臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

心靈實在論、物理的因果封閉性原則和心靈因果的存在三個設理能否同時成立？如果主張心靈因果作用存在與心靈實在論，會導致物理因果封閉性原則的失敗。如果主張物理因果封閉性原則，則心靈實在論需要更強的支持，心靈因果作用的存在也會受威脅。做為一個物理論者如何能同時接受這三個設理，而不至於導致矛盾呢？這是本文要處理的問題。

Kim是所有哲學家中，將心理現象的因果問題最成熟呈現的人。Kim用這三個主張產生的衝突，來論證心靈因果作用不存在，真正的因果作用只發生在物理層次，所以化約論為真。本文檢討Kim的論證，主張Kim並未解決心靈因果作用的問題。

也有哲學家例如Baker主張物理的因果封閉性原則是錯的，因果是知識論的問題，而不是形上學的問題，所以心靈的因果作用存在；她的因果主張接近Hume，所以必須承繼Hume的所有困難。本文不同意Hume將因果視為心理習慣的見解。

我認為心靈實在論、物理的因果封閉性原則和心靈因果的存在，這三個主張皆為真，它們所導致的衝突只是表面上的矛盾。這個表面矛盾之所以產生，是在於對因果關係這個概念的認知上有錯誤。只要提出往下之因果作用的新解，就可以成功解釋心理現象的因果問題。本文將發展Searle的生物自然主義，和往下之因果作用的新解，來解決心理現象的因果問題。

Could these three theses, mental realism, the physical causal closure principle and mental causation jointly be consistent with each other? It seems that mental realism and mental causation will result in the failure of the physical causal closure principle. On the other hand, the physical causal closure principle will threaten the other two theses. In this thesis I am concerned with the problem of how to make these three theses consistent.

Kim is a philosopher who has done the best in dealing with the issue of mental causation. He rejects the existence of mental causation, because he thinks there is a paradox among the three theses. He argues that the real causal interaction happens only at the physical or brain level. For Kim, reductive physicalism is the best we can have. What I will do is to examine Kim’s argument, and I argue that he did not solve the problem.

Some philosophers such as Baker reject the physical causal closure principle. According to Baker, causation is an epistemological principle, not a metaphysical doctrine. The existence of mental causation is an unnecessary worry. This view is similar to Hume’s position, so it has to face the same problems that Hume has to deal with. I do not accept the view that the causation is just psychological habit.

I will assume that, these three theses are all true. And I will argue that the paradox derived from them is just a surface contradiction. I will contend that a proper theory of the downward causation can successfully solve the problem of mental causation. This thesis develops Searle’s biological naturalism and a new approach to the downward causation. By doing that, I will argue that the problem of mental causation can be resolved.

口試委員會審定書………………………………………………………… i
誌謝………………………………………………………………………… ii
中文摘要…………………………………………………………………… iii
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………… iv

第一章：導論……………………………………………………………… 1
1.1本論文要處理的問題：心靈因果問題………………………… 1
1.2 心靈實在論……………………………………………………… 2 1.3 物理的封閉性原則……………………………………………… 7
1.4 心靈因果存在…………………………………………………… 10
1.5 本文章節安排…………………………………………………… 12

第二章：心靈因果與反化約論…………………………………………… 14
2.1 什麼是心靈因果作用？………………………………………… 14
2.2 化約論與反化約論與同一論…………………………………… 19
2.3 化約論沒有心靈因果的問題…………………………………… 29
2.4 化約論的困難…………………………………………………… 31
2.5 為什麼本文不採取化約論？…………………………………… 31
2.6 特殊科學做為高層次科學……………………………………… 34
2.7 心理性質之多重可實現性……………………………………… 35
2.8 心理科學的自主性……………………………………………… 36
2.9 心靈因果是反化約論的困難之問題所在？…………………… 39

第三章：Kim的化約論能解釋心靈因果嗎？…………………………… 41
3.1 Kim的解決策略………………………………………………… 41
3.2 Kim的問題在哪裡？…………………………………………… 42
3.3 心靈因果作用為什麼不存在？Kim的論證…………………… 44
　　 3.4 Kim的化約論…………………………………………………… 51
3.5 Kim的化約論不能解釋心靈因果作用………………………… 54
3.6 Baker對心物問題的看法………………………………………… 56

第四章：一個新觀點：浮現論與向下因果作用………………………… 61
4.1 什麼是分層本體論……………………………………………… 61
4.2 分層本體論與浮現論…………………………………………… 63
4.3 Searle浮現論如何處理心靈因果問題…………………………… 64
4.4 向下之因果作用新解…………………………………………… 67

第五章：結論……………………………………………………………… 70
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………… 74

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