臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

通常哲學家會以思想實驗當作反例來質疑一個哲學分析的有效性，如果一個想法是形上學上或是邏輯上可能的話，哲學家們就會認為在作哲學分析的時候應該要把它納入考量。但是僅從某些可以想像的場景中獲得實質上得結論，這樣的推論過程不會太倉促了嗎？威爾基(Wilkes )認為一個實質上有貢獻的思想實驗必須要符合兩項要件：(一)提出思想實驗的作者本身要知道「實際環境」在這個思想實驗的場景中，哪些條件被改變了？哪些條件保持不變？(二)作者必須要知道以思想實驗當作反例是否切中主題，不然思想實驗會讓我們脫離主題陷入想像泥濘裡。相對於思想實驗，精神疾病學提供另一條更為實際的途徑來驗證哲學上不同的主張。在這篇論文裡，我藉由心理學家對精神分裂症的研究來初步認識自我意識，再進一步作哲學分析。由於當代最具影響力的理論是弗立斯(Frith )對精神分裂症所提出的認知神經模型 (Neurocognitive Model)
在第一章，我一方面順著弗立斯對精神分裂症的區分來說明精神分裂症的各種症狀。另一方面闡明弗立斯的認知神經模型對精神分裂症所做的解釋和弗立斯模型背後所依據的想法
在第二章，我引入關於自我意識三種不同的哲學分析：第一是史卓森(Galen Strawson)的SEMET，第二是羅森薩(David Rosenthal)的第一人稱高階思想理論(Higher-order first-person thoughts)，最後是任哈維(Dan Zahavi)的自我理論(egological theory)。三者比較討論之後，我認為自我理論是理解自我意識的最佳途徑。
在第三章的開始，我對弗立斯的認知神經模型所造成的缺失進行批評，最後以自我理論的哲學立場為基礎，提出趕?Shaun Gallagher)的理論來解釋精神分裂症。

The customary way to test the validity of philosophical analyses is to look for invalidating counter-examples. By means of imagination, that is, thought experiments, we do not necessarily have to come across factual or actual counter- examples. And if this conceptual or metaphysical possibility is the case, then we should take it into account when assessing reliability of the philosophical analyses. But, is it really legitimate to draw substantial philosophical conclusions from the fact that certain scenarios are imaginable? As Wilkes has pointed out, for a thought experiment to be valuable it must fulfill the prerequisites (1)one must acknowledge what is being altered and what remains the same in the imagined scenario when compared to the actual world; (2)one actually know something about the topic under discussion. Otherwise we might easily end in a situation where it seems to us that we have succeeded in imagining a possible situation, whereas nothing have be done genuinely. Except thought experiments, psychiatry provides another raw data for examining our philosophical points; Dealing with real phenomena can probe and test our concept and intuition in a more reliable, actual way.
The methodology of my essay is started with concrete abnormal phenomena, schizophrenia, its symptoms and signs. With explication Frith’s the underlying psychopathological framework for schizophrenia, philosophical debates about self-consciousness come next. And, the model which is based on phenomenal approach of self-consciousness criticizes Frith’s model in the final part. For me, arguments come across references to zombie, brain-transplantations and twin-earths have their own virtues, and just being expressed dramatically. However, they are not suitable as the first stop in the long journey for philosophical research.

Chapter 1 The Nature of Schizophrenia and Frith’s Neurocognitive Model
2 Philosophical Debates about Self
3 Phenomenological Approaches to Schizophrenia

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