臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

債務融資是這幾年來學者廣泛研究的課題，由於中國債券市場發展迅速，逐漸成為中國金融體系中不可或缺的一個重要組成部分，為中國的經濟發展發揮了很大的促進作用，因此本文在以前的學者的基礎上加入了債券融資，來探討債務融資的治理作用。本研究以MM理論、權衡理論、委託代理理論、信號傳遞理論以及資訊不對稱理論作為理論基礎，對債務融資的治理作用進行分析。以2007-2014年至中國a股市場上市公司作為研究對象。通過修正的Jones模型、Roychowdhury模型及Richardson模型來對債務融資與盈餘管理以及企業非效率投資行為做研究，來探討債務融資的治理作用。在研究企業投資行為時，把企業分成了國有和非國有公司。結果顯示：（1）債務融資對於盈餘管理的影響是非單調性的，呈『U』型。（2）商業信用比例與企業盈餘管理不存在顯著關係。銀行借款比例與企業盈餘管理為正相關，銀行借款比例越高，越容易導致盈餘管理行為的產生。債券融資比例與企業應計盈餘管理為正相關，與實質盈餘管理為負相關。債券融資對於盈餘管理的影響暫時沒有結果（3）國有上市公司更容易導致非效率投資。（4）商業信用對於國有上市公司和非國有上市公司的治理作用一致。債券融資對於國有上市公司和非國有上市公司的治理作用還需做進一步的研究。（5）對於非國有上市公司而言，短期債務融資起到一定的治理作用。研究還發現，自由現金流不會導致過度投資，但能緩解投資不足，但這與國外學者的研究不符。並且盈利越高的企業，越容易產生過度投資的行為，同樣，也能緩解投資不足。
本文的研究揭示了債務融資的治理作用，對債權人的保護以及企業應當避免非效率投資的決策有一點的現實意義。但是由於中國的債券處於發展階段，並且中國才踏入市場經濟，所以債券融資的治理作用並不清晰，有待其他學者進一步研究。

Debt financing is a topic researched widely by scholars in recent years and it gradually becomes an indispensable important part of Chinese finance system and has played great promotion role on economic development of China because of rapid development of Chinese bond market; therefore, the paper increases bond financing to discuss governance function of debt financing based on research result of previous scholars. The study analyzes governance function of debt financing by taking MM theory, balance theory, principal-agent theory, signal transmission theory and information dissymmetry theory as theoretical basis and taking listed companies in a share market from 2007 to 2014 as research objects. Research debt financing, earnings management and inefficient investment of enterprises and discuss governance function of debt financing by modified Jones model, Roychowdhury model and Richardson model. During researching investment behavior of enterprises, enterprises are divided into state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. Result shows that: (1) influence of debt financing on earnings management is non-monotonic and presents [U] shape. (2) There is no significant relationship between commercial credit proportion and enterprise earning management. Bank loan proportion and enterprises earnings management present positive correlation: when bank loan proportion is higher, it is easy to lead to earnings management behavior. Bond financing proportion presents positive correlation with accrued earnings management of enterprises and bond financing proportion presents negative correlation with practical earnings management. There is no result about influence of bond financing on earnings management. (3) It is easier for state-owned listed company to lead to inefficient investment. (4) Governance functions of commercial credit on state-owned listed company and non-state-owned company are the same. It requires further research for governance functions of bond financing on state-owned listed company and non-state-owned company. (5) For non-state-owned listed company, short-term debt financing plays certain governance role on debt financing. It is also found that free cash flow will not lead to excessive investment, but it will relieve shortage of investment, while it is inconsistent with research of foreign scholars. It is easier for enterprises with higher profit to invest excessively; at the same time, it can also relieve shortage of investment.
Research of the paper reveals governance function of debt financing and protection to creditor and decision that enterprise shall avoid inefficient investment has certain practical significance. However, because bond of China is in development stage and China steps into market economy for a short time, governance function on bond financing is not clear and it requires further research by other scholars.

摘要 I
Abstract II
謝辭 IV
目錄 V
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VIII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的和意義 5
第三節 研究議題 6
第四節 研究方法 7
第五節 研究框架 8
第二章 文獻綜述 9
第一節 債務融資治理研究 9
第二節 盈餘管理的相關研究 11
第三節 非效率投資的相關研究 16
第四節 債務融資對盈餘管理的相關研究 18
第五節 債務融資對企業投資行為的影響相關研究 20
第六節 小結 21
第三章 相關背景分析 22
第一節 中國上市公司債務融資狀況 22
第二節 中國上市公司現況 24
第三節 中國上市公司董事會現狀 25
第四章 理論分析和研究假設 26
第一節 基礎理論 26
第二節 債務融資對盈餘管理的影響 30
第三節 債務融資對非效率投資的影響 32
第五章 實證檢驗 38
第一節 樣本選擇與數據來源 38
第二節 模型設定與變量定義 38
第三節 Panel data估計方法選擇 43
第四節 債務融資對盈餘管理的影響的實證結果 45
第五節 債務融資對非效率投資的影響的實證結果 57
第六章 結論與建議 73
第一節 研究結論 73
第二節 政策性建議 74
第三節 研究貢獻 76
第四節 研究限制及未來的研究方向 76
參考文獻 78

方軍雄，2007，〈我國上市公司資訊披露透明度與證券分析師盈餘預測〉，《金融研究》，第6期：136-148頁。
石曉軍與張順明，2010，〈商業信用, 融資約束及效率影響〉，《經濟研究》，第1卷：102-114頁。
朱磊與丁立波，2008，〈負債對企業投資行為的影響——基於利益相關者衝突的視角〉，《山西財經大學學報》，第30期：120-124頁。
何進日與周藝，2004，〈債務融資對企業過度投資約束的分析〉，《湘潭師範學院學報: 社會科學版》，第26期：43-45頁。
汪輝，2003，〈上市公司債務融資，公司治理與市場價值〉，《經濟研究》，第8期： 28-35頁。
林毅夫與李志贇，2004，〈政策性負擔, 道德風險與預算軟約束〉，《經濟研究》，第2期： 17-27頁。
胡國柳與周德建，2012，〈股權制衡, 經理人過度自信與企業投資過度的實證研究〉，《商業經濟與管理》，第9期：47-55頁陳駿，2010，〈基於債務契約的銀行監督有效嗎?——來自盈餘管理視角的經驗證據〉，《中央財經大學學報》，第12期：84-90頁。
楊興全，2002，〈我國上市公司融資結構的治理效應分析〉，《會計研究》，第8期：37-45頁。
雷強，2010，〈銀行監督與上市公司盈餘管理關係的實證研究——來自中國證券市場的經驗證據〉，《審計與經濟研究》，第6期：91-98頁。
萬紅波、阮銘華與王蓓蓓，2010，〈負債融資, 債務契約與盈餘資訊質量關係研究——基於中國上市公司panel data的實證分析〉，《首都經濟貿易大學學報》，第5期：53-60頁。
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. 1992. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting. The review of economic Studies 59 (3): 473-494.
Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 31 (03): 377-397.
Aharony, J., C. J. LIN, and M. P. Loeb. 1993. Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management*. Contemporary accounting research 10 (1): 61-81.
Alicke, M. D. 1985. Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and social Psychology 49 (6): 1621.
Barnea, A., R. A. Haugen, and L. W. Senbet. 1980. A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework. The journal of finance 35 (5): 1223-1234.
Bartov, E., F. A. Gul, and J. S. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary-Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications. Journal of accounting and economics 30 (3): 421-452.
Berglöf, E., and E.-L. Von Thadden. 1994. Short-Term Versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 1055-1084.
Brennan, M. J., and E. S. Schwartz. 1988. The case for convertibles. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1 (2) : 55-64.
Burkart, M., and T. Ellingsen. 2004. In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit. American Economic Review: 569-590.
Cahan, S. F. 1992. The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary Accruals: A Refined Test of the Political-Cost Hypothesis. Accounting Review: 77-95.
Chung, R., M. Firth, and J.-B. Kim. 2005. Earnings Management, Surplus Free Cash Flow, and External Monitoring. Journal of Business Research 58 (6): 766-776.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. Fan and L. H. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance 57 (6): 2741-2771.
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner. 1994. Accounting Choice in Troubled Companies. Journal of accounting and economics 17 (1): 113-143.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. Accounting review: 193-225.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the Sec*. Contemporary accounting research 13 (1): 1-36.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. f accounting and economics 17 (1): 145-176.
Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. The American economic review 96 (1): 369-386.
Faccio, M., and L. H. Lang. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of financial economics 65 (3): 365-395.
Fama, E. F. 1985. What's Different About Banks? Journal of monetary economics 15 (1): 29-39.
Fama, E. F., and M. H. Miller. 1972. The Theory of Finance. Vol. 3: Dryden Press Hinsdale, IL.
Firth, M., C. Lin, and S. M. Wong. 2008. Leverage and Investment under a State-Owned Bank Lending Environment: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (5): 642-653.
Ghosh, A. A., and D. Moon. 2010. Corporate Debt Financing and Earnings Quality. Journal of business finance & accounting 37 (5‐6): 538-559.
Heaton, J. B. 002. Managerial optimism and corporate finance. Financial management, 33-45.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1990. Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. Journal of finance: 321-349.
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure: Oxford university press.
Harvey, C. R., K. V. Lins, and A. H. Roper. 2004. The Effect of Capital Structure When Expected Agency Costs Are Extreme. Journal of financial economics 74 (1): 3-30.
Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting horizons 13 (4): 365-383.
Heinkel, R., and J. Zechner. 1990. The Role of Debt and Perferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 25 (01): 1-24.
Ho, T. S., and R. F. Singer. 1982. Bond Indenture Provisions and the Risk of Corporate Debt. Journal of financial economics 10 (4): 375-406.
Holmen, M., and P. Högfeldt. 2004. A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13 (3): 324-358.
Grenadier, S. R., and N. Wang. 2005. Investment timing, agency, and information. Journal of Financial Economics 75 (3): 493-533.
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Tbeory Ofthe Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Capital Strutture. Journal of financial economics 3.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (2).
John, K., and L. Senbet. 1988. Limited Liability. Corporate Leverage, and Public Policy.
Lee, K. W., B. Lev, and G. Yeo. 2007. Organizational Structure and Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 22 (2): 293-331.
Liu, Y., Y. Ning, and W. N. Davidson III. 2010. Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues. Financial Review 45 (3): 659-681.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of financial economics 27 (2): 595-612.
Mian, A. R., and A. I. Khwaja. 2004. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market. Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market (December 2004).
Miller, E. M. 1977. Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. The journal of finance 32 (4): 1151-1168.
Mills, K., S. Morling, and W. Tease. 1995. The Influence of Financial Factors on Corporate Investment. Australian Economic Review 28 (2): 50-64.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American economic review: 261-297.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction. The American economic review: 433-443.
Moreira, F. d. S. 2006. Microbiologia E Bioquímica Do Solo: Ufla.
Morris, J. R. 1976. On Corporate Debt Maturity Strategies. The Journal of Finance 31 (1): 29-37.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of financial economics 5 (2): 147-175.
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of financial economics 13 (2): 187-221.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan. 1997. Trade credit: theories and evidence. Review of financial studies 10 (3): 661-691.
Rajan, R. G. 1992. Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt. The journal of finance 47 (4): 1367-1400.
Richardson, S. 2006. Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies 11 (2-3): 159-189.
Rodríguez-Pérez, G., and S. van Hemmen. 2010. Debt, Diversification and Earnings Management. Journal of accounting and public policy 29 (2): 138-159.
Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of business: 197-216.
Ross, S. A. 1977. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. The bell journal of economics: 23-40.
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation. Journal of accounting and economics 42 (3): 335-370.
Sapienza, P. 2004. The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending. Journal of financial economics 72 (2): 357-384.
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on Earnings Management. Accounting horizons 3 (4): 91-102.
Sercu, P., H. Vander Bauwhede, and M. Willekens. 2006. Earnings Management and Debt. DTEW-AFI_0619: 1-25.
Shaw, K. W. 2003. Corporate Disclosure Quality, Earnings Smoothing, and Earnings' Timeliness. Journal of Business Research 56 (12): 1043-1050.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. The journal of finance 52 (2): 737-783.
Smith, C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of financial economics 32 (3): 263-292.
Stein, J. C. 1989. Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 655-669.
Stulz, R. 1990. Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies. Journal of financial economics 26 (1): 3-27.
Sweeney, A. P. 1994. Debt-Covenant Violations and Managers' Accounting Responses. Journal of accounting and economics 17 (3): 281-308.
Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong. 1998a. Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of financial economics 50 (1): 63-99.
Teoh, S. H., T. J. Wong, and G. R. Rao. 1998b. Are Accruals During Initial Public Offerings Opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1-2): 175-208.
Tian, L. 2005. Bank Lending, Corporate Governance, and Government Ownership in China. Guanghua School of Management, Beiijing University.
Urcan, O., and R. Kieschnick Jr. 2006. Earnings Management and Convertible Debt Issuance. Unpublished working paper. University of Texas at Dallas.
Valipour, H., and M. Moradbeygi. 2011. Corporate Debt Financing and Earnings Quality. Journal of applied finance & banking 1 (3): 139-157.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory.
Williamson, O. E. 1988. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. The journal of finance 43 (3): 567-591.