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研究生:陳瑞玉
研究生(外文):Chen, Jui Yu
論文名稱:重分配政策之主觀偏好:以所得稅、遺產稅為例
論文名稱(外文):Preference for Redistribution Policies: The Case of Income Tax and Estate Tax
指導教授:張文俊張文俊引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chang, Wen Chun
口試委員:胡偉民吳文傑
口試委員(外文):Hu, Wei MinWu, Wen Jie
口試日期:100年6月3號
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:財政學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:57
中文關鍵詞:遺產稅所得稅主觀偏好重分配政策
外文關鍵詞:estate taxincome taxredistributionpreference
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:1140
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:82
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
在市場機能的運作之下,所得分配的變動情況主要是受到勞動市場的影響,因此政府針對薪資所得課徵的所得稅可謂是實施重分配政策之主要動力來源;然而,僅就努力工作之收入報酬課稅,實難真正達到社會公平正義之目標,因此除了所得稅之外,在實質意義上與之對立的另一稅目─遺產稅,也是政府預達重分配所得之重要政策工具。
然而,隨著世界各國貿易往來愈加頻繁、經濟成長的同時,卻也帶來所得差距逐漸擴大的負面影響。不僅國與國之間貧富差距不斷擴大,我國近幾十年來家庭所得分配情況也趨於惡化。在此情況下,政府目前在所得稅、遺產稅之稅制設計上是否符合公平正義之目標,以及是否貼近人民之所需便是值得關切的議題。故本研究以2007年「台灣社會變遷基本調查計畫之社會階層組問卷」為資料來源,利用非線性序列機率模型 (Ordered Probit Model)來探討個人之主觀重分配政策偏好─特別是針對所得稅及遺產稅的部分,以及探討影響因素為何。
實證結果顯示,個人在面對重分配議題時,是以家戶整體之經濟條件為重要考量因素而非以個人之所得條件來判定,而且當家戶所得地位越高,個人之主觀重分配偏好越為強烈。年齡、教育程度及社會地位的增加會使個人更為體認到社會正義之重要性,主觀重分配偏好因而更高。而個人投資財富的多寡則與重分配政策的主觀偏好有著顯著的反向相關。

In a market economy, income distribution is mainly the outcome of the labor market. Therefore, the income tax levied against earned income can be described as the core of redistribution policies. However, it is difficult to achieve the goal of the equalizing income distribution only from taxing hard work. In reality, both the income tax and the estate tax are the important policy tools for redistribution.

Under the trend of free trade and globalization, economic growth often accompanies with the negative effects of widening income gap between rich and poor. As a result, it is highly concerned that whether the systems of income tax and estate tax can meet the objectives of fairness and justice, and whether they can be consistent with the people’s preferences. By using the data from the 2007 Taiwan Social Change Survey, this study investigates people’s preferences for redistribution polices for the cases of income tax and estate tax.

Measured as the ratio of a family’s income to the median family income, the empirical results of this study suggest that the higher the relative income status of a household, the more supportive for a higher rate of estate tax. In addition, the amount of personal investment has a significantly negative relationship with the preferences for redistribution policies.

圖表目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 - 1 -
第一節 研究背景 - 1 -
第二節 研究動機與目的 - 4 -
第三節 研究方法及架構 - 6 -
第二章 文獻回顧 - 7 -
第一節 最適所得稅理論 - 8 -
第二節 遺贈稅現況與課稅原則 - 11 -
第三節 由效用回歸到幸福 - 15 -
第四節 小結 - 17 -
第三章 理論模型 - 19 -
第一節 理論基礎 - 19 -
第二節 重分配偏好 - 22 -
第四章 實證架構、資料來源與變數定義 - 24 -
第一節 實證架構 - 24 -
第二節 資料來源 - 24 -
第三節 變數定義 - 25 -
第四節 敘述統計 - 31 -
第五章 實證結果分析 - 33 -
第一節 個人之相對所得條件下的結果分析 - 34 -
第二節 家戶之相對所得條件下的結果分析 - 39 -
第六章 結論與建議 - 45 -
第一節 結論 - 46 -
第二節 建議 - 47 -
附錄 - 49 -
參考文獻 - 53 -
中文文獻 - 53 -
英文文獻 - 54 -

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謝明瑞 (2007),「行為經濟學理論與探討」,商學學報 (空大),15,頁253-289。
蘇慧君 (2000),「論約翰彌爾之社會福利思想」,華信金融季刊,頁99-124。
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