臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討公司薪酬差距與公司經營績效之間的關係。以公司績效作為應變數，薪酬差距作為自變數，對2012到2021年台灣之上市公司進行迴歸分析。並在此基礎上研究了公司是否會因為公司治理與學歷之關係對此研究結果產生影響。
本文結果顯示，薪酬差距確實會對公司績效產生影響，且在不同產業有著不同之效果，本文將資料細分為電子業與非電子業，在電子業中，董監事、高管與基層員工的薪酬差距對於公司績效有著顯著正相關；相反的，在非電子業中，則是高管與基層員工的薪酬差距對於公司績效有著顯著相關性；在公司治理方面，董事長兼任總經理對於台灣上市公司只有在電子業有著顯著負相關；在學歷方面則是呈現出電子業與非電子業結果不同的結果，在電子業中高管學歷對於公司績效是呈現顯著負相關，然而在非電子業中則是呈現顯著正相關。

This study investigates the relationship between executive-employee compensation gap and firm performance among listed companies in Taiwan from 2012 to 2021.Firm performance is used as the dependent variable, and the compensation gap serves as the independent variable in the regression analysis. Additionally, the study explores how corporate governance and educational backgrounds may influence the relationship between pay gap and firm performance.
The results of this study indicate that the compensation gap does indeed impact firm performance, and its effects vary across different industries. The data is further categorized into the electronics industry and the non-electronics industry. In the electronics industry, there is a significant positive correlation between the compensation gap of directors, executives, and front-line employees and firm performance. Conversely, in the non-electronics industry, a significant correlation is observed between the compensation gap of executives and front-line employees and firm performance. Regarding corporate governance, the study finds a significant negative correlation between the dual roles of chairman and CEO only in the electronics industry among Taiwanese listed companies. As for educational backgrounds, the results differ between the electronics and non-electronics industries. In the electronics industry, there is a significant negative correlation between the educational background of executives and firm performance, whereas in the non-electronics industry, a significant positive correlation is observed.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 薪酬差距 7
第二節 公司治理 10
第三節 學歷 11
第三章 研究資料與方法 12
第一節 研究假說 12
第二節 變數定義 13
第三節 資料選擇與來源 15
第四節 模型設定 16
第四章 實證結果與分析 17
第一節 敘述統計表 17
第二節 相關係數表 19
第三節 迴歸分析 20
第五章 結論 34
第一節 研究結論 34
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 35
參考資料 37

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