臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

根據傳統的主流文獻，許多學者發現加盟廠商對加盟主所收取的權利金比例越低，加盟主會有更強烈的動機去維持分店的品質；並且，權利金比例與加盟金兩者之間呈現負向的關係。根據Alchian and Allen Theorem，不同的高價的高階產品能透過捆綁銷售而改變相對價格，進而促成整個產品組合的有效定位。本研究利用Alchian 與 Allen 定理，探討加盟總部是否會利用加盟金以及權利金這兩項費用來促進加盟總部為其加盟連鎖體系於競爭市場中定位; 另外，加盟主也可以透過這些資訊來辨別不同加盟廠商所提供的服務品質。
根據本研究所收集之89間美國餐飲連鎖業者的資訊，探討加盟金和權利金費用之間的關係。我們發現，如果將加盟金所對應的服務與權利金所對應的服務視為兩類不同的產品時，兩類產品共同捆綁銷售的價格，就是總加盟金與權利金的加總。提供不同服務品質的加盟廠商，他們所收取的權利金和加盟金在加總後所形成的相對價格，也就反映出提供不同加盟服務的總部在市場中提供不同的服務定位。本研究還發現，加盟廠商所收取的加盟金和授權期間所支付的權利金總費用兩者呈正向關係時，加盟金與權利金的加總金額越高，廠商的分店總數也就越多。希望本研究之分析結果可供加盟主做為判定一個加盟廠商服務品質的方向與參考指標。

According to the traditional mainstream literatures, many scholars found that the lower the royalty rate, the higher the incentives to franchisees on maintaining the quality of a franchised store. Also, the royalty rate and the franchise fee are inversely related. According to Alchian and Allen Theorem, the relative price of different high-priced high-end products can be changed through bundling sales in order to facilitate the efficient positioning of whole product portfolio. This research uses the Alchian and Allen Theorem to investigate that whether the franchisors will use the prices of franchise fee and royalty fee to contribute to their positioning in a competitive market. Besides, franchisees can identify the different franchisors’ service qualities based on these information.
In this paper, we explore the nature of the relationship between the franchise fee and the royalty fee. According to the empirical data we collected of the 89 franchising restaurants in the United States, we have the following findings. If we regard the services corresponding to the franchise fee and the royalty fee as different products, the total price of bundling sales is the sum of franchise fee and royalty fee. Franchises, providing different service qualities, use the different relative prices of the totality of franchise fees and royalty fees to reveal the different services positioning in the market. In addition, we also find that a franchise, charging the positive relationship between the franchise fee and the royalty fee during the franchise contract, has more outlets. Hope the findings of this research can help franchisees to identify a franchise’s service quality efficiently.

Table of Contents
摘要 I
Abstract II
Table of Contents III
List of Figures IV
List of Tables V
1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background 1
1.2 Franchising-Definition 2
1.3 Research Motivation 3
2. Literature Review 6
2.1 The Decision of Constructing The Franchise Contract 6
2.1.1 The Negative Relationship Between Franchise Fees and Royalties 6
2.1.2 The Nonnegative Relationship Between Franchise Fees and Royalties 7
2.2 The Decision For The Percentage of Franchisor-Owned Outlets 8
2.3 The Decision of Choosing Franchising Operating Type 9
2.4 The Third Law of Demand 10
3. Research Method 15
3.1 Research Constructions 15
3.2 Data Resources 15
3.3 Research Method 16
3.4 Research Hypothesis 16
4. Empirical Results 20
4.1 The Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 20
4.2 Empirical Results 23
5. Conclusions 32
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 32
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 33
References 34

List of Figures
Figure 2.4.1: The Relative Price of the High-End Grape to the Low-End Grape Drops After the High-End Grape is bundled with the Shipment Service 11
Figure 2.4.2:The Nominal Price of the High-Quality Grape Rises After the High-Quality Grape is Bundled with the Shipment Service and Sold in a High-Quality Segment 12
Figure 4.2.1: The Scatter Diagram of Royalty Fees and Franchise Fees 26

List of Tables
Table 1.1.1: The Influence of Frnahcises in United Sates Economy 1
Table 1.3.1: The Mainly Context in Franchise Contract 5
Table 2.4.1: The Grape Story of the Alchian-Allen Theorem (1964) 11
Table 3.2.1: The Number of Samples on Each Classification 16
Table 4.1.1: The Definition of Variables 20
Table 4.1.2: Descriptive Statistics 22
Table 4.2.1: Relationship Between Franchise Fees and Royalty Rates 24
Table 4.2.2: Relationship Between Franchise Fees and Royalty Fees 25
Table 4.2.3: The Relationship Between Nominal Price and Outlets in Successful Positioning Franchise 27
Table 4.2.4: The Relationship Between Nominal Price and Outlets in Unsuccessful Positioning Franchise 27
Table 4.2.5: The Estimates of The First Regression of The 2SLS 28
Table 4.2.6: The Determinants of Franchise Fees 30
Table 4.2.7: The Summary of Hypotheses 31

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