臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文以2013年至2022年台灣上市（櫃）公司資料作為研究樣本，探討關係人交易與投資機會集對企業價值之影響，及投資機會集對關係人交易影響企業價值是否因而產生調節效果。過去研究指出關係人交易可能對公司價值產生正反兩種影響：若公司管理者有效運用關係人交易，降低資訊不對等所造成的交易成本讓公司利益最大化，能使企業價值提升，此為契約效率之觀點；倘若管理者因自身利益，以投機目的利用關係人交易獲取公司資源，危害利害關係人的利益，因而降低企業價值。投資機會集對企業價值亦具有正/負向影響，本論文係採用Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996 )提出之衡量方法，以投資密集度、資產市值成長率、研究發展費用對資產帳面價值比等三項變數，經因素分析法萃取得出IOS分數後，按十分位數轉換作為投資機會集之代理衡量變數，納入各類關係人交易對企業價值的影響進行迴歸估計；另亦探討投資機會集對關係人交易影響企業價值是否產生調節效果。
本論文結果實證顯示：(1)關係人交易對公司價值之影響，在應付關係人融資交易、關係人銷貨收入占資產總額比率，及應付關係人融資占資產總額比率等與企業價值呈顯著正相關。惟有無關係人交易、關係人進貨交易對企業價值有負面影響。(2)投資機會集與企業價值呈顯著正相關，顯示投資機會集愈大，公司成長性愈高，企業價值提升。(3)投資機會集對關係人交易影響企業價值具調節效果，呈負相關，且具統計顯著性，可能係因企業進行關係人交易基於自利欺騙目的，會危害股東利益，使企業整體價值降低。

This paper is based on the data of Taiwan's listed companies (OTC) from 2013 to 2022, to investigate the impacts of the related party transactions and the investment opportunity set on firm value, and whether the investment opportunity set moderates the influence of the related party transactions on firm value. The previous research indicates that the related party transactions may have both positive and negative impacts on the value of a company. From the perspective of contractual efficiency, the value of a company can be increased if the company's managers can effectively utilize the related party transactions to minimize the transaction costs caused by the information asymmetry and maximize the benefits of the company; if the managers utilize the related party transactions to acquire the corporate resources for speculative purposes and their own benefits; this will jeopardize the benefits of the related party, and thus reduce the firm value. The investment opportunity set also has both positive and negative impacts on firm value. This paper adopts the measurement method proposed by Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996), which uses three variables : investment intensity, market capitalization growth rate of assets, and research and development expenses to book value of assets, to extract IOS scores by factor analysis, and then converts them into proxy measures of the investment opportunity set by deciles, which are included in the regression estimation of the impacts of various types of the related-party transactions on firm value. In addition, the regression estimation of the impact of the related party transactions on firm value was also conducted to investigate whether the investment opportunity set moderates the impact of the related party transactions on firm value.
The empirical results of this paper indicate that: (1) The impact of the related party transactions on firm value is significantly positively correlated with firm value in terms of the financing payable to related parties, the ratio of sales revenue to total assets of the related parties, and the ratio of financing payable to total assets of the related parties. However, unrelated party transactions and related party purchase transactions had a negative impact on firm value. (2) The positive correlation between the set of investment opportunities and enterprise value indicates that the larger investment opportunities set, the higher company growth and the higher firm value. (3) The investment opportunity set has a moderating effect on the impact of the related party transactions on firm value, showing a negative correlation which is statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that companies engage in the related party transactions for self-interested and deceptive purposes, which jeopardizes the stockholders' benefits and reduces the overall firm value.

摘要 i
目錄 v
表次 vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第一節 關係人交易 3
第二節 投資機會集 5
第三節 企業價值 6
第三章 研究方法與假說 9
第一節 研究假說之建立 9
第二節 實證模型 13
第三節 變數定義 17
第四節 數據來源與樣本選取 22
第四章 實證結果分析 23
第一節 敘述性統計 23
第二節 相關係數分析 27
第三節 複迴歸分析 30
第四節 進一步測試 39
第五章 結論與建議 51
第一節 研究結論 51
第二節 研究限制與建議 52
參考文獻 53
附錄 變數定義表 60

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