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研究生:甘偵蓉
研究生(外文):Zhen-rong Gan
論文名稱:理解人權:一種修正羅爾斯人權觀的理論
論文名稱(外文):Understanding Human Rights: A Revised Rawlsian Conception of Human Rights
指導教授:謝世民謝世民引用關係許漢許漢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ser-min SheiHahn Hsu
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:哲學所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:205
中文關鍵詞:人權規範人權羅爾斯人性尊嚴德沃金GriffinTasioulasBeitzPogge
外文關鍵詞:human rightsRawlshuman dignityDworkinhuman rights normsGriffinTasioulasBeitzPogge
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論文旨在回答「什麼是人權?」這個問題,試圖去分析人權概念,並尋找一套理解人權的較佳觀點。論文將在經過討論、分析、比較兩大類型的哲學的人權論述後主張,約翰.羅爾斯(John Rawls)在《政治民族間的律法》(The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999)中所提供的一套人權觀如予以部份修正,將可被視為理解人權的較佳觀點。而這項修正同時是檢討與回應Charles R. Beitz所提出羅爾斯人權觀與傳統人權觀迥異的說法。
論文主要是以人權規範成立的理由有無被列入人權概念的說明當中,而將對於人權概念的說明區分成結構性的與實質性的說明兩種,並以這兩種說明作為整個論文的論述架構。
第一章中首先對於人權概念進行結構性的說明,接著在藉由討論當代頗具代表性的人權觀以對於人權概念提供實質性的說明前,先於第二章中針對目前學界的各種人權論述進行分類工作。從這項分類工作當中,論文選擇以採取政治觀點理解人權的羅爾斯人權觀作為主要探究對象,並在第三章以採取道德觀點理解人權的Griffin與Tasioulas人權觀作為對照比較,因為他們的人權觀在Beitz的區分當中,正可被歸類為傳統人權觀的類型。而論文指出Griffin與Tasioulas的人權觀除了無法合理說明人權的道德普遍性外,人權在他們的刻劃下並不符合當代國際人權體制中的一些特徵。
學界過去對於羅爾斯人權觀由於頗多批評與誤解,論文在第四章將先重新論述他在《政治民族間的律法》中說明人權的目的與他的人權觀特色,第五章再就目前學界對他的人權觀較常見的五種批評進行討論與評述。論文指出這五項批評或出於誤解或出於預設自由主義的普遍化,皆未能正確指出羅爾斯人權觀的缺失。但論文仍指出,他的人權觀最終將因為三項缺失而無法合理主張非自由主義式政治社會能夠確保人權,而這些缺失都指明了其人權觀欠缺一套政治性的人觀,以至於在說明人權的道德優先性方面有所不足。
第六章則試圖藉由討論朗諾.德沃金(Ronald Dworkin)對人性尊嚴的說法,以尋找一套可與羅爾斯人權觀相容的政治性的人觀。論文指出,德沃金對於人性尊嚴的說法經過適當修改後,將有可能放在羅爾斯的人權觀底下,而被視為一套政治性的人觀看待。
最後,論文指出,羅爾斯人權觀經適當補充德沃金對於人性尊嚴的說法後,在吸納傳統人權觀的優點之餘,可避免原先理論的缺失,而這種修正後的羅爾斯人權觀便有可能合理說明人權的道德優先性與普遍性。
In this thesis, I attempt to answer the problem concerning what human rights are. My work will begin with an analysis of the concept of human rights and with the results of this analysis I shall propose what a better understanding of human rights would be. Based on this analysis I will explain how such a better understanding of human rights should come out of a revision of John Rawls’s conception of human rights, which sketchily presented in The Law of Peoples. I will explain and argue that such a revision of Rawls is capable of leading to the afore mentioned better understanding and as well as responding to Beitz’s contrast between Rawls’s conception and orthodox conceptions of human rights.
The analysis this thesis begins with is structured by discussions of two accounts of human rights – one is a structural account, according to which the justification of human rights norms is excluded from accounts of the notion of human rights; the other is a substantive account, according to which the justification of human rights norms is included in accounts of the notion of human rights.
Chapter 1 discusses the structural accounts of human rights, while the substantive accounts will be discussed in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. After discussing the structural accounts in chapter 1 but before discussing the substantive accounts, I shall supplement a classification of theories of human rights in chapter 2. In light of such a classification, it will be made clear and argued why I choose Rawls’s conception of human rights as the research subject. Rawls’s conception of human rights, according to my classification, is political. By contrast, James Griffin’s and John Tasioulas’s conceptions of human rights (discussed in chapter 3) are moral conceptions of human rights which can also be classified as orthodox conceptions of human rights, according to Beitz’s distinction. But I argue that Griffin’s and Tasioulas’s conceptions are inadequate since they are incapable of providing an account of the needed moral universality of human rights. I also argue that their conceptions of human rights do not fit with some of the widely accepted characteristics of international human right regimes.
Rawls’s conception of human rights receives a lot of criticisms and various misunderstandings in the past, I will first, as a defense, explain in detail his conception of human rights presented in The Law of Peoples, and the necessity of human rights for his project in chapter 4. Then in chapter 5, I will discuss five common criticisms. I will argue all these five criticisms fail either because of misunderstanding Rawls’s conception or because of the general bias of liberalism. Nevertheless, I will argue that Rawls cannot reasonably claim that non-liberal societies can protect human rights adequately, due to three defects of his conception. All of the three defects show that his conception needs to be supplied with a political conception of persons. Otherwise his conception cannot reasonably account the moral priority of human rights.
By discussing Ronald Dworkin’s conception of human dignity in chapter 6, I try to explicate the idea of a political conception of persons and will claim that this political conception of persons is not only compatible with Rawls’s conception of human rights but also needed by it. I will argue that Dworkin’s conception of human dignity with some restrictions can be regarded as a political conception of persons under the framework of Rawls’s conception of human rights.
Finally, I will argue that a revised Rawlsian conception of human rights, which is supplied with a restricted Dworkin’s conception of human dignity, can have the benefits of those orthodox conceptions of human rights but without the afore mentioned defects infecting his conception. Such a revised Rawlsian conception of human rights should be preferred since it is capable of giving a reasonable account of the moral priority and universality of human rights which any adequate theory of human rights cannot do without.
前言 1
第一章 人權概念 6
第一節 一般權利的特徵 9
(一)四種權利的形式 10
(二)三元關係的請求權 11
第二節 人權的義務承擔者的類型 13
(一)所有人都是人權的義務承擔者 15
(二)政府作為人權的義務承擔者 17
(三)制度作為人權的義務承擔者 19
第三節 人權語詞的判斷特徵、評價對象與意涵 22
(一)人權語詞的判斷特徵 23
(二)人權語詞的評價對象 30
(三)未擁有人權與擁有人權的意涵 31
第二章 三種對於人權理論的分類 40
第一節 以論述的理據與人權的性質作分類 40
(一)基礎論的普遍主義 40
(二)非基礎論的普遍主義 42
(三)非基礎論的文化相對主義 44
(四)基礎論的文化相對主義 46
第二節 以論述人權規範的路徑作分類 47
(一)Beitz對於傳統路徑的批評有失公允 48
(二)Beitz過度誇大傳統路徑與實踐路徑之間的差異 50
第三節 以制度是否影響人權規範的成立作分類 52
(一)道德觀點與政治觀點 52
(二)政治觀點底下的法制化觀點與非法制化觀點 53
(三)非法制化的政治觀點底下的制度化與非制度化保障人權 54
第三章 Griffin與Tasioulas的人權觀 57
第一節 Griffin的人權觀 59
(一)人權的概念觀 59
(二)人權規範成立的一般條件 63
(三)人權的角色與功能 65
第二節 Tasioulas的批評與價值多元主義 68
第三節 Tasioulas對於Griffin的批評再檢討 73
(一)人權規範的普遍性 73
(二)人權規範成立的理據 78
第四節 四種挑戰Griffin的人權觀之論證 82
(一)理想幸福人生與最低限標準的論證 82
(二)價值網絡與排序的論證 85
(三)人權在當代國際政治的角色之論證 88
(四)可行性指明制度面向的論證 91
第四章 羅爾斯的人權觀 95
第一節 人權在政治民族律法的角色 96
(一)政治民族律法 98
(二)各政治民族的社會基本制度以及他們彼此的關係 102
第二節 羅爾斯的人權觀 107
(一)非全面性學說 107
(二)非政治偏狹 111
第三節 合宜的政治民族 115
(一)共善正義觀的兩項門檻 116
(二)社會是良序的 118
第五章 羅爾斯的人權觀之評述 123
第一節 五種批評羅爾斯的人權觀之檢討 123
(一)形式的批評 124
(二)實質的批評 131
第二節 羅爾斯人權觀的三個問題 139
(一)階層體制與人權保障並不相容 139
(二)人權保障採取惟承受者論的缺失 143
(三)政治民族律法缺少了政治性的人觀 147
第三節 人權被理解為一種政治權利 151
第六章 德沃金的人權觀 155
第一節 人權規範成立的理據 156
(一)人性尊嚴二原則 156
(二)人權侵害的判準 157
第二節 內在價值原則的意涵 161
第三節 個人責任原則、分配平等與民主 166
第四節 寬容的非民主社會 170
第五節 人權侵害的判準問題 174
結論 182
參考文獻 195
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