跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.200.171.74) 您好!臺灣時間:2022/08/12 08:28
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

: 
twitterline
研究生:謝惠婷
研究生(外文):Hsieh, Hui-Ting
論文名稱:專利授權在一般均衡分析的三個議題
論文名稱(外文):Three Essays on General Equilibrium Analysis of Patent Licensing
指導教授:賴景昌賴景昌引用關係馮立功馮立功引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lai, Ching-ChongFerng, Li-Kung
口試委員:翁永和黃登興謝智源陳宏易
口試委員(外文):Weng, Yung-HoHuang, Deng-ShingShieh, Jhy-YuanChen, Hung-Yi
口試日期:2015-07-23
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:國際經濟研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:英文
論文頁數:125
中文關鍵詞:專利授權不完全競爭強制授權品質提昇成長模型
外文關鍵詞:Patent LicensingImperfect CompetitionCompulsory LicensingQuality-ladder Growth Model
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:691
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:27
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本文旨在利用專利授權(patent licensing)的議題將其引入一般均衡模型(general equilibrium model)中,來探討既存文獻的不足。首先,我們利用單期的不完全競爭總體模型(macroeconomic model of imperfect competition)來討論專利持有廠商的最適授權契約問題。最適授權契約意指何種授權契約會使專利持有廠商(patent holder)獲取最大的利潤。本文發現,一般均衡分析考慮了商品市場和勞動市場的互動之後,實質工資和家計單位的勞動所得變成內生決定;因此,以致於我們的結論和既存的專利授權文獻會有所不同。其次,本文討論同樣利用了單期的不完全競爭總體模型結合政府使用強制授權(compulsory licensing),來討論社會福利分析(social welfare analysis)。當研發廠商的技術移轉時,其收取的授權金收入是由研發廠商自身或是政府所決定時,最適的單位權利金(royalty licensing)會有何差異。本文發現,當產品差異程度較小時,政府決定的最適單位權利金會大於研發廠商所決定的最適單位權利金;當產品差異程度較大時,政府決定的最適單位權利金會小於研發廠商所決定的最商單位權利金。並且,政府決定的最適單位權利金和產品差異程度會產生逆U型(inverse U-shaped)。最後,本文嘗試將非常著名的品質提昇成長模型(quality-ladder growth model)來討論單位權利金授權。由於傳統的品質提昇模型文獻都是假定研發廠商會收取被授權廠商所有的利潤,來當做授權金收入,然而這些文獻並沒有明顯的處理研發廠商是用何種授權方式來獲取他們的專利報酬。為了使品質提昇模型能討論單位權利金授權,我們改變了傳統的品質提昇模型兩個地方。第一,中間財廠商從事古諾競爭(Cournot competition)。第二,每個產業的研發廠商為獨佔廠商,所以每一期都會持續做研發。經過了上述兩點的改變,品質提昇模型可以討論單位權利金授權。此外,我們也比較了伯特蘭德競爭(Bertrand competition)模型和古諾競爭模型下,最適的單位權利金的差異,並且討論中間財廠商家數會如何減少於市場之中,以及中間財廠商的最適行為如何被單位權利金所影響。
This dissertation incorporates patent licensing issue into the general equilibrium model to interpret the lack of existing literature. First, we discuss the optimal licensing contract of patent-holding firm in the imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model. The optimal licensing contract means that what the optimal licensing contract is for a profit-maximizing patent-holder. This dissertation is found that our general equilibrium analysis explicitly brings the mutual interaction between the goods market and the labor market into the picture, and hence endogenizes the real wage and the household’s income. Hence, our analysis finds some conflicting results compared to the existing studies on patent licensing. Second, this dissertation proposes how the level of social welfare would change under the compulsory licensing regime and patent licensing regime in the imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model. We adopt royalty licensing to compare the decisions of the policy authority (government) and the R&D firm. This dissertation is found that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the optimal royalty rate and market power under the compulsory licensing regime. Moreover, when market power is relatively smaller (greater), the optimal royalty rate under the compulsory regime is higher (lower) than that under the R&D firm’s patent licensing regime. Finally, we set up a quality-ladder growth model that is able to explicitly analyze the role of royalty licensing. Canonical quality-ladder growth studies specify that the R&D firm takes away the entire profits of the intermediate firm that uses its innovative technology, but these studies do not explicitly deal with how the R&D firm acquires its rewards from the patent by way of patent licensing. We develop a framework in which intermediate goods firms can engage in either Bertrand competition or Cournot competition. By comparing these two types of competition, this paper provides insights toward understanding the linkages among the R&D firm’s royalty licensing, the intermediate goods firm exit, and the intermediate goods firm’s optimal production behavior.
謝辭…………………………………………………………………………….………i
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………………ii
英文摘要……………………………………………………………………………...iv
Chapter I Introduction…………………………………………………………..1
Chapter II A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..5
2.2 The baseline model………………………………………………………….8
2.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium………………………………………………..11
2.4 Comparison of the three regimes: macroeconomic variables………………22
2.5 Comparison of the three regimes: the welfare level………………………...31
2.6 Extensions and Discussion………………………………………………….33
2.7 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………45
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………….47
Figure…………………………………………………………………………...52
Table………………………………………………………………………….…54
Chapter III Royalty Licensing in a Macroeconomic Model: Patent Licensing Versus Compulsory Licensing
3.1Introduction………………………………………………………………….55
3.2 The Model……………………………………………….……………….…57
3.3 Government’s Compulsory Licensing Regime……………………………..63
3.4 Numerical Analysis…………………………………………………………67
3.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..71
Appendix …………………………………………………………………….72
Figure…………………………………………………………………………...74
Table…………………………………………………………………………….77
Chapter IV Royalty Licensing and Firm Exit in a Quality-Ladder Growth Model
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………78
4.2 The Model…………………………………………………………………..80
4.3 Bertrand Competition………………………………………………………87
4.4 Cournot Competition……………………………………………………..…93
4.5 Numerical Analysis and Discussion……………………………………….101
4.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………106
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………..109
Figure…………………………………………………………………………113
Table………………………………………………………………………….118
Chapter V Conclusions…………..………………………………….119
References…………………………………………………………………….….121




Acemoglu, D. and Akcigit, U., 2012. Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Competition and Innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1-42.
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P., 1992. A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Econometrica, 60, 323-351.
Arrow, K. J., 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in R. R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Athreye, S. and Yang, Y., 2011. Disembodied Knowledge Flows in the World Economy. WIPO Economics Research Working Papers No. 4. Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X., 2004. Economic Growth, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Beladi, H. and Chao, C. C., 1993. The Choice of Licensing Versus Direct Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Journal of Economics, 58, 175-186.
Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. E. A., 1994. Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns, Journal of Economic Theory, 63, 19-41.
Bilbiie, F. O., Ghironi, F., and Melitz, M. J., 2012. Endogenous Entry, Product Variety, and Business Cycles, Journal of Political Economy, 120, 304-345.
Bousquet, A., Cremer, H., Ivaldi, M., and Wolkovicz, M., 1998. Risk Sharing in Licensing. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 535-554.
Censolo, R. and Colombo, C., 2008. Mixed Industrial Structure and Short-run Fiscal Multiplier, Australian Economic Papers, 27, 156-165.
Chang, J. J., Hung, H. W., and Huang, C. C., 2011. Monopoly Power, Increasing Returns to Variety, and Local Indeterminacy, Review of Economic Dynamics, 14, 384-388.
Chen, J. H., Shieh, J. Y., Lai, C. C., and Chang, J. J., 2005. Productive Public Expenditure and Imperfect Competition with Endogenous Price Markup, Oxford Economic Papers, 57, 522-544.
Chu, A. C., 2007. Optimal Patent Breadth: Quantifying the Effects of Increasing Patent Breadth. MPRA Paper 3910, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Costa, L. F. and Dixon, H. D., 2011. Fiscal Policy under Imperfect Competition with Flexible Prices: An Overview and Survey, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 5, 1-57.
Crooke, P., Foreb, L., and Tschantz, S., 1999. Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria. Review of Industrial Organization, 15, 205-217.
D’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillover, American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137.
Denicolὸ, V., 1996. Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length. Journal of Industrial Economics, 44,249-265.
Denicolὸ, V. and Zanchettin, P., 2010. Competition, Market Selection and Growth. Economic Journal, 120, 761-785.
Devereux, M. B., Head, A. C., and Lapham, B. J., 1996. Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Retruns, and the Effects of Government Spending, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28, 233-254.
Devereux, M. B., Head, A. C., and Lapham, B. J., 2000. Government Spending and Welfare with Returns to Specialization, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102, 547-561.
Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J. E., 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
Dixon, H. D., 1987. A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition with Walrasian Features. Oxford Economic Papers, 39, 134-160.
Dixon, H. D. and Hansen, C. T., 1999. A Mixed Industrial Structure Magnifies the Importance of Menu Costs, European Economic Review, 43, 1475-1499.
Etro, F., 2004. Innovation by Leaders. Economic Journal, 114, 281-303.
Faulí-Oller, R., Gonzalez, X., and Sandonís, J., 2013. Optimal Two-part Tariff Licensing Contracts with Differentiated Goods and Endogenous R&D, Manchester School, 81, 803-827.
Faulí-Oller, R. and Sandonís, J., 2002. Welfare Reducing Licensing, Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 192-205.
Faulí-Oller, R. and Sandonís, J., 2003. To Merger or to License: Implications for Competition Policy, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 655-672.
Feenstra, R. C., 2003. A Homothetic Utility Function for Monopolistic Competition Models, without Constant Price Elasticity, Economics Letters, 78, 79-86.
Gallini, N. T., 1992. Patent Policy and Costly Imitation. RAND Journal of Economics, 23, 52-63.
Gilber, R. and Shapiro, C., 1990. Optimal Patent Length and Breadth. RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 106-112.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E., 1991. Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 43-61.
Heijdra, B. J., 2009. The Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iwaisako, T. and Futagami, K., 2003. Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model. Journal of Economics, 78, 239-258.
Jaimovich, N., 2007. Firm Dynamics and Markup Variations: Implications for Sunspot Equilibria and Endogenous Economic Fluctuations, Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 300-325.
Jaimovich, N. and Floetotto, M., 2008. Firm Dynamics, Markup Variations, and the Business Cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 1238-1252.
Jones, C. I., 1995. R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 759-784.
Jones, C. I. and William, J. C., 2000. Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment in R&D. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 65-85.
Jovanovic, B., 2009. The Technology Cycle and Inequality, Review of Economic Studies, 76, 707-729.
Kabiraj, T., 2005. Technology Transfer in a Stackelberg Structure: Licensing Contracts and Welfare, Manchester School, 73, 1-28.
Kamien, M. I., Oren, S. S., and Tauman, Y., 1992. Optimal Licensing of Cost Reducing Innovation, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483-508.
Kamien, M. I. and Tauman, Y., 1986. Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M. I. and Tauman Y., 2002. Patent Licensing: The Inside Story, Manchester School, 70, 7-15.
Kamiyama, S., Sheehan, J., and Martinez, C., 2006. Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual Property. STI Working Paper Series.
Katz, M. L. and Shapiro, C., 1986. How to License Intangible Property, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 567-589.
Klemperer, P., 1990. How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? Journal of Industrial Economics, 21, 113-130.
Kortum, S., 1993. Equilibrium R&D and the Patent-R&D Ratio: U.S. Evidence. American Economic Review, 83, 450-457.
Kremer, M., 2002. Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 67-90.
Lai, C. C., Chin, C. T., and Chang, S. H., 2010. Vertical Separation versus Vertical Integration in a Macroeconomic Model with Imperfect Competition, International Review of Economics and Finance, 19, 590-602.
Li, C. W., 2001. On the Policy Implications of Endogenous Technological Progress. Economic Journal, 111, C164-C179.
Molana, H. and Moutos, T., 1992. A Note on Taxation, Imperfect Competition and the Balanced Budget Multiplier, Oxford Economic Papers, 44, 68-74.
Moser, P. and Voena, A., 2011. Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act. American Economic Review, 102, 396-427.
Mukherjee, A., 2010. Competition and Welfare: The Implications of Licensing. Manchester School, 78, 20-40.
Mukherjee, A. and Balasubramanian, N., 2001. Technology Transfer in a Horizontally Differentiated Product Market, Research in Economics, 55, 257-274.
Nadiri, M. I., 1993. Innovations and Technological Spillovers, NBER Working Paper, No. 4423.
OECD, 2012. Science, Technology and Industry Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OECD, 2014. Science, Technology and Industry Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Poddar, S. and Sinha, U. B., 2004. On Patent Licensing and Spatial Competition, Economic Record, 80, 208-218.
Powers, J., 2003. Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on Performance of University Technology Transfer. The Journal of Higher Education , 74, 26-50.
Rivera-Batiz, L.A. and Romer, P. M., 1991. Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 531-555.
Roeger, W., 1995. Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Difference between Primal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for U.S. Manufacturing. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 316-330.
Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 71-102.
Rostoker, M., 1983. A Survey of Corporate Licensing. IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology, 24, 59-92.
San Martin, M. and Saracho, A. I., 2010. Royalty Licensing, Economics Letters, 107, 284-287.
Segerstrom, P. S., 2007. Intel Economics. International Economic Review, 48, 247-280.
Segerstrom, P. S. and Zolnierek, J. M., 1999. The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders. International Economic Review, 40, 745-766.
Sen, D. and Tauman, Y., 2007. General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-Reducing Innovation, Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163-86.
Startz, R., 1989. Monopolistic Competition as a Foundation for Keynesian Macroeconomic Models, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 737-752.
Steger, T. M., 2005. Welfare Implications of Non-scale R&D-based Growth Models. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107, 737-757.
Stokey, N. L., 1995. R&D and Economic Growth. Review of Economic Studies, 62, 469-489.
Tandon, P., 1982. Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, Journal of Political Economy, 90, 470-486.
Tirole, J., 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Torregrosa, R. J., 1998. On the Monotonicity of Balanced Budget Multiplier under Imperfect Competition, Economics Letters, 59, 331-335.
Wang, P. and Wen, Y., 2008. Imperfect Competition and Indeterminacy of Aggregate Output, Journal of Economic Theory, 143, 519-540.
Wang, X. H., 1998. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model, Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
Wang, X. H., 2002. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly, Journal of Economics and Business, 54, 253-266.
Yang, X. and Heijdra, B. J., 1993. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Comment, American Economic Review, 83, 295-301.









QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top