臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去文獻多以董事及監察人(董監事)固定酬勞及變動酬勞之合計數探討其與公司績效之關聯，然而未考慮董監事可能係藉由應計項目以影響公司盈餘，且董監事固定酬勞係屬於董監事為公司提供服務所獲得之勞務對價，無論公司盈虧均應支付予董監事，故董監事缺乏誘因，操弄或允許操弄盈餘之動機較弱；而董監事酬勞係公司依據章程規定以稅後盈餘乘以某成數，或由股東會依據公司營運結果決定發放之數額，在為了領取更多酬勞之誘因下，董監事操縱或允許操縱盈餘之動機較強。實質上董監事固定酬勞與董監事變動酬勞係屬不同性質之酬金，影響盈餘品質程度亦不同，因此本研究嘗試分別探討董監事固定酬勞、董監事變動酬勞以及董監事固定酬勞及變動酬勞之合計數與盈餘品質之關聯為何。研究結果顯示，董監事固定酬勞與異常應計數呈顯著負相關，代表董監事領取之固定酬勞越高，操弄或允許操弄盈餘之動機較薄弱，公司之盈餘品質較佳；董監事變動酬勞與異常應計數呈顯著正相關，意謂董監事領取越多變動酬勞，操縱盈餘之誘因較強烈，因此公司盈餘品質較差。最後，董監事固定酬勞及變動酬勞之合計數與異常應計數呈顯著正相關，表示董監事容易為了領取越多之酬勞，向上操縱公司盈餘之動機強，則公司盈餘品質較差。

Previous studies have mostly explored the correlation between corporate performance and director and supervisor compensation, both fixed and variable, but few studies have explored the possibility that directors and supervisors influence corporate earnings by manipulating accruals. Fixed compensation is payment for the labor that a director or supervisor provides in service to a corporation, and it is paid regardless of corporate profits or losses; therefore, directors and supervisors with fixed compensation lack incentives to manipulate or allow the manipulation of earnings. By contrast, variable director and supervisor compensation systems, which award a percentage of after-tax earnings as stipulated by the company or a performance-based awards determined by the shareholder meeting, provide incentive for directors and supervisors to manipulate or allow the manipulation of earnings to obtain higher levels of compensation. In other words, fixed and variable compensation for directors and supervisors have various effects on earnings quality. We explored the correlation that fixed compensation, variable compensation, and the sum of fixed and variable compensation for directors and supervisors have with earnings quality. The results indicated that fixed compensation for directors and supervisors had a significantly negative correlation with abnormal accruals, signifying that fixed compensation reduces directors’ and supervisors’ motivation to manipulate or allow the manipulation of earnings, resulting in a high quality of corporate earnings quality. Variable compensation for directors and supervisors was significantly and positively correlated with abnormal accruals, signifying that variable compensation increases the directors’ and supervisors’ motivation to manipulate or allow the manipulation of earnings, resulting in a low quality of corporate earnings. Last, the total amount of fixed and variable compensation was significantly and positively correlated with abnormal accruals, signifying that directors and supervisors develop stronger motivation to manipulate corporate earnings to earn more compensation, resulting in a low quality of corporate earnings.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 4
第一節 董監事固定酬勞與變動酬勞之不同 4
第二節 董監事酬勞之相關研究 6
第三節 董監事固定酬勞或變動酬勞與盈餘品質之關聯性研究 8
第四節 假說發展 9
第三章 研究設計 11
第一節 資料說明 11
第二節 實證模式與變數定義 12
第四章 實證結果 22
第一節 敘述性統計量 22
第二節 相關係數 22
第三節 迴歸結果 25
第四節 敏感性分析 36
第五章 結論與建議 43
第一節 結論 43
第二節 研究建議 44
參考文獻 46

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