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研究生:李佳臻
研究生(外文):LEE, KAH-JEN
論文名稱:具網路外部性下的從量與從價單位授權金之比較
論文名稱(外文):Per-unit versus Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing under Network Externalities
指導教授:陳宏易陳宏易引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN, HUNG-YI
口試委員:胡均立鍾暳陵
口試委員(外文):HU, JIN-LICHUNG, HUI-LING
口試日期:2023-06-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:國際經營與貿易學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:貿易學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2023
畢業學年度:111
語文別:中文
論文頁數:48
中文關鍵詞:網路外部性固定權利金授權從量單位權利金授權從價單位權利金授權
外文關鍵詞:Network externalitiesFixed-fee licensingPer-unit royalty licensingAd valorem royalty licensing
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本文探討產品具網路外部性下從量單位授權與從價單位授權的最適授權策略及其社會福利的比較。本文建立一雙占模型,考慮專利廠商與被授權廠商生產同質與完全相容的產品,專利廠商擬將其非劇烈創新專利技術授權予競爭對手,並於市場上從事 Cournot 競爭。本文發現,首先,當產品具網路外部性下,最適從量單位權利金授權可能為內解或角解,取決於創新程度的大小。其次,在創新程度小時,當網路外部性強度弱 (強),專利廠商偏好從價 (從量) 單位權利金授權;在創新程度大時,從量單位權利金授權優於從價單位權利金授權。第三,若與固定權利金授權的授權方式相比,在創新程度小時,當網路外部性強度弱 (強),專利廠商偏好從價單位權利金 (固定權利金) 授權;在創新程度大時,當網路外部性強度弱 (強),專利廠商偏好從量單位權利金 (固定權利金) 授權。第四,從社會福利的觀點來看,無論創新程度大小,隨著網路外部性強度越強,社會福利越高。第五,三種授權方式社會福利的比較,由高至低排序為固定權利金授權、從量單位權利金授權以及從價單位權利金授權。
This paper examines the optimal licensing strategy between per-unit royalty licensing and ad valorem royalty licensing under products with network externalities. This paper develops a Cournot duopoly model in which the patentee and licensee produce homogeneous products with network externalities. The patentee decides whether to license its non-drastic innovation technology to the rival firm. The results of this paper are as follows. First, when products with network externalities, the optimal royalty rate may be internal solution or corner solution, depending on the degree of innovation. Second, when the degree of innovation is low and the network externalities are small (large), the optimal licensing strategy for the patentee is to use ad valorem (per-unit) royalty licensing. However, when the degree of innovation is high, per-unit royalty is superior to ad valorem royalty licensing. Third, comparing with fixed-fee licensing, when the degree of innovation is low and the network externalities are small (large), the patentee prefers to use ad valorem royalty (fixed-fee) licensing. When the degree of innovation is high and the network externalities are small (large), the patentee prefers to use per-unit royalty (fixed-fee) licensing. Fourth, from the perspective of social welfare, regardless of the degree of innovation, the larger the network externalities are , the higher the social welfare will be. Finally , the ranking of social welfare among these three licensing methods, from high to low, is fixed-fee licensing, per-unit royalty licensing and ad valorem royalty licensing.

第一章 研究動機 1
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 網路外部性相關文獻 4
第二節 技術授權相關文獻 7
第三章 基本模型與不同授權行為下的均衡 10
第一節 授權未發生 11
第二節 固定權利金授權 14
第三節 從量單位權利金授權 18
第四節 從價單位權利金授權 25
第四章 最適授權策略 31
第一節 從量單位權利金授權與從價單位權利金授權之比較 31
第二節 三種授權方式利潤之比較 34
第五章 消費者剩餘與福利分析 39
第一節 三種授權方式與授權前的消費者剩餘分析 39
第二節 三種授權方式與授權前的社會福利分析 41
第六章 結論 44
參考文獻 46
中文參考文獻
王光正、蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2008),「網路外部性、商譽與市場失靈」,人文及社會科學集刊,2020,頁173-203。
王光正、吳宜謙、梁文榮 (2017),「訊息不對稱下的產業內授權行為」,經濟論文叢刊,45,頁639-674。
陳宏易、林虹妤、邱俊榮 (2006),「網路外部性與進口貿易政策的效果」,經濟論文,34,頁161-190。
郭平欣、曹古駒、邱靖珈、林燕淑 (2018),「產業外產品創新授權及福利分析」,經濟論文叢刊,46,頁619-644。
張瑞雲、黃鴻、彭正浩 (2020),「多產品下品質改善的技術授權」,經濟論文叢刊,48,頁547-572。
許至乙、張瑞雲、彭正浩 (2018),「垂直異質寡占市場之品質授權」,經濟論文叢刊,46,頁181-207。
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