臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

戰後的日本面臨重建等諸多壓力，使得國家與政府在這個時期扮演著非常重要的角色。在五五體制後，以自民黨(Liberal Democratic Party, LDP)為首的日本政治在短短幾年間就將戰後的日本引向繁榮，創造出日本的經濟奇蹟。進而形成日本政治經濟發展的模式。在日本社會的服從性、集體性、共識決等傳統觀念下，使政商關係建立在人際關係的基礎上。長期使用非正式行政指導(informal administration)的方式，順利地推動諸多產業政策。尤其是透過從天而降(descent from heaven, amakudari)的方式，建立起日本有效率的政商關係。

有效率的日本政商關係雖被視為日本發展式國家(developmental state)的主體，但非正式方式也創造省廳內部競爭激烈，以及金權政治中劇烈的分贓現象。然而，在日本恩從主義下的資源交換關係，牽涉非常龐大的人際網絡，不只為權力與保障的象徵，也為補償性獲利與承諾的長期成長。這種恩從體系與財務集權化使自民黨在地方勢力佔有優勢。因此，日本權力的政治鬥爭，就是發生在自民黨內派閥，動搖日本政治地位乃自民黨內凝聚力高低，以及各派閥的政治影響力。因此，要削弱日本的金權政治，就要削弱自民黨內派閥的政治影響力，增加首相權力。民意所指、個人特色強烈與有能力的首相是可能解決金權問題的關鍵。泡沫經濟後的日本政治證實這個改革的趨勢。

With the great pressure of reconstruction after the World War II, the Japanese state and government acted as an indispensible role. In the 1955-system, the Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP) as the leading party in the Japanese politics brought prosperity and economic miracle in the few years. Then, the Japanese political economic model was formed. With the traditions of obedience, collective, and consensus, the Japanese government-business relations was built on the human relations. Using the informal means, such as administrative guidance promoted industrial policy successfully. Especially, descend from heaven also built up the basis of the efficient Japanese government-business relations.

The efficient Japanese government-business relations was the mainstream of developmental state in Japan. Nevertheless, the informal means caused the competiton between ministries and the radical pork-barrel in plutocracy. With the exchange of resource in patron-client relations,caused the complicated interaction in the social network. This was not only power and guarantee, but compensation and promise in the long-term profit. The patron-client relations and centralization of finance made the advantage of LDP in local Japan. Therefore, the power competition was usual occurred in interal party, the factions. To decrease the plutocracy, the necessarily to eliminate the factions and increase the power of Prime Minister in Japan.

論文審定書……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….I
誌謝……………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………II
中文摘要......................................................................................................................III
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………IV
目錄………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….V
第一章 緒論...........................................................................................................1
第一節 研究動機...............................................................................................1
第二節 研究背景及範圍...................................................................................4
第三節 文獻回顧.............................................................................................11
第四節 研究方法、限制與研究目的..............................................................35
第五節 章節安排……………………………………………………………………………………......39
第二章 理論架構.................................................................................................41
第一節 恩從主義簡介…………………………………………………………………………………41
第二節 自民黨恩從主義下的派閥政治………………………………………………………45
第三節 小結.....................................................................................................54
第三章 日本自民黨派閥政治的消長.................................................................56
第一節 日本戰後憲政體制的改變與政黨的復甦………………………………………56
第二節 日本戰後五五體制下穩定的派閥政治運作...........................................64
第三節 日本泡沫經濟後的派閥政治...................................................................78
第四節 現今日本首相魅力對派閥政治的影響………………………………………………..85
第五節 小結...........................................................................................................90
第四章 善用非正式途徑造成的分贓政治...............................................................92
第一節 日本政治分贓的非正式手段..................................................................92
第二節 日本自民黨派閥與分贓的關係...............................................................99
第三節 日本派閥政治的恩從利益交換…………………………………………….…..…..…..110
第四節 日本派閥政治演變對分贓現象的影響...............................................115
第五節 小結.......................................................................................................117
第五章 結論...........................................................................................................119
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………….………………..……..124
附錄………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….139
圖次
圖4-1: 安倍晉三相關政治資金流動圖…………………………………………………….………..106
表次
表2-1: 橋本派2001年給予森派的政治人物，卻未記載至政治資金報告書之人………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………….……………50
表2-2: 黨派團體收入概況(前二十名)………………………………………………….………………53
表4-1: 自民黨各派閥籌資持續狀況(收入與人數)…………………………..…………………105
表4-2: 政治家籌資能力前十名(2011年資金管理團體與政黨分部總額)…………108
表4-3：戰後日本派閥涉入金權政治一覽表………………………………………………………112
表4-4：田中-竹下派席次膨脹(1972-1992)…………………………………………………………114

中文：
1.專書
吳乃德、陳明通，1993。〈政權轉移和菁英流動：台灣地方政治菁英的歷史形成〉，賴澤涵主編，《台灣光復初期歷史》。臺北：中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所專書。
吳錫澤，1966。《戰後日本論》。臺北：台灣商務印書館。
葉志誠，2000。《社會科學概論》。臺北：揚智文化。
陳鵬仁，1978。《戰後日本的政黨與政治》。臺北：大舞台書苑出版社。
陳鵬仁，1999。《日本當前政情(1989-1990)》。臺北：水牛出版社。
許介鱗，1991。《日本現代史》。臺北：三民書局股份有限公司。
楊國樞、文崇一、吳聰賢等，1989。《社會及行為科學研究法》。臺北：臺灣東華。
2.專書譯著
Ranjit Kumar著，胡龍騰、黃瑋瑩、潘中道譯，2000。《研究方法：步驟化學
習指南》(Methodology: Guidance of Step)。臺北：學富文化。
Benjamin Crabtree, William L. Miller著，黃惠雯譯，2002。《質性方法與研究》(Qualitative Methodology and Research)。臺北：韋伯文化。
W．G．Baesley著，葉延燊譯，1992。《現代日本的崛起》(The Rise of Modern Japan)。臺北：金禾出版社。
Kenneth B. Pyle著，傅曾仁譯，1996。《日本問題》(The Japanese Question )。臺北，金禾出版社。
3.期刊論文
吳明上，2011/6。〈從自民黨總裁選舉制度分析自民黨派閥勢力的形成與消長〉，《政治科學論叢》，第48期，頁33-61。
侯水平，2008。〈日本公共建設工程招投標監管機制及其主要特點〉，《現代日本經濟》，第158卷第2期，頁36-41。
陳鵬仁、黃婉君，2004年。《戰後日本的政府與政治》。臺北：水牛出版社。
蔡增家，2002/6。〈九零年代日本派閥政治之分析〉，《問題與研究》，第41卷第3期，頁61-82。
4.學位論文
蔡禎昌，2008。《日本政黨政治與五五體制的興衰》。臺北：中國文化大學史學研究所博士論文。
 
日文：
1.專書
大嶽秀夫，2003。《日本型ポピュリズム：政治への期待と幻滅》。東京：中央公論新社。
水野均，2000。《檢證－日本社會黨はなぜ敗匇したか，五五年體制下の孜全保障論爭を問う》。東京：並木書房。
石川真澄，1995。《戰後政治史》。東京：岩波書店。
內田健三、石川真澄、後藤基夫，1984。《戦後保守政治の軌跡 》。東京：岩波書店。
北村公彥，2004。《現代日本政黨史錄(6)》。東京：第一法規株式會社。
安藤良雄，2004。《近代日本經濟史要覽》。東京：東京大學出版會。
後藤基夫，1994。《戦後保守政治の軌跡 (上) 》。東京：岩波書店。
草野厚，2008。《政権交代の法則：派閥の正体とその変遷》。東京：角川グループパブリッシング。
野中尚人，2008。《自民党政治の終わり》。東京：筑摩書房。
2.期刊論文
斉藤淳，2003。〈中選挙区制における自民党黨議員の差別化戦略〉，《レヴァイアサン》，第37卷，頁203-207。
3.官方文件
日本法務省，1993/11/12。〈行政手続法〉，《法務省》，第88号。
政治資金制度研究會，2000。〈政治資金規正法：逐條解說〉，《ぎょうせい》。
4.網際網路
朝日新聞，1947/2/2。〈植原悅二郎內相說詞〉，《朝日新聞》。
朝日新聞，1989。〈ドキュメントリクルート報道〉，《朝日新聞》。
&;lt;http://www.amazon.co.jp/報道-朝日新聞部/dp/4022560452&;gt;
日本共産党，2005/2/2。〈その答弁が政治不信を増大させる　小泉首相まるで人ごと：自民派閥ヤミ資金　井上議員質問に〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik4/2005-02-02/03_01.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2005/2/11。〈政治とカネ：自民・民主の「泥仕合」といわれるが本当は何が問題〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik4/2005-02-11/04_02.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2005/9/30。〈強まる企業献金・政党助成金依存：2004年政治資金収支報告〉，《日本共産党》。
日本共産党，2006/9/8。〈２００５年政治資金収支報告：企業献金・政党助成金 どっぷり〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik4/2006-09-08/2006090826_01_0.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2007/4/14。〈水谷建設元会長に実刑：東京地裁　法人へ罰金２億４０００万円〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik07/2007-04-14/2007041415_02_0.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2012/9/21。〈自民総裁選 ５候補すべて金権体質：パー券販売 料亭で豪遊〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2012-09-21/2012092115_01_1.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2012/12/25。〈安倍総裁の「政治とカネ」：企業・団体献金、政党助成金にどっぷり　３日に１回飲み食い ７５８万円支出〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2012-12-25/2012122515_01_1.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2013/1/1。〈庶民の感覚と程遠い： 政治家集金力上位１０人，政治資金収支報告書２０１１年分〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2013-01-01/2013010101_05_1.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2013/2/24。〈徳田前国交政務官に迂回献金か：政党支部トンネルに２０００万円　女性問題で辞任〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2013-02-24/2013022414_01_1.html&;gt;
日本共産党，2013/3/19。〈自民派閥パーティー活発：参院選へカネ集めに奔走“与党復帰効果”？〉，《日本共産党》。
&;lt;http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik12/2013-03-19/2013031901_03_1.html&;gt;

 
英文：
1.Books
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Arrowsmith , Sue, 2003. Government Procurement in the WTO. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Belloni, Frank. P. and Dennis C. Beller, 1978. Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspectives. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Inc,.
Calder, Kent E., 1988. Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986. United States of America: Princeton University Press.
Dolan, Ronald E. and Robert L. Worden, 1992. Japan: A Country Study. United States of America:Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
Evans, Diana., 1995. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ferejohn, John A., 1974. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation 1947-1968. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Fletcher III,W. Miles and Peter W. von Staden, 2013. Japan''s ''Lost Decade'': Causes, Legacies and Issues of Transformative Change. London: Taylor &; Francis.
Hayao, K., 1993. The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Hayes, Louis D., 2009. Introduction to Japanese Politics.United States of America: M.E. Sharpe, Inc..
Inoguchi, Takashi, 2005. Japanese Politics: An Introduction. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press,.
Johnson, Chalmers, 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. California: Stanford University Press.
Kabashima, Ikuo and Gill Steel, 2010. Changing Politics in Japan. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Kaiser, Robert G., 2009. So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Kawata, Junuchi, 2006. Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Kohno, Masaru, 1990. Japan’s Postwar Party Politics. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lambsdorff , Johann Graf, 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cambridge University Press.
Lincoln, Edward J., 2001. Arthritic Japan: The Slow Pace of Economic Reform. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Magstadt, Thomas M., 2014. Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions &; Issues. United States: Cengage Learning.
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Michael Johnston, 2005. Influence Markets: influence for rent, decisions for sale,” Syndromes of Corruption Wealth, Power, and Democracy . Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, Richard H., 1996. Political Bribery in Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Mulgan, George, Aurelia, 2005. Japan’s Interventionist State: The Role of the MAFF. New York and London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Park , Gene, 2011. Spending Without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan. California: Stanford University Press.
Park, Cheol Hee, 1998. Enduring Campaign Network in Tokyo Shitamachi District in How Electoral Reform Boomeranged, ed. Hideo Otake .Tokyo: JCIE.
Pempel, T. J.,1990. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
Pharr, Susan J., Krauss, Ellis S., 1996. Media and Politics in Japan. University of Hawaii Press.
Powell , G.B., 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.
Ramseyer, J.M. and F.M. Rosenbluth , 1993. Japan’s political marketplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1999. Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schlesinger, Jacob M., 1999. Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar Political Machine. Stanford University Press.
Schwartz , Frank J., 1998. Advice and Consent: The Politics of Consultation in Japan. London: Cambridge University Press.
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Stockwin , Prof J A A and J. A. A. Stockwin , 2003. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Japan. London: Taylor &; Francis.
Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, Valeria Brusco, 2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Takeshi, Sasaki, 1999. Daigishi to kane-Politicians and money. Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha.
Tsuneo, Watanabe,1959. Habatsu-Factional. Tokyo: Kobundo.
van Wolfreren, K., 1989. The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation. London: Macmillan.
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Zakowski , Karol, 2011 Successes and Failures of Nemawashi Practices in Japan: Comparative Analysis of Decision Making on VAT Increases in 1988 and 2012 (DEC-2011/01/B/HS5/00863) . Poland: Polish National Science Centre.
2.Journal articles
Arai, Koki, Ikuo Ishibashi and Rieko Ishii Ishibashi , 2009. “Research and Analysis on Bid-Rigging Mechanisms,” Competition Policy Research Center Japan Fair Trade Commission, Vol. 42, No.2, pp. 363-386.
Boucek, Francoise, 2009. “Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism,” Party Politics, Vol. 15, No. 4 , p.455-485.
Browne , Eric C. and Kim Sunwoong, 2003. “Factional rivals and electoral competition in a dominant party:Inside Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, 1958–1990,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol.42, p.107-134.
Castberg, Anthony Didrick, 2000. “Corruption in Japan and the US,” United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, Resource Material Series, Vol. 56, p.435-439.
Cox , Gary W., Frances Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, 2000. “Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions, and Party Structure: Comparing Factions in Japan’s Upper and Lower Houses,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, pp. 115–222.
Haley, John O., 2010. “Why Study Japanese Law,” The American Journal Of Comparative Law, Vol. 58, pp.1-14.
Hillman, Ben, 2010. “Factions and Spoils: Examining Political Behavior Within the Local State in China,” The China Journal, No. 64, pp. 1-18.
Husted, B. W., 1994. “Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries,” Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 4, pp.17–27.
Jain, Arvind K., 2001. “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys ,Vol.15, pp.71-121.
Kawata, Junuchi, 2011. “The End of Liberal Democratic Party-led Politics?：From the Point of View of Political Clientelism and Corruption” Osaka University Law Review, No. 58, pp. 1-26. .
Klein, B., R. G. Grawford and A. Alchian, 1978 “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, pp.297-326.
Lazarus, Jeffrey, 2010. “Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 2 , pp. 338–353.
Leitch, Shirley and Judy Motion, 2004. “Public-private partnerships: Consultation,cooperation and collusion,” Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3,No. 3, pp.273-278.
Masuyama, Mikitaka and Benjamin Nyblade , 2004. “Japan: the prime minister and the Japanese Diet,” The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.10, No. 2-3, pp.250-262.
Misawa, Mitsuru, 2008. “An Overview Of Problems Concerning Political Donations In Japan,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 21, No.2, pp.162-181.
Mulgan, Aurelia George, 2009. “The perils of Japanese politics,” Japan Forum, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp.183–207.
Norris, Michael J., 2010. “The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan: Explaining the Party''s Ability to Dominate Japanese Politics,” Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.1-2.
Ono, Yoshikuni, 2012. “Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 553–567.
Park, Cheol Hee, 2001. “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP Since Political Reform Continuity and Change,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp.428-461.
Pempel , T. J., 2010. “Between Pork and Productivity: The Collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party”, The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 227-254.
Reed, Steven R., 1996. “Political Corruption in Japan,” The International Social Science Journal, Vol.149, pp.395-405.
Richard Graham.,1997. “Clientelismo na cultura politica brasileir” Sdo Paulo: Braudel Center Paper, No. 15, pp.1-2.
Roniger, Luis, 2004. “Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp.353-375.
Scheiner, Ethan, 2005. “Pipelines of Pork：Japanese Politics and a Model of Local Opposition Party Failure,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 7, pp.799-823.
Scheiner, Ethan, 2005. “Pipelines of Pork：Japanese Politics and a Model of Local Opposition Party Failure,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 7, pp.799-823Nyblade, Benjaminy, Reed, Steven R.,2008 “Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947-1993,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp.926-941.
Schuster C. and Lundstrom W., 2002. “Publicprivate Partnerships in International Trade: A Lobbying Effort from Passive to Aggressive in the USA?” Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.125-135.
Takayasu, Kensuke, 2011. “New Conventions Required: Ideas to Re-invigorate Japanese Party Politics,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.86-87.
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Woodall, Brian, 1997. “Japan Under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works,” Ofer Feldman Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 , pp. 578-579.
Yukins ,Christopher R., 2013 “Feature Comment: Considering The Effects of Public Procurement Regulations on Competitive Markets,” Information and Analysis on Legal Aspects of Procuremen, Vol. 55, No. 9, pp.1-6.
3. Conference papers
Davidson, R. and A. Schejter , 2010. ‘‘Their Deeds are the Deeds of Zimri; but They Expect a Reward Like Phineas,”Neoliberal and Multicultural Discourses in the Development of Israeli DTT Policy, Communication, Culture &; Critique, No. 4, pp. 1-22.
Kobayashi, Masaya, 2006. “Political Clientelism and Corruption：Neo-structuralism and Republicanism” in Junuchi Kawata, Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.1-2.
Mccubbins, Mathew D. and Michael F. Thies ,1995/3/24-26. “As a matter of factions: The budgetary implications of shifting factional control Japan’s LDP,” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, pp. 1-53.