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This thesis included two parts. In the first part of this
thesis, under theassumption of private property right, we
extended Cheung''s model(1969),byincorporating owned farms and
transaction cost in the general equilibrium modelof the choice
farm patterns. By comparative approach, the data of Chinese
farms(1920s-1940s) and of world census of agriculture(1970) were
used to test the above theoretical model . The major finding of
this study were that,firstly, there is no ranking of operation
efficiency on patterns of farms. Secondly, the view of Cheung,
that the share tenancy is as efficient as fixed-rentcontract
farms and wage contract farms, can not be sustained.The main
reason is that under different circumstance, the tenant and the
landlord would choice different patterns of contracts, in order
to reduce their transaction cost.In the second part of this
thesis, the assumption of private property rightwas relaxed, we
analysis the effect of government intervention on the patterns
of contract choice of farming. We use the new institutional
economic theory, especially the theory of institutional change
extended by North(1981,1990),to explain why, due to the
transaction cost ,there is a interaction relationship between
the institution choice and the contract choice.We also use
Dream-Tyan institution ,which was enforced from Bay-Wei Dynasty(
A. D. 485)to the middle Toan Dynasty(A. D.780), and the postwar
Taiwan agricultural land institution, as the case study to
explain the theory we haveextended. The major finding of the
second part of this thesis was that, due togovernment
intervention on the patterns of contract choice of farming ,the
transaction cost was increased.
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