訪客IP:18.207.134.98
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
本論文永久網址: 
line
研究生:林子淵
研究生(外文):Lin Tzu-Yuan
論文名稱:在非對稱垂直整合之下,核心產品、非核心產品與製程創新交互影響之探討
論文名稱(外文):Interaction of core products, non-core product and process innovation between Asymmetric and Symmetrical Vertical-Integrated Firms
指導教授:謝登隆謝登隆引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsieh Deng-Long
口試委員:徐俊明陳靜瑜
口試委員(外文):Hsu Jun-mingChen Jing-yu
口試日期:2014-05-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:國際貿易學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:貿易學類
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:垂直整合製程創新差異化
外文關鍵詞:vertical integrationprocess innovationdifferentiation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:4
  • 點閱點閱:362
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:11
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究主要參考Buehler and Schmutzler(2008)與Levy(2012)的文獻,試圖建構經濟數學模型,探討非對稱垂直整合下,核心產品以及非核心產品互相的影響。本文主要研究三個變數,分別對廠商的交互影響,最後衍生出不同結果:變數(1)核心製程技術與非核心製程技術的差距,(2)核心產品與非核心產品的替代相關性,(3)市場規模大小。獲得結果如下所述:
一、領先廠商(垂直廠商)與追隨廠商(非垂直整合)替代相關性影響:產品替代性越強,不管是領先廠商,還是追隨廠商都會將研發經費作調整,將核心製程技術的研發經費調降,非核心製程技術的研發經費調升,使得公司總收益增加。另外,替代相關性越大,對於追隨廠商影響較小,利潤的減少亦低於領先廠商所減少的利潤。因此,當產品替代性越高時,廠商做出這樣的決策會更明顯之。
二、核心產品製程成本與非核心產品製程成本越來越接近時,代表其在核心製程技術上的研發費用呈邊際效益遞減,廠商會將核心製程研發費用降低,非核心製程研發費用提升,此舉不但可以省下成本,還可以增加收益。
三、市場大小對於兩家廠商都成正向影響之。兩家廠商分食的市場增大,使得廠商所獲取的利潤都增大,這時,廠商會降低研發製程技術經費,因為市場規模增大比起研發製程技術更為有利潤。

This study refers to Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) and Levy (2012) to construct a quantitative model to infer firm’s decisions about their core and non-core products under the structure of asymmetric vertical integration. Explore the vertical integration under asymmetric and the mutual influence of non-core products core products. I attempt to investigate how the following three factors affect firms’ behavior: (1) core and non-core process technology gap, (2) product substitution relevance, and (3) market size are summarized as follows:

1. Leader (vertical vendor) and follow the manufacturer (non-vertical integration) alternative correlation effects:Product substitution is stronger, whether it is a leader, or follow the manufacturers will be adjusted for R & D funding. The R & D funding cut core process technology, R & D expenditures of non-core process technology raised, making the company's total revenue increased. In addition, alternative relevance bigger impact on smaller follow manufacturer. Follow manufacturer to reduce the profit is less than leader manufacturer.

2. As the processing cost of core products and non-core products is getting closer, it would decrease the research and development cost in technology of processing core products. Considering firms would decrease the R&D cost in technology of processing core products, the R&D cost in technology of processing non-core products increases. This proposition would not only decrease the costs, it would also increase the firm’s profit.

3. Market size for the two vendors have become a positive influence. Market increases, so that the profits of manufacturers to get the two companies are increasing. At this time, manufacturers will reduce R & D process technology funds, because the market size increases more than the R & D process technology profitable.

論文目錄
圖目錄.......................................................................................................................................................iii
表目錄...............................................................................................................................v
第一章 緒論.....................................................................................................................1
第一節 研究背景...........................................................................................................1
第二節 研究目的...........................................................................................................2
第三節 研究架構...........................................................................................................3
第二章 文獻回顧.............................................................................................................4
第一節 垂直整合相關文獻...........................................................................................4
第二節 創新相關文獻...................................................................................................9
第三章 研究方法與模型設計.......................................................................................12
第一節 模型假設與變數定義.....................................................................................12
第二節 模型設計與架構.............................................................................................15
第三節 數理模型推導.................................................................................................15
第四章 模型經濟效益分析與探討...............................................................................19
第一節 變數的模擬合理範圍值.................................................................................19
第二節 核心與非核心產品製程技術差異對於各變數的影響.................................20
第三節 產品替代性強度對於各變數的影響.............................................................27
第四節 市場規模對於各變數的影響.........................................................................39
第五章 結論與未來研究方向.......................................................................................47
第一節 結論.................................................................................................................47
第二節 未來可研究方向...............................................................................................49

一、中文部分
1.吳思華 (1998). "第七屆產業管理研討會論文集, 政治大學科技管理研究所."
2.吳思華 (2002). 策略九說: 策略思考的本質, 復旦大學出版社.
二、英文部分
1.Avenel, E. and C. Barlet (2000). "Vertical foreclosure, technological choice, and entry on the intermediate market." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 9(2): 211-230.
2.Blair, R. D. and D. L. Kaserman (1978). "Vertical integration, tying, and antitrust policy." American Economic Review: 397-402.
3.Buehler, S. and A. Schmutzler (2008). "Intimidating competitors—Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly." International Journal of Industrial Organization 26(1): 247-265.
4.Carlton, D. W. (1979). "Vertical integration in competitive markets under uncertainty." Journal of Industrial economics 27(3): 189-209.
5.Chacke, G. "K., 1988." Technology management-application to corporate markets and military mission, Preager, New York.
6.Clark, K. B. (1985). " Interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological evolution." Research policy 14(5): 235-251.
7.Colangelo, G. (1995). "Vertical vs. Horizontal integration: pre-emptive merging." Journal of Industrial Economics: 323-337.
8.Drucker, P. F. (1985). "Entrepreneurial Strategies." California Management Review 27(2).
9.Ellison, J. (1991). "Celestial Mechanics and the Location Theory of William H. Dean, Jr., 1930-52." American Economic Review 81(2): 315-317.
10.Harrigan, K. R. (1985). "Exit barriers and vertical integration." Academy of Management Journal 28(3): 686-697.
11.Hill, C. W. and G. R. Jones (2008). Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach: An Integrated Approach, Cengage Learning.
12.Levy, N. (2012). "Technology sharing and tacit collusion." International Journal of Industrial Organization 30(2): 204-216.
13.Mahoney, J. T. (1992). "The choice of organizational form: vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration." Strategic management journal 13(8): 559-584.
14.Malburg, C. (2000). "Vertical Integration." Industry Week 249(20): 17.
15.Mathewson, G. F. and R. A. Winter (1984). "An economic theory of vertical restraints." Rand Journal of Economics 15(1): 27-38.
16.Michael, W. (1984). Economic theory of the industry, CUP Archive.
17.Milliou, C. (2004). "Vertical integration and R&D information flow: is there a need for ‘firewalls’?" International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(1): 25-43.
18.Porter, M. E. (2008). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors, Simon and Schuster.
19.Riordan, M. H. and O. E. Williamson (1985). "Asset specificity and economic organization." International Journal of Industrial Organization 3(4): 365-378.
20.Salop, S. C. and D. T. Scheffman (1983). "Raising rivals' costs."American Economic Review: 267-271.
21.Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). Theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, Transaction Publishers.
22.Spengler, J. J. (1950). "Vertical integration and antitrust policy."Journal of Political Economy: 347-352.
23.Williamson, O. E. (1971). "Vertical integration of production: market failure considerations." American Economic Review: 112-123.



QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊
 
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔