跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(18.97.14.87) 您好!臺灣時間:2025/02/09 10:46
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:姚懷捷
研究生(外文):Huai-Jie Yao
論文名稱:全球化導致的傳訊成本
論文名稱(外文):The increased signaling cost form globalization
指導教授:梁孟玉
指導教授(外文):Meng-Yu Liang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:98
語文別:英文
論文頁數:27
中文關鍵詞:全球化傳訊勞動市場訊息不對稱
外文關鍵詞:globalisationsignalinglabor marketasymmetric information
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:233
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
全球化下,行銷海外的機會漸增。出口產品要能成功地打入另一國家的市場時,往往需將其產品與當地文化結合加以銷售。而此種將產品與外國生活文化整合的工作,適合由同時掌握技術及異國文化的人力來完成。因此隨著全球化的步伐,將產生一種對既掌握該國生產技術也瞭解異國文化的人才需求。透過擴大市場帶來的利基,掌握技術及異國文化的人將相對其他類型勞動者有較高的產出,廠商也願意用高薪聘僱。但基於勞動市場資訊不對稱的特性,出口廠商在聘用前並不清楚員工是否具有其需要的特質,所以廠商需要透過勞動者的傳訊以辨識需要的人才。

本文以Spence教育傳訊模型為基礎,探討在勞動市場資訊不對稱下,一個出口國在面臨新的勞動需求時,對國內勞動市場的衝擊。我們的發現是,當新的需求產生,市場上願以高薪聘僱此類雙才時,其他勞動者將由於覬覦其報酬,競相模仿「雙才」在市場上傳遞的訊號,於是引起連鎖的傳訊競爭。這將使得許多原先不必傳訊的勞動者現在必須傳訊,也讓整體勞動市場上的傳訊成本大幅提升。

本文證明在某些條件下,所有滿足Intuitive Criterion條件的均衡結果,傳訊產生的成本會抵銷出口帶來的好處,所有人都變得比全球化之前更差。這是全球化所可能衍生的一個負面結果。



As the deepening of globalization, intensified contact and decreased trade barrier brings new opportunities for marketing abroad. A problem arises facing export firms that the popularity of their products in a foreign country may not remain in a different country. Due to cultural difference, export firms have to adapt their products for a specific country or region, which is called localization. Moreover, this task of adapting products to a foreign culture would be better done by workers who masters the producing techniques and acquaints foreign culture. Then there arises new demand for workers who possess both two abilities, and those workers will be more productive than others workers in the labor market. Under asymmetric information, firms choose workers by signals they observe and allocate workers into appropriate position. We consider Spence education model to analyze the effect of the new demand. Our result shows that it gives rise to a chain of signaling in the labor market, in which some workers who are not capable of two abilities will send signals that is also sent by workers who master both skills. Then it turns out to generate too much signaling in the labor market. When parameter in a certain range, we can prove that in all equilibrium outcomes which satisfies Intuitive Criterion workers send too much signals as to become worse than before globalization .

1.Introduction…………………………………………1

2.The model ……………………………………………4
Before globalization…………………………………5
Globalization …………………………………………7

3.Analysis ……………………………………………10
Benchmark one…………………………………………10
Benchmark two…………………………………………11

4.Equilibria …………………………………………15

5.Welfare analysis …………………………………20

6.Appendix ……………………………………………21

Reference………………………………………………25


Reference
1. Spence, Michael. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87
(August 1973): 355–74.
2. BANK, J., AND J. SOBEL, “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games,”Econo-
metrica 55 (1987), 647–62.
3. Stiglitz, Joseph. “The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of
Income.”American Economic Review 71 (June 1975):393–410.
25
4. Cho, I. and Kreps, D. (1987). ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibrium’, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 179–221.
5. Rasmusen, Eric (2001), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game The-
ory, 3rd ed. Blackwell, Oxford.
6. Binmore, Ken (1991), Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D. C. Heath,
Lexington,MA.
7. Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991), Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
8. Myerson, Roger B. (1991), Game Theory: Analysis of Con‡ict. Harvard Univer-
sity Press,Cambridge, MA.
9. Gibbons, Robert (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ.
10. David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton 1990
11. Robert J. Aumann (1989) Lectures on Game Theory, Westview Press, Inc.,
Boulder, Colorado.
12. David M. Kreps (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford University
Press.
13. L. J. Savage (1954) The Foundations of Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, New
York.
14. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1944) The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior,Princeton University Press.
15. Harsanyi, J. (1967-8): “Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’
players”, Management Science 14, 159-189, 320-334, 486-502.
16. Hurwicz, L. (1973): “The design of mechanisms for resource allocation”, Amer-
ican Economic Review 63, Papers and Proceedings, 1-30.
17. Jackson, M. (1991): “Bayesian implementation”, Econometrica 59, 461-477.
26
18. Maskin, E. (1977): “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality”. Paper presented
at the summer workshop of the Econometric Society in Paris, June 1977. Published
1999 in the Review of Economic Studies 66, 23-38.
19. Matsushima, H. (1988): “A new approach to the implementation problem”,
Journal of Economic Theory 45, 128-144.
20. Moore, J. and R. Repullo (1988): “Subgame perfect implementation”, Econo-
metrica 56, 1191-1220.
21. Myerson, R. (1979): “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem”,
Econometrica 47, 61-73.

QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top