 19 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 258, 258-91 (2022).
46. Mack, Nicholas P., The COVID–19 Pandemic Highlighted the Need for Mandated ESG Disclosures: Now What?, 30 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 188, 188-224 (2022).
47. Mahoney, Paul G., Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047-1112 (1995).
48. Mahoney, Paul G., Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 623-70 (1992).
49. Mahoney, Paul G., The Economics of Securities Regulation: A Survey 1-74, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3910557.
50. Matsumura, Ella Mae, Prakash, Rachna & Vera-Munoz, Sandra C., To Disclose or Not to Disclose Climate-Change Risk in Form 10-K: Does Materiality Lie in the Eyes of the Beholder? 1-58, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986290.
51. Oesterle, Dale A., The Overused and Under-defined Notion of "Material" in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 167-207 (2011).
52. Oesterle, Dale Arthur, The Inexorable March toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 135-225 (1998).
53. Orcutt, John L., Investor skepticism v. investor confidence: Why the new research analyst reforms will harm investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 1-77 (2003).
54. Paredes, Troy A., Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-85 (2003).
55. Pollman, Elizabeth, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance 1-20 (Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-35), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479723.
56. Pollman, M. Elizabeth, The Making and Meaning of ESG 1-46 (U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 22-23), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4219857.
57. Rahmani, Youcef, ESG Information, ESG Investing Strategies and the Impact on Asset Prices 1-30, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4274325.
58. Ripken, Susanna Kim, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 139-204 (2006).
59. Romano, Roberta, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 387-562 (2001).
60. Rose, Amanda M., A Response to Calls for SEC-Mandated ESG Disclosure, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1821, 1821-56 (2021).
61. Roulstone, Darren T., Analyst Following and Market Liquidity, 20 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 551, 551-78 (2003).
62. Ruggie, John Gerard, The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation, 9 GLOBAL GOV. 301, 301-321 (2003).
63. Sale, Hillary A. & Thompson, Robert B., Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 487-552 (2015).
64. Schanzenbach, Max M. & Sitkoff, Robert H., Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 381-454 (2020).
65. Schwartz, Jeff, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 531-607 (2012).
66. Serafeim, George & Yoon, Aaron, Which Corporate ESG News Does the Market React To?, 78 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 59, 59-78 (2022).
67. Serafeim, George, ESG: Hyperboles and Reality 1-20 (Harvard Business School Research Paper Series Working Paper 22-031), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3966695.
68. Strine, Leo E., Jr., Smith, Kirby M. & Steel, Reilly S., Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1885-1922 (2021).
69. Szabó, Dániel Gergely & Sørensen, Karsten Engsig, New EU Directive on the Disclosure of Non-Financial Information (CSR), 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 307, 307-40 (2015).
70. Thel, Steve, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 219-98 (1994).
71. Wagner, Constance Z., Evolving Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the European Union Directive on Non-Financial Reporting, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 619, 619-708 (2018).
72. Williams, Cynthia A. & Nagy, Donna M., ESG and Climate Change Blind Spots: Turning the Corner on SEC Disclosure, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1453, 1453-85 (2021).
73. Winden, Andrew W., Jumpstarting Sustainability Disclosure, 76 BUS. LAW. 1215, 1215-64 (2021).
(三)法院判決
1. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
3. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation-Taj Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d 357, 368-71 (3rd Cir. 1993)
4. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Industry Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015).
5. Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993).
6. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164 (2nd Cir. 2004).
7. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1998).
8. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
9. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
10. U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998).
(四)報告資料
1. BAINBRIDGE, STEPHEN M. ET AL., PROPOSAL ON CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES FOR INVESTORS 1-20 (2022), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20126528-287180.pdf.
2. BAINBRIDGE, STEPHEN M. ET AL., PROPOSAL ON CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES FOR INVESTORS 1-9 (2022), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20132133-302619.pdf.
3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A RENEWED EU STRATEGY 2011-14 FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1-15 (2011), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0681&from=EN.
4. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING (METHODOLOGY FOR REPORTING NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION) 1-20 (2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01)
5. FISCH, JILL E. ET AL., RE: ENHANCEMENT AND STANDARDIZATION OF CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES FOR INVESTORS 1-18 (2022), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20130354-297375.pdf.
6. FORD, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REVIEW 1-36 (2022), https://s201.q4cdn.com/693218008/files/doc_downloads/key-disclosures/2022/Ford-ESG-Presentation_November-2022.pdf.
7. GUIDELINES ON NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING: SUPPLEMENT ON REPORTING CLIMATE-RELATED INFORMATION 1-30 (2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019XC0620(01)&from=EN.
8. KKS ADVISORS, COVID-19 AND INEQUALITY: A TEST OF CORPORATE PURPOSE 1-97 (2020), https://c6a26163-5098-4e74-89da-9f6c9cc2e20c.filesusr.com/ugd/f64551_a55c15bb348f444982bfd28a030feb3c.pdf.
9. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1-29 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf.
10. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE ENHANCEMENT AND STANDARDIZATION OF CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES FOR INVESTORS 1-490 (2022), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/33-11042.pdf.
11. TCFD, IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 1-82 (2017), https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-Amended-121517.pdf.
12. TCFD, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 1-66 (2017), https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf.
13. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, WHO CARES WINS CONNECTING FINANCIAL MARKETS TO A CHANGING WORLD 1-41 (2004), https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2004/stocks/who_cares_wins_global_compact_2004.pdf.
14. THE HOME DEPOT, ESG REPORT 2022 1-95 (2022), https://corporate.homedepot.com/sites/default/files/2022-10/2022_ESG_Report_final_4.pdf.
15. UNEP FI ASSET MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 1-153 (2005), https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_20051123.pdf.
16. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBLIC COMPANIES DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 1-66 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707967.pdf.
17. VERIZON, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) REPORT 2021 1-92 (2021), https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/Verizon-2021-ESG-Report.pdf.
(五)網路資料
1. Clayton, Jay, Remarks at Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee, Securities and Exchange Commission, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-statement-investor-advisory-committee-meeting-052120.
2. Diamond, Colin J., Gez, Maia, Herrick, Danielle, Kerschner, Seth, Mulry, Laura, Patel, Henrik, Rosamond, Victoria & Connellan, Clare, ESG Disclosure Trends in SEC Filings, Whitecase, available at https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/esg-disclosure-trends-sec-filings#takeaways.
3. Gensler, Gary, Prepared Remarks Before the Principles for Responsible Investment “Climate and Global Financial Markets” Webinar, Securities and Exchange Commission, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-pri-2021-07-28#_ftn5.
4. Grant, Mitchell, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Definition, Examples, and FAQ, Investopedia, available at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mandatory-binding-arbitration.asp.
5. Kenton, Will, Economies of Scale: What Are They and How Are They Used?, Investopedia, available at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp.
6. Lee, Allison Herren, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures, Securities and Exchange Commission, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures.
7. Legal Information Institute, Regulation S-K, Cornell Law School, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/regulation_s-k.
8. Morris, Alex, Idiosyncratic Rater Effect & 3 Biases That Hijack Performance Reviews, Employee Experience Magazine, available at https://www.emexmag.com/idiosyncratic-rater-effect-3-biases-that-hijack-performance-reviews/.
9. Peirce, Hester M., We are Not the Securities and Environment Commission - At Least Not Yet, Security and Exchange Commission, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-climate-disclosure-20220321.
10. Ramonas, Andrew, SEC Boosts Climate Disclosure Scrutiny Before Reporting Mandate, Bloomberg Law, available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-boosts-climate-disclosure-scrutiny-before-reporting-mandate?context=article-related.
11. SASB, Exploring Materiality, SASB, available at https://www.sasb.org/standards/materiality-map/.
12. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Securities and Exchange Commission, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-46.
13. The Investopedia Team, Economies of Scope: Definition, Example, and Importance, Investopedia, available at https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscope.asp.
14. United Nation Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, United Nation Global Compact, available at https://unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
15. United Nation Global Compact, Who We Are, United Nation Global Compact, available at https://unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc.
16. Wall Street Prep, Conservatism Principle, Wall Street Prep, available at https://www.wallstreetprep.com/knowledge/conservatism-principle/.
17. Warren, Zach, Upcoming SEC climate disclosure rules bring urgency to ESG data strategy planning, REUTERS, available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/upcoming-sec-climate-disclosure-rules-bring-urgency-esg-data-strategy-planning-2023-01-30/.
18. Watson, Liv, Data accuracy in sustainability reports, Workiva, available at https://www.workiva.com/blog/data-accuracy-sustainability-reports.
19. White, Thomas, SEC Amends Regulation S-K Disclosure Requirements, American Bar Association, available at https://businesslawtoday.org/month-in-brief/august-brief-securities-law-2020/.

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