臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討管理者薪酬-績效敏感度對投資-現金流量敏感度之影響，以及中國上市公司國營企業和非國營企業的管理者薪酬-績效敏感度對投資-現金流量敏感度影響的差異。
我們以2005年起至2014年中國深圳及上海證券交易所之A股上市公司為研究對象。樣本包含2,408家上市公司，總觀測值20,374筆。本文將薪酬-績效敏感度分為兩部分固定薪酬-績效敏感度(Salary Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Salary PPS)和激勵薪酬-績效敏感度(Incentive Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Incentive PPS)。分別探討固定薪酬-績效敏感度和激勵薪酬-績效敏感度對投資-現金流量敏感度之影響，激勵薪酬包括管理者當年度所收到的股票與選擇權數量。除了檢驗完整樣本之外，也對樣本進行切割分群，以探討不同狀況下，薪酬-績效敏感度和投資-現金流量敏感度的關係。
我們發現，在自由現金流量大於零的狀況下，可以找出薪酬-績效敏感度和投資-現金流量敏感度呈現負向關係，也就是說薪酬-績效敏感度將弱化投資-現金流量敏感度，另外，當中國上市公司為國營企業時，其公司治理較差，薪酬-績效敏感度將無法用來描述代理問題的狀況。

In this study we investigate the relation between pay-performance sensitivity and investment-cash flow Sensitivity of 2,408 listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We also examine the differences in such relationship betweenState-owned and Non- State-owned enterprises.
The proxies for pay-performance sensitivity are salary pay-performance Sensitivity and incentive pay-performance sensitivity. Incentive pay includes stock and stock options that company's CEO received by the end of each year.
We find that pay-performance sensitivityattenuate the relationship between investment and cash flow sensitivity under the condition that company's free cash flow greater than 0. Such relation is more significant in non-state-owned firms than in State-owned firms, implying that the latter are more poorly governed than the former.

摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 6
第一節 代理問題和投資關係 6
第二節 資訊不對稱和投資 8
第三節 假說建立 9
第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 研究樣本 11
第二節 變數定義 12
第三節 薪酬-績效敏感度（Pay-Performance Sensitivity, PPS） 14
第四節 研究設計 16
第四章 實證結果與分析 17
第一節 敘述性統計分析 17
第二節 迴歸結果與分析 20
第五章 結論 29
參考文獻　　　31

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