臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文之目的在探討我國電子業『董監事暨重要職員責任保險』(D&O保險)需求的影響因素，以2008年至2012年台灣上市電子業為研究對象，實證結果發現影響我國上市電子業董監事責任險最主要的因素為公司治理構面，對於是否購買D&O責任險與D&O投保金額，其主要影響因素為董監事持股比率、董事會規模、股份盈餘偏離差、董監兼經理人比率和董監事酬勞。而對於D&O投保金額比率，則主要與股份盈餘偏離差、董監兼經理人比率有關，因為股份盈餘偏離差越大或董監兼經理人比率越低，其董監事責任險的需求越大。這些結果皆顯示我國電子業的董監事責任險需求與公司治理具有密切的相關性。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of D&O liability insurance demand in electronics industry in Taiwan.And an object of the study is Taiwanese listed companies in the electronics industry from 2008 to 2012.Based on the empirical analysis, it is found that the primary reasons for D&O insurance are corporate governance.For whether to purchase D&O insurance and D&O insurance coverage ,the most influential factors are Directors' shareholding ratio, board size,deviation of voting right and cash flow right, Directors sever as managers ratio,Directors’compensation.For D&O insurance coverage ratio, the decision for D&O insurance is highly related to deviation of voting right and cash flow right and Directors sever as managers ratio.It’s mean that firms with higher deviation of voting right and cash flow right or Directors sever as managers ratio are likely to purchase D&O insurance,because it could generate more agency problems and lead to higher litigation risk.These results show that the demand for D&O liability insurance is significantly related to the corporate governance.

第一章 緒論 ....................................................................................................................... 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ................................................................................................ 1
第二節 研究流程 ............................................................................................................ 6
第二章 文獻探討................................................................................................................ 7
第一節 董監事責任險介紹 ............................................................................................. 7
第二節 董監事責任險的實施概況 ................................................................................. 8
第三節 電子業董監事責任險需求因素 ....................................................................... 13
第三章 研究方法.............................................................................................................. 20
第一節 資料來源與研究範圍 ....................................................................................... 20
第二節 模型設計與變數說明 ....................................................................................... 20
第四章 實證結果.............................................................................................................. 28
第一節 變數敘述性統計分析 ....................................................................................... 28
第二節 變數相關性分析 .............................................................................................. 31
第三節 風險變數對D&O責任險購買需求 ................................................................... 33
第五章、結論 ..................................................................................................................... 41
參考文獻 ............................................................................................................................. 42


圖目錄
圖 1 研究架構與流程 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 6

表目錄
表 1-1我國董監事責任保險費收入與賠款情形 ................................ ......................... 12
表 3-1風險代表變數對董監事責任需求的說明 ................................ ......................... 27
表 4-1敘述統計表 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 30
表 4-2研究變數相關係表 ................................ ................................ ............................. 32
表 4-3影響是否購買 D&O 責任險的因素 ................................ ................................ ......... 35
表 4-4影響 D&O 投保金額的因素 ................................ ................................ ..................... 38
表 4-5影響 D&O 投保率的因素 ................................ ................................ ......................... 40

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