臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
全球最大的Arthur Andersen會計事務所於今年被捲入美國Enron公司會計舞弊案，不但本身信譽瀕臨破產，更令會計師專業的信用招致投資人的強烈質疑。此事件不但造成會計業生態的劇烈改變與衝擊，也使得美國近年來會計師的法律訴訟風潮的發展幾近極致狀態。會計師面臨強大的訴訟壓力，不若從前僅是花費較高的成本在輕薄的訴訟(weak claims)上而已，其所承受的將是可能破產倒閉之風險。Schwartz(1997)之研究發現在會計師深口袋(deep pocket)之損害賠償機制下，嚴格責任制度將致使投資人完全忽略應內生化之風險性考量而產生過度投資之經濟後果。然而，若會計師宣告破產倒閉，是否仍使審計保險功能存續，是本研究欲探討的議題。

本研究採用Schwartz(1997)之賽局模型，探討會計師破產風險對於審計品質與投資之影響，而將會計師破產機率分為外生變數與內生變數討論。若會計師破產的可能性確實受到投資層面之影響，則在會計師有可能宣告破產而不再扮演深口袋理賠者之際，審計的保險功能將受到損害。過高的法律責任(嚴格責任制)未必一定引發過度投資之經濟後果，而投資層面有機會尋求一符合社會最適之水準。然而此時過高的法律責任卻也使得會計師的努力水準降低而造成損傷審計品質的不效率性結果。對社會整體而言，是否應提高會計師的法律責任，應同時權衡上述兩者的結合效果。本研究之結果可供主管機關對於審計品質管制要求的法律制度面參考。

Abstract

The worldwide leading accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, was involved in the Enron scandal and faced with significant bankruptcy risk. This event caused the auditor’s existing environment deeply changed and reputation harmed. Dye(1993) pointed out that auditing plays two important roles in the capital market, the information role and the insurance role, while Schwartz(1997) finds that under “out-of-pocket damage measure” the insurance role may lead investors to over-invest without considering risky assets investment, compared with the social optimal level. Whether the bankruptcy risk faced by the auditor, however, would change the insurance role and the investment level or not is the main concern we are exploring.

This study is based on Schwartz(1997) analytical model to stress the impacts of auditor’s bankruptcy risk on audit quality and investment. We find out that under the out-of-pocket damage measure with auditor’s bankruptcy consideration, the economic consequence of over-investment may not still exist in the capital market. In addition, the effort level of auditor would decline in the strict legal regime when bankruptcy risk occurs compared with the social optimal level. Our analysis would provide valuable reference in auditor’s legal liability determination for policy-makers and regulators.

內容目錄
頁次
內容目錄I
圖表目錄II

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究主題 5
第三節 研究架構 5

第二章 會計師法律責任演進與文獻探討 7
第一節 會計師法律責任基本概念介紹 7
第二節 訴訟風潮發展與現況 14
第三節 1995年改革法案之介紹 18
第四節 法律責任、審計品質與投資之相關文獻探討 21

第三章 會計師破產風險之均衡分析 25
第一節 基本模型 25
第二節 社會福利函數 32
第三節 會計師破產機率為外生變數之均衡分析 34
第四節 會計師破產機率為內生變數之均衡分析 41

第四章 結論與建議 51
第一節 結論 51
第二節 研究限制與建議53

參考文獻 54
附錄一 中華民國會計師執行簽證業務之法律責任 56
附錄二 證明 64

圖表目錄

表次
表2.1 習慣法下會計師專業之普通過失、重大過失及舞弊比較 11
表2.2 習慣法下第三人範圍之演進發展 12
表2.3 成文法下第三人範圍與著名判例 13
表3.1 訴訟發生時會計師有賠償責任的情況 28
表3.2 不同法律責任制度下本研究採用之函數標記彙總表 31
表3.3 會計師與投資人雙方反應函數在過失責任制度
與社會最適之情況下比較 45
表3.4 會計師與投資人雙方反應函數在嚴格責任制度
與社會最適之情況下比較 49
表3.5 兩種法律責任制度與社會最適之差異比較 49
表3.6 本研究與Schwartz(1997)之會計師與投資人最適反應函數比較 50
表3.7 會計師努力水準與投資人投資水準與社會最適
情況比較彙總一覽表 50

圖次
圖1.1 本研究架構圖 6
圖2.1 適用共同連帶賠償制或比例賠償制之判斷流程圖 20
圖3.1 基本賽局模式 28
圖3.2 時間次序決策圖 29

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