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研究生:蔡宜庭
研究生(外文):TSAI,YI-TING
論文名稱:垂直相關市場、跨國持股與關稅政策
論文名稱(外文):Cross-border Shareholding and Tariff Policies in Vertically Related Markets
指導教授:楊雅博楊雅博引用關係
指導教授(外文):YANG,YA-PO
口試委員:李仁耀鄭義暉楊雅博
口試日期:2024-06-26
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2024
畢業學年度:112
語文別:中文
論文頁數:28
中文關鍵詞:從量關稅從價關稅交叉持股垂直相關市場
外文關鍵詞:ad valorem tariffspecific tariffcross-border shareholdingvertically related market
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本文建立一個垂直相關市場模型,在模型中,本國上游有一家原料供應商提供要素給一家位於國內及一家位於國外之廠商生產最終財,兩廠商在本國市場從事Cournot競爭,本國政府則對外國廠商之產品課徵進口從量或從價關稅,以比較從量關稅與從價關稅的福利效果。
本文發現,當本國將從量關稅改成從價關稅,亦即關稅簡化,且使得市場均衡的總產量維持不變時,本國最終財廠商的要素價格將會降低;若本國上游廠商對於外國最終財廠商的持股比例較小(大)於 56,外國最終財廠商的要素價格將會降低(提高)。本國最終財廠商的產量及利潤將會提高,外國最終財廠商的產量及營運利潤將會下降。本國上游廠商的利潤將會降低,而關稅收入將會提高。此外,若本國原料供應商未持股外國最終財廠商,則從價關稅的本國福利大於從量關稅。若本國原料供應商完全持股外國最終財廠商,則當外國廠商的生產產品的製程成本高(低)於本國廠商時,從價關稅的本國福利高(低)於從量關稅。
This research establishes a vertical related market model, where a domestic upstream raw material supplier provides inputs to a domestic and a foreign firm to produce final goods and engage in Cournot competition in the domestic market. The domestic government imposes either a specific or an ad valorem tariff on the foreign firm's products to compare the welfare effects of these two types of tariffs.
This research finds that when the domestic country switches from a specific tariff to an ad valorem tariff—thereby simplifying tariffs—and keeps the total market equilibrium output unchanged, the input price for the domestic final goods firm will decrease. If the domestic upstream firm’s shareholding in the foreign final goods firm is less (more) than 5/6, the input price for the foreign final goods firm will decrease (increase). The output and profit of the domestic final goods firm will increase, while the output and operating profit of the foreign final goods firm will decrease. The profit of the domestic upstream supplier will decline, but tariff revenue will increase. Moreover, if the domestic raw material supplier does not hold shares in the foreign final goods firm, the welfare of the domestic country is greater under an ad valorem tariff than under a specific tariff. If the domestic raw material supplier fully owns the foreign final goods firm, then when the production process cost of the foreign firm is higher (lower) than that of the domestic firm, the domestic welfare under an ad valorem tariff is higher (lower) than under a specific tariff.
中文摘要 ....................................................................................................................... I
英文摘要 .................................................................................................................... III
第壹章 緒論............................................................................................................ 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 .................................................................................... 1
第二節 參考文獻 ................................................................................................ 1
第三節 研究方法 ................................................................................................ 3
第貳章 模型設定與市場均衡................................................................................ 5
第一節 基本模型 ................................................................................................ 5
第二節 從量關稅下的市場均衡 ........................................................................ 6
第三節 從價關稅下的市場均衡 ...................................................................... 10
第參章 兩種關稅政策下的福利比較分析.......................................................... 16
第肆章 結論 .......................................................................................................... 22
參考文獻 .................................................................................................................... 24
陳宏易、楊雅博與王穎達(2022),關稅簡化、垂直差異化產品和社會福利,《經濟論文叢刊》,50:2 , 175– 215。
Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., & Marjit, S., (2013), Cross-border Mergers in Vertically Related Industries. European Economic Review, 59, 97-108.
Collie, D. R, (2006). Tariffs and subsidies under asymmetric oligopoly: ad valorem versus specific instruments. The Manchester school ,74(3),314-333.
Flath, D., (1989), Vertical Integration by Means of Shareholding Interlocks, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1989,7(3):369-380.
Fanti, L., (2016) Social Welfare and Cross-ownership in a Vertical Industry: When the Mode of Competition Matters for Antitrust Policy, Japan and the World Economy, 37, 8–16.
Jørgensen, J. G., & P. J. H. Schröder, (2005), Welfare-Ranking Ad Valorem and Specific Tariffs under Monopolistic Competition, Canadian Journal of Economics, 38(1), 228–241.
Kowalczyk, C., & S. E. Skeath, (1994), Pareto Ranking Optimal Tariffs under Foreign Monopoly, Economics Letters, 45, 355-359.
Lockwood, B. and K. Y. Wong, (2000), Specific and ad valorem tariffs are not equivalent in trade wars. Journal of International Economics ,52(1), 183-195.
Shea, K.L., & E. Y. P. Shea, (2006), On the Equivalence of Ad Valorem Tariffs and Specific Tariffs under Duopoly, Review of International Economics, 14(3), 445–451.
Skeath, S. E., & G. A. Trandel, (1994), A Pareto Comparison of Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes in Noncompetitive Environments, Journal of Public Economics, 53(1), 53–71.
Yang, Y. P., & L. F.S. Wang, & Q. Zhang, (2022), Tariff simplification, Privatization and Welfare Superiority, Metroeconomica, 73(2). p. 683-707.
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