臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在當今高度數位化的世界中，全球定位系統（GPS）在許多關鍵領域扮演著不可或缺的重要角色。而民用GPS訊號架構本身具備的開放性和易於接入性導致了弱點的形成容易遭受GPS欺騙攻擊，也因此許多文獻提出了各種保護檢測機制來識別與緩解GPS欺騙攻擊。經過對現有文獻提出的「非同步GPS欺騙攻擊」進行研究，我們推論若將非同步GPS欺騙攻擊的時間資訊與當前的時間同步對齊，便能令原本非同步GPS欺騙攻擊無法產生效果的行動終端GPS接收器受到影響，以此結果也能推斷該行動終端GPS接收器可能具備時間相關的保護檢測機制。本論文的研究目的為建構一套能使非同步GPS欺騙的時間資訊與當前的時間同步對齊的方法，並以實驗測試驗證加入該方法的GPS欺騙對行動終端GPS接收器的攻擊成效。實驗中我們採用開源軟體gps-sdr-sim搭配軟體定義無線電BladeRF架設現有文獻提出之GPS欺騙攻擊的欺騙訊號發射器環境，讓行動終端GPS接收器獲取與使用欺騙訊號。實驗結果顯示經過時間對齊後的GPS欺騙攻擊，能夠有效地使原本文獻的GPS欺騙攻擊無法產生效果的行動終端GPS接收器受到影響，同時也較原本文獻提出之GPS欺騙攻擊的性能相比有顯著提升。

In today's highly digital world, the Global Positioning System (GPS) plays an indispensable role in many critical areas. However, the inherent openness and easy accessibility of civilian GPS signal architecture have led to vulnerabilities, making it susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Consequently, many studies have proposed various protection and detection mechanisms to identify and mitigate GPS spoofing attacks. After studying the "asynchronous GPS spoofing attack" proposed in existing literature, we infer that if the time information of the asynchronous GPS spoofing attack is synchronized with the current time, it can affect mobile terminals GPS receivers that were previously unaffected by asynchronous GPS spoofing attacks. This result also suggests that these mobile terminals GPS receivers might possess time-related protection and detection mechanisms. The objective of this study is to develop a method to synchronize the time information of asynchronous GPS spoofing with the current time. This method will be experimentally tested to verify the effectiveness of GPS spoofing attacks on mobile terminals GPS receivers when incorporating this synchronization technique. In the experiment, we used the open source software gps-sdr-sim and the software-defined radio BladeRF to set up a spoofing signal transmitter environment for GPS spoofing attacks proposed in existing literature, allowing mobile terminal GPS receivers to obtain and use spoofing signals. Experimental results show that the time-aligned GPS spoofing attack can effectively affect mobile terminals GPS receivers where the GPS spoofing attack in the original literature cannot be effective. At the same time, it is significantly better than the performance of the GPS spoofing attack proposed in the original literature.

摘要............................i
ABSTRACT.......................ii
致謝...........................iii
目錄............................iv
圖目錄..........................vi
表目錄..........................viii
壹、 緒論........................1
一、 研究背景.....................1
二、 研究動機.....................2
三、 背景知識.....................2
(一) 全球定位系統 (GPS)...........2
(二) GPS廣播星曆數據..............2
(三) GPS欺騙攻擊..................3
(四) 保護檢測機制.................3
四、 論文架構.....................3
貳、 全球定位系統與欺騙攻擊........5
一、 GPS系統架構..................5
二、 RINEX格式...................8
三、 文獻探討....................10
(一) 同步GPS欺騙攻擊.............10
(二) 非同步GPS欺騙攻擊............11
(三) 訊號功率監測.................12
(四) 資料一致性檢查...............13
(五) 慣性導航系統 (INS)...........13
參、 非同步GPS欺騙攻擊............14
一、 非同步GPS欺騙攻擊流程.........14
(一) gps-sdr-sim.................15
(二) BladeRF.....................18
二、 非同步GPS欺騙攻擊演示.........20
(一) 欺騙訊號生成與發送............20
(二) 行動終端欺騙攻擊..............23
三、 非同步GPS欺騙攻擊問題.........29
肆、 改良GPS欺騙攻擊...............31
一、 星曆複製延伸法.................31
(一) GPS廣播星曆數據修改............32
二、 改良GPS欺騙攻擊演示............34
(一) 欺騙訊號生成與發送.............34
(二) 行動終端欺騙攻擊...............39
三、 實驗項目與測試結果..............46
(一) 受測行動終端室外測試............48
(二) 定位資訊優先使用測試............49
(三) 攻擊花費時間比較測試............52
伍、 結論...........................56
陸、 參考文獻.......................57

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