臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究針對2000年至2010年間被列入全額交割股票恢復正常交易之公司，將樣本公司分為全部恢復正常交易公司及恢復後正常交易公司和恢復正常交易後又再度列為全額交割甚至下市之公司，探討公司財務變數和公司治理變數對樣本公司在恢復正常交易後股價報酬率之影響
研究結果顯示，資產報酬率對全部樣本公司之股價報酬率呈現正向顯著的結果，顯示對全部樣本公司而言，資產報酬率越高，愈容易有較高的股價報酬率。當全額交割公司在恢復正常交易時，若財報上負債比率和董監事質押比率越高時或是總資產週轉率越低時，恢復正常交易公司再度被列入全額交割甚至下市的機率便會增加。全額交割股票在恢復正常時股價報酬率皆為正，無論往後是否會再度列入全額交割甚至下市，在恢復正常交易時，市場皆會給予正面評價，股價皆呈現正報酬。

This study focuses on the securities in which the trading method had been changed to require full delivery and later reinstated during 2000 to 2010. The sample companies are divided into companies whose transactions of securities were all reinstated, companies reinstated and back to normal trading, and the reinstated companies went full delivery again, or even delisted. This study investigates the effect of corporate finance variables and corporate governance variables to the sample companies’return on stock value after reinstated normal trading.
The results show that return on assets (ROA) has a positive impact on the return of stock value in all of the sample companies. The results indicate that the higher the return on assets, the easier for companies to have better return on stock value. When those companies reinstated from full delivery,the higher the leverage ratio, or the higher the equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors, or the lower the total assets turnover in the financial statement, the more the chances of those reinstated companies to go full delivery again, or even delisted. The securities changed to full delivery would have positive returns of stock value after reinstated. Whether went full delivery once more, or even delisted from transactions, those companies’securities would be given positive evaluation from the market, and would have positive returns on stock value.

第一章 緒論 .......................................................1
第一節 研究動機 .................................................1
第二節 研究目的 .................................................2
第三節 研究架構 .................................................3
第四節 研究流程 .................................................4
第二章 文獻探討 ...................................................5
第一節 全額交割股票與恢復正常交易之定義 .........................5
第二節 全額交割相關文獻 .........................................9
第三節 財務危機和財務危機預警相關文獻 ..........................10
第四節 公司治理相關文獻 ........................................11
第三章 研究方法及變數說明 ........................................15
第一節 研究假說 ................................................15
第二節 樣本資料 ................................................17
第三節 變數說明 ................................................18
第四節 研究分析方法 ............................................21
第四章 實證結果分析 ..............................................24
第一節 基本敘述統計量檢定 ......................................24
第二節 迴歸分析結果 ............................................28
第三節 Logit迴歸分析結果 ......................................31
第四節 事件研究法分析結果 ......................................32
第五章 結論與建議 ................................................35
第一節 研究結論 ................................................35
第二節 研究限制 ................................................36
第三節 研究建議 ................................................37
文獻探討 .........................................................38

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