臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘 要
自從1997年亞洲金融風暴後，許多針對東亞國家之研究發現，此地區公司的股權集中程度普遍高於其他地區，且公司監理機制之不完善，是導致亞洲金融危機的最主要原因。因此，本研究即以La Porta 等人（1999）追蹤公司「最終控制權」的方法，探討我國上市公司的最終控制型態，亦即分辨投票權之最終控制者身份，將屬於同一控制群體的直接與間接所持有的投票權相加，藉以辨認公司的最大控制群體（持股最大股東）。此外，並以市價淨值比作為公司權益評價之因變數，透過控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離的情形，來衡量控制股東對於小股東財富剝奪的程度。再者，考量董監事逐漸成為我國上市公司監理機制的主要核心下，本研究亦探討董監事結構在公司監理機制上能否扮演減緩公司核心代理問題的角色。最後，本研究亦建立所有權結構為一內生變數的假設，以探討獎酬契約在權益代理問題上所能發揮之成效。
本研究以民國八十七年至八十九年間曾發佈公開說明書之上市公司為研究對象，另考量金融保險業之營業性質及財務結構較為特殊，與其他產業相差甚鉅予以排除後共得有效樣本163家。透過複迴歸分析，其實證結果如下：
1.台灣上市公司確實存在有明顯的股權集中現象，且其最終控制型態係以家族為最主要的控制型態。
2.台灣上市公司的控制股東普遍運用金字塔結構、交叉持股與透過名目投資公司的方式獲取控制權，及藉由參與管理來強化控制權。並因此而使其控制權與現金流量權產生偏離，且家族控制型態確實顯示出有較高的控制權與控制權與現金流量權偏離的現象。
3.控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離幅度愈大者，控制股東對小股東剝削的程度就愈大，其中又以家族企業集團利用名目投資公司再轉而持有母公司股份者最為嚴重。
4.台灣上市公司之監理機制，在散戶投資者眾多及機構投資者著重短期投資策略及無法入主董事會情況下，並無法發揮其應有的監理功能。
5.控制股東的控制權是決定公司價值和投資的一重要因素，相對的，公司價值亦是決定控制股東控制權和投資的一重要函數。亦即，公司價值較高時，控制股東會較願意持有公司較多的控制權，且較高的控制股東控制權亦會有較高的投資比率。

關鍵詞：核心代理問題、公司治理、金字塔股權、交叉持股、股東價值

Abstract
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, several researches for the East Asian have found that concentration of ownership higher than other areas and weak corporate governance have been important reasons of financing crisis. Therefore, the study adopts the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), which traces the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights, identifies their ultimate control patterns, finds the controlling shareholders of firm, and then calculates each ultimate owner’s control rights and cash flow rights.
In Addition, we regress to the market-to-book ratio of common equity on controlling shareholders’ control rights deviating from cash flow rights, then examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders. Furthermore, considering the quality of board oversight has received increasing attention in recent years. This paper investigates whether the board construction on corporate governance mechanism effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.
Finally, the study tests whether it is appropriate to treat ownership structure as exogenous, and explores the function of managerial compensation contracting on equity’s agency problem.
The research data are collected from the publications of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market between 1998 and 2000.There are 163 validated observations which are obtained. Empirical result suggests：
1.The high concentration of ownership is more common in Taiwan publicly listed companies and those firms are typically controlled by families.
2.The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights because they through the use of pyramids, cross-holdings, paper company and participation in management. And the condition of family control company is the worst.
3.The more the controlling shareholders’ control rights deviate from cash flow rights, the worsen the central agency problem is between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and the extent of expropriation is particularly serious among family-controlled samples.
4.For Taiwan publicly listed companies, the corporate governance mechanism could not effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.
5.The results of simultaneous equation regression show that controlling shareholders’ control rights is an important determinant of corporate value and investment. More importantly, the regressions also show that corporate value is an important function of controlling shareholders’ control rights and investment.

Key Words：Central agency problem, Corporate governance, Pyramid structure, Cross-holding, Shareholder value.

目 錄
第一章緒論 ················································································ 1
第一節研究動機與目的 ························································ 1
第二節研究問題 ···································································· 4
第三節研究架構 ···································································· 4
第二章文獻探討 ········································································ 6
第一節股權結構與核心代理問題 ········································ 6
第二節監理機制與核心代理問題 ········································ 8
第三章研究設計 ······································································ 16
第一節研究假說 ·································································· 16
第二節理論模型 ·································································· 20
第三節研究變數定義與研究模型········································ 22
第四節控制權與現金流量權的定義 ·································· 28
第五節範例 ·········································································· 32
第六節研究期間與樣本選擇 ·············································· 38
第四章實證結果與分析···························································· 39
第一節基本統計量分析························································ 39
第二節實證結果分析···························································· 49
第五章結論與建議···································································· 75
第一節結論············································································ 75
第二節建議············································································ 78
第三節研究限制···································································· 80

附錄 ····································································································· 81
參考文獻 ····························································································· 86

圖 目 錄
圖1-1：研究架構圖 ·········································································· 5
圖2-1：世界銀行公司監理架構圖···················································· 9
圖 四：金字塔股權結構圖······························································ 31
圖 五：交叉持股結構圖·································································· 31
圖5-1：徐旭東家族對遠東集團的股權控制圖······························ 32
圖5-2：吳亦圭家族對台聚集團的股權控制圖······························ 35
圖5-3：郭木生家族對力麗集團的股權控制圖······························ 37


















表 目 錄
表 1：樣本公司選取過程表····························································· 38
表4-1-1：台灣上市公司最終所有者型態之比較（10﹪標準）·········· 40
表4-1-2：台灣上市公司最終所有者型態之比較（20﹪標準）·········· 40
表4-1-3：台灣上市公司不同產業別之最終所有者型態之比較·········· 40
表4-2-1：基本敘述統計量（全體樣本）············································· 44
表4-2-2：基本敘述統計量（不同產業別）········································· 45
表4-2-3：基本敘述統計量（不同最終所有者型態）························· 46
表4-3：相關係數矩陣 ······································································· 48
表4-3-1：模型一以「 」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果····· 51
表4-3-2：模型一以「 」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果········· 53
表4-3-3：模型一以「 」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果··········· 55
表4-3-4：模型一以「相對偏離100」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果·········· 57
表4-3-5：模型一以「相對偏離0」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果············ 59
表4-3-6：模型一以「偏離100」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果·················· 61
表4-3-7：模型一以「偏離0」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果···················· 63
表4-4-1：模型二以「相對偏離100」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果·········· 66
表4-4-2：模型二以「相對偏離0」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果············ 67
表4-4-3：模型二以「偏離100」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果·················· 68
表4-4-4：模型二以「偏離0」衡量之迴歸分析分析結果···················· 69
表4-5-1：模型三全體樣本之迴歸分析分析結果·································· 71
表4-5-2：模型三家族控制型態樣本之迴歸分析分析結果·················· 72
表4-5-3：模型三非電子產業樣本之迴歸分析分析結果······················ 73
表4-5-4：模型三電子產業樣本之迴歸分析分析結果·························· 74

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