臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本文研究董事會規模與公司績效之關係是否因董監事及 (或) CEO過度自信而改變，以了解過去文獻在董事會規模之治理效果上的實證結果分歧是否與內部人過度自信有關。使用1996至2015年本國上市櫃公司 (不含金融股) 為樣本，發現：董事會規模大且公司內部人均過度自信時，公司績效較差；董事會規模小且內部人均無過度自信時，公司績效較好。在大董事會規模之下，內部人均無過度自信時，績效優於僅董監事過度自信而CEO未過度自信時，但與董監事未過度自信而CEO過度自信時無顯著差異，意味董監事過度自信之不利影響比CEO過度自信之影響大。在小規模董事會而董監事和CEO僅其一過度自信時，績效優於內部人均過度自信時。最後，雖董監事人數少對績效有利，但內部人都過度自信或只董監事過度自信下，績效會低於董監事人多但內部人只有CEO過度自信或都未過度自信時，故內部人過度自信對績效有害，尤其是董監事。以上結果在營運績效較顯著，市場面績效的效果偏弱。內部人過自信以平均來看，確實會影響董事會規模與公司績效之間的關係。

　　This paper studies whether directors and (or) CEO overconfidence change the relationship between board size and the performance of a company, such that we can understand whether the mixed empirical results about the corporate governance effect of board size in the past literature are related to insider overconfidence. Using listed and OTC companies (excluding financial sector) from 1996 to 2015 as a sample, the findings are that when director board is large and all insiders are overconfident, firms have relatively poor performance; there is no insider overconfident in a small board creating the better performance of a company. Further, under a large board, the performance of firms without overconfident insiders is better than that of firms with overconfident directors and un-overconfident CEOs, but insignificantly different from that of firms with un-overconfident directors and overconfident CEOs. This result indicates that the negative effect of director overconfidence is more serious than that of CEO overconfidence. Moreover, when the board is small and only one type of insiders (directors and CEOs) is overconfident, the firm performance is superior to that when all insiders are overconfident. Finally, although the small number of directors is favorable for performance, all insiders or just directors are overconfident making performance worse than the large board with all insiders not overconfident or only CEO overconfident. Thus, insider overconfidence is detrimental to performance, especially directors. These results are more significant for operating performance and weaker effect for the market-side performance. On average, insider overconfidence really affects the relationship between board size and firm performance.

目錄
目錄 I
表目錄 II
圖目錄 III
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 董事會規模的影響 7
第二節 公司高層過度自信與假說發展 10
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節 樣本說明 13
第二節 變數定義 13
第三節 假說檢定方法 15
第四節 穩健性檢查 16
第四章 實證結果 18
第一節 樣本分布 18
第二節 敘述統計 18
第三節 假說結果檢定：複迴歸分析 19
第四節 穩健性檢定 22
第五章 結論 39
參考文獻 40


表目錄
表3-1 假說檢定之樣本分組 15
表4-1 樣本分布 24
表4-2 變數敘述統計量 25
表4-3 公司績效迴歸結果：不考慮內部人過度自信與董事會規模之交互效果 26
表4-4 公司績效迴歸結果：考慮內部人過度自信與董事會規模之交互效果 (不含董監事過度自信變數) 27
表4-5 公司績效迴歸結果：考慮內部人過度自信與董事會規模之交互效果 (不含董監事過度自信與董事會規模交乘項) 28
表4-6 Tobin's Q迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果 29
表4-7 ROA迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果 30
表4-8 ROA_INDU迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果 31
表4-9 董事會規模之Heckman第一階段Probit迴歸 32
表4-10 公司績效迴歸結果：考慮內部人過度自信與董事會規模之交互效果及內生性 (不含董監事過度自信變數) 33
表4-11 公司績效迴歸結果：考慮內部人過度自信與董事會規模之交互效果及內生性 (不含董監事過度自信與董事會規模交乘項) 34
表4-12 Tobin's Q迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果(考慮內生性) 35
表4-13 ROA迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果(考慮內生性) 36
表4-14 ROA_INDU迴歸係數差異Wald檢定結果(考慮內生性) 37
表4-15 假說檢定結果總表 38


圖目錄
圖1-1 研究架構圖 5

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