臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　如何解釋行動？這個問題是行動哲學所探討的問題之一。我們通常會提出理由來解釋行動。但這個解釋行動的理由能不能當做行動發生的原因，這便有許多爭論。一種觀點認為我們解釋行動的理由就是行動發生的原因，這種觀點叫做「行動的因果理論」(causal theory of actions)。本論文主要是要探討Donald Davidson的行動的因果理論是如何為理由解釋即為原因解釋做出辯護。
　　本論文第一章說明什麼是行動，並探討行動的因果理論的起源和發展。第二章探討Davidson的行動因果理論是如何說明理由解釋即為原因解釋。第三章探討Davidson早先觀點中的一些問題，以及他對自己的觀點的修正。第四章則是對異常因果鏈的探討，並從其他哲學家的觀點中找出可能的解決方式。

How to explain an action? This question is one of the issues in the philosophy of action. We usually give reasons to explain actions. However, are the reasons for an action its causes? This is a controversial question. One view is that our reason for an action is its causes. This view is called "causal theory of action." The present thesis is mainly to discuss Donald Davidson's defense for this theory.
Chapter one explains what action is, and discusses the origin and development of causal theory of action. Chapter two explains Davidson's theory in some detail. Chapter three discusses some difficulties in Davidson's earlier and revised views. Chapter four discusses the problem of deviant causal chains and its possible solutions.

第一章 緒論..............................1
第二章 理論背景...........................5
第一節 什麼是行動.....................5
第二節 Aristotle的目的論解釋..........12
第三節 Wittgenstein對理由與原因之區別..15
第三章 Davidson的行動的因果理論............19
第一節 理由的描述.....................19
第二節 行動的理由即是它的原因...........27
第四章 Davidson對意向及實踐推理的修正.......33
第一節 純粹意圖......................34
第二節 意向與信念....................36
第三節 意向與支持態度.................39
第五章 異常因果鏈.........................44
第六章 結論..............................51
參考書目..................................53

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