臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘 要
本文探討混合寡占市場經濟決策並專注於混合寡占市場中在邊際成本遞增情況，廠商生產與污染防治方面如何進行決策以及政府在情境下如何制定最適污染稅。相對先前研究大多基於邊際成本固定的假設，為了更貼近實際經濟的現象，我們考慮了邊際成本隨著產量遞增的情況，觀察廠商的生產量與污染防治決策是否會有所改變，結果顯示在混合雙占市場存在邊際成本遞增的情況下，當污染防治的效率越高時，政府會制定較高的污染稅。同時，當邊際環境成本的遞增幅度提高時，政府也會制定更高的污染稅。此外，我們也觀察到與僅存在雙民營廠商的市場相比，這兩種市場狀況下的結果實際上是相同的。在雙民營廠商存在的寡占市場中，在邊際成本遞增幅度增加的情況下，若邊際環境損害增加，政府會制定較高的污染稅。污染防治效率越高時，政府也會制定較高的污染稅。最後探討一家公營廠商與多間民營廠商存在的市場，我們發現與過去相關文獻中不同的結果，邊際成本固定下，民營廠商的數量並不會影響政府制定污染稅，然而本文研究發現當民營廠商的數量越多，則政府制定的污染稅越低。本文研究結果提供了混合寡占市場下在邊際成本遞增假設下更深入的理解。

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to delve into the economic decision-making in mixed oligopolistic markets. We focus on how firms decide on production and pollution control under increasing marginal cost conditions in mixed oligopolistic markets, and how the government sets an optimal pollution tax under such circumstances. In contrast, most prior research has been based on the assumption of fixed marginal costs. In order to be more closely aligned with real economic phenomena, we consider situations where marginal costs increase with output, and observe whether firms' production and pollution control decisions change under such circumstances.Our research findings indicate that in a mixed duopoly market with increasing marginal costs, the government sets a higher pollution tax when the efficiency of pollution control is higher. At the same time, when the increasing rate of marginal environmental costs rises, the government also sets a higher pollution tax. In addition, we observed that the results under these two market conditions are actually the same as those in a market with only two private firms. In a mixed oligopoly market with two private firms, the government sets a higher pollution tax as the rate of increase in marginal cost and marginal environmental damage rises. When the efficiency of pollution control is higher, the government also sets a higher pollution tax.We then examined a market with one public firm and multiple private firms. We found results different from previous literature; under fixed marginal costs, the number of private firms does not affect the government's setting of pollution taxes. However, our study found that the more private firms there are, the lower the pollution tax set by the government. Our research findings provide a deeper understanding of mixed oligopoly markets, especially considering the case where marginal costs increase with output. In addition, our results also contribute to understanding how the government sets environmental policies, and how these policies affect the behavior of market participants.

目錄　　　　　　

中文摘要 ………………………………………………………….. i
英文摘要 ………………………………………………………….. ii
誌謝 ………………………………………………………….. iii
目錄 ………………………………………………………….. v

第1章、 緒論…………………………………………….1
1.1 研究動機與目的…………………………………..1
1.2 研究方法……………………………………………. 3
1.3 論文架構……………………………………………. 4
第2章、 文獻回顧………………………………….....4
第3章、 基本模型……………………….......... 10
3.1 模型設定………………………………………. 10
3.2 最適產量及污染防治量………………………………. 12
3.3. 最適污染稅…………………….…………………......... 18
3.4. 雙民營廠商最適產量與防治量………………….... 22
3.5 雙民營廠商最適污染稅............................. .....24
第4章、 一般化模型…………………………………………….. 25
4.1 多家民營廠商與一家公營廠商最適產量……………… 26
4.2 多家民營廠商與一家公營廠商最適污染稅…………… 28
第5章、結論與建議……………………………………………....... 31
5.1 結論................................................................ 31
5.2 建議................................................................. 32
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………...... 33

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