臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要是將下游廠商技術授權納入考慮，探討上游廠商訂價策略對社會福利的影響。本文建立一個垂直相關模型，假設上游為一家獨占原料供應商，提供原料給兩下游最終財廠商，此一獨占原料供應商可採取單一訂價或差別訂價。兩家下游廠商則將自上游原料供應商購得之原料搭配各自擁有之技術或互補性要素投入生產最終財後，在最終財市場從事Cournot競爭。此外，在兩家最終財廠商中，有一家具備有製程專利技術，可以以固定權利金或單位權利金的授權模式授權給另一家最終財廠商。本文結果如下。第一，若差別訂價下的產業總產量小於單一訂價，則差別訂價下的社會福利會低於單一訂價。第二，若差別訂價下的產業總產量與單一訂價相等，則差別訂價下的社會福利可能會高於或低於單一訂價。第三，若差別訂價下的產業總產量高於單一訂價，則在差別訂價下的社會福利可能會高於或會低於單一訂價。本文結果與DeGraba (1990)以及Inderst and Shaffer (2009)之結論有所差異。DeGraba (1990)指出差別訂價下的總產量和社會福利會比單一訂價下低。Inderst and Shaffer (2009)則提出的差別訂價下的總產量和社會福利皆高於單一訂價。

This paper compares the welfare effect of pricing strategies of an upstream supplier which sells its input to downstream duopoly market where one firm transfer a process innovation technology to another firm. By the model, we want to compare the welfare effect of uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing strategies of the upstream monopolistic supplier. We have found result as the following. First, if the total output under discriminatory pricing is lower than under uniform pricing, then the social welfare under discriminatory pricing will be lower than under uniform pricing. Secondly, if the total output under discriminatory pricing equals to under uniform pricing, then the social welfare under discriminatory pricing will be lower or higher than under uniform pricing. Thirdly, if the total output under discriminatory pricing is higher than under uniform pricing, then the social welfare under discriminatory pricing will be lower or higher than under uniform pricing. And such results differ from the literatures of DeGraba (1990) and Inderst and Shaffer (2009).

1.諸論..............................................1
1.1研究動機與研究目的.............................1
1.2 文獻回顧......................................2
1.3 基本模型......................................8
1.4 本文架構......................................9
2.上游原料供應商採取單一訂價.......................10
2.1下游市場均衡.................,,,,,,,,,,,,,....10
2.1.1不授權下的市場均衡.....,,,,,,,,,,,,,,...10
2.1.2授權下的市場均衡........................11
2.2下游的最適授權契約............................13
2.3 上游原料供應商的最適訂價.....................14
3.差別訂價.........................................21
3.1下游市場均衡..................................21
3.1.1 不授權下的市場均衡.....................21
3.1.2 授權下的市場均衡.......................22
3.2下游的最適授權契約............................24
3.3上游原料供應商的最適訂價......................25
4.兩種訂價策略下各種效果的比較.....................36
4.1兩種訂價策略下的福利效果比較..................36
4.2 兩種訂價策略下的上游原料供應商利潤效果比較...46
4.3 兩種訂價策略下的兩下游廠商利潤效果比較.......48
5.結論.............................................52
附錄一.............................................53
附錄二.............................................54
參考文獻...........................................66

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