臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
近年來企業面臨國際金融環境的劇烈變化。2007年美國的次級房貸風暴造成了全球股市的動盪與不安。2008年雷曼兄弟公司破產而引發了全球金融海嘯，世界各國股匯市及不動產交易遭受重挫，企業紛紛減薪、裁員甚至倒閉，造成失業率不斷攀升，各國經濟陷入冰點。如何在瞬息萬變的大環境中，占有一席之地，搏取企業最大利潤，是大部分企業最重視的事情。財務風險管理、企業避險已被公司企業所重視。其中金融工具避險即是很重要的議題。
國內關於高階經理人薪酬差距的研究，目前大多以競賽理論為基礎，檢視企業高階經理人的薪酬差距是否符合競賽理論及影響公司績效，但對於企業避險與薪酬競賽誘因對公司決策的相關研究仍屬少見。
本研究承續競賽理論的薪酬差距概念，針對國內高階經理人，探討公司導入衍生性金融商品作為避險工具，是否會影響高階經理人公司決策的制定。

關鍵詞：衍生性金融商品、避險、競賽誘因、公司決策

Abstract
In recent years, enterprises have faced dramatic changes in the international financial environment. The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007 caused the global stock markets in turmoil and uneasiness. In 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers led to a global financial tsunami. Thus, the world's stock exchanges and real estate transactions had suffered heavy losses. Enterprises had reduced their wages, laid off employees and even closed down. As a result, the unemployment rate had been rising and the economies of various countries had fallen into freezing. How to take a place in the ever-changing environment and win the biggest profits of enterprises are the most important thing for most companies. Financial risk management and corporate hedging have been highly valued by companies and financial instruments are a very important issue.
At present, the research on the salary gap of high-level managers is mostly based on the competition theory. It is necessary to examine whether the salary gap of high-level managers meets the competition theory and influence the company's performance. However, the researches on corporate risk-managing and compensation competition inducing the company's decision-making are still rare.
This study continues the concept of salary gap in competition theory. Moreover, it focuses on domestic high-level managers and aims to find out whether the introduction of financial derivatives as a hedging tool will affect the decision-making of high-level managers.

Keywords: Financial Derivatives, hedging, competition incentives, company decision

目錄
謝誌 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第壹章緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究架構 6
第四節 研究流程 7
第貳章 文獻探討 8
第一節 衍生性金融商品與避險之定義 8
第二節 競賽誘因與高階經理人薪酬結構 13
第三節 公司避險與競賽誘因及公司決策之探討 15
第參章 研究方法 19
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 19
第二節 實證模型 21
第三節 變數定義 22
第肆章 實證結果與分析 28
第一節 敘述統計 28
第二節 迴歸分析 30
第伍章 結論與建議 38
參考文獻 40

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