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研究生(外文):Yang Chih-Hsiao
論文名稱(外文):The Gap between the Rich and the Poor and Turnout Rate-Choices for Taiwanese between Living Predicament and Democracy Value
指導教授(外文):Chang, Wen-Chun
口試委員(外文):Wu, Wen-ChiehLo, Kuang-Ta
外文關鍵詞:the gap between the rich and the poorturnout rateincome inequality
  • 被引用被引用:1
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Taiwan is a democratic society. People have the right for free speech to show their opinions toward public affairs. Public views and people’s needs are usually reflected by the media, social movements and electoral results. Income inequality has become one of the most significant issues across countries in recent years. While the income inequality has become more severe in Taiwan over the past decades, government welfare policies are often essential. To provide more welfare benefits for the poor and needed, an increase in tax burden for wealthy people may be necessary. This may lead to a political competition on the welfare policies between the poor and the rich through electoral participation to express their preferences over government’s redistributive policies. It has been argued that the high-income people with more political resources have an advantage over the low-income people in competing for redistributive policies through voting. However, this argument has not extensively examined for the case in Taiwan. This research attempts to investigate people’s electoral participation in competing for redistributive policies in Taiwan, while the society’s income inequality has continued to increase drastically over the past decades.

This research utilizes the data from the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure and the Financial Statics of the Ministry of Finance in Taiwan. The empirical results using the OLS model from this study show that, the level of income inequality measured by the disposable income has a significantly negative effect on voting turnout, which is consistent with the relative power theory addressed in previous literature. That is, the more unequal the distribution of income is, the lower turnout rate will be. However, this negative effect becomes less statistically significant with the fixed effect estimations. Based on the results from this study, it is found that the turnout rates decrease with the larger poverty gap in Taiwan. Public opinions for redistributive policies might not be fully reflected in the electoral results and the high-income people often have an advantage in expressing their preferences through voting.
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與背景 1
第二節、研究目的 7
第三節、研究方法與架構 9
第二章、文獻回顧 10
第一節、重分配政策 10
第二節、投票行為的決定因素 14
第三節、黨派傾向對於投票決策的影響 18
第四節、國內文獻對於政治參與的探討 23
第五節、小結 25
第三章、理論基礎與實證模型 27
第一節、理論基礎來源 27
第二節、實證模型與設立 32
第四章、資料來源與變數定義 34
第一節、資料來源 34
第二節、變數定義 35
第三節、敘述統計 39
第五章、實證結果分析 44
第一節、不同的所得分配指標在OLS下之實證結果 45
第二節、不同的所得分配指標在固定效果及隨機效果下的實證結果 52
第六章、結論與建議 56
第一節、結論 57
第二節、建議 59
第三節、研究限制與未來研究方向 60
參考資料 61
附錄 65


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