臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

網路商業交流興起代表了資訊技術的不斷進步給傳統商業活動帶來了巨大的衝擊，也衝擊了銀行必須在這波網路熱浪中不斷追求網路金融創新發展，也顯示了金融電子化的投資及其帶來的策略價值都越來越重要。
本篇研究將探討銀行第三方支付平台之投資決策時的評價應用，以網路預估交易數據模擬出銀行投資於第三方支付平台為研究案例，運用賽局理論分析銀行進行第三方支付平台之專案投資。
在本研究各項情境假設前提下，銀行於投資平台專案時，運用淨現值評價法來看是值得投資之專案。於策略分析方面，模擬兩個相同規模之銀行於投資平台專案時，為了拉開與對手的競爭距離，針對做行銷策略時去作出相關核心功能細項費用減免，並與知名境內或境外網路商家合作提升市佔率及營利，計畫行銷決策應避免核心功能費用減免。
基於電子金融的特殊性質，並非傳統資產投資的評估方法就能合理的評估出其資訊投資的真正價值及做出較合理的決策分析。如能利用NPV及賽局理論中的對不同投資狀況隨機假設下的投資時機及價值進行分析 ,形成有良好解釋的直覺式評估,將為銀行投資網路金融專案取得最適投資策略。

Internet business exchange represents a progressive rise of information technology to the traditional commercial activities brought a huge impact, but also the impact of the bank must continue to pursue the development of a network of financial innovation in this heat wave network, and also shows the financial electronic the value of its investment strategy to bring increasingly important.
This study will examine the evaluation of third-party payment application banks when the investment decision platform to simulate a network forecast transaction data bank to invest in third-party payment platform for the case studies, the use of game theory to analyze Bank of third-party payment platform project investment.
In the context of this study, under the assumption of the bank at the time of investment platform project, use the NPV evaluation point of view is worth the investment project. In policy analysis, simulated bank when two of the same scale investment platform project, in order to pull away opponents and competition for time to do the marketing strategy to make the relevant breakdown of the core functions of fee waivers, and with the well-known inside or outside the network business cooperation to enhance market share and profit, plan marketing decisions should avoid core function fee waiver.
Based on the special nature of e-finance, assessment methods are not traditional asset investment will be able to reasonably assess the true value of their IT investments and make a more rational decision analysis. Can take advantage of investment opportunities as and value NPV and game theory in different investment situation is analyzed under the assumption of random form a good intuitive explanation assessment project will finance investment banking network to obtain the optimal investment strategy.

目次
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 第三方支付 5
第二節 投資評估分析 8
第三節 賽局理論 10
第三章 研究方法 12
第一節 研究模式與步驟 12
第二節 第三方支付系統投資研究方法 14
3.2.1　淨現值法（ＮＰＶ） 14
3.2.2　賽局模型的建立及其分析 16
第四章 第三方支付投資專案案例分析 19
第一節 市場分析 19
第二節 第三方支付兩岸現況 22
第三節 政府政策 27
第四節 現行法規進程 28
第五節 法規分析 31
第六節 本研究模擬假設銀行第三方支付專案開發進程 32
6.6.1　在國內市場業務 32
6.6.2 境外市場業務範籌 35
第七節 第三方支付專案國內網路金融代理收付架構說明 37
第八節 專案系統建置時程與人力規劃 42
第九節 專案未來展望策略 45
第十節 專案收益評估表 48
第十一節 投資策略分析 53
第十二節 境內與境外策略分析 68
第五章 結論與未來建議 81
參考文獻 82

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