臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在通訊技術快速發展的今日，低軌（Low Earth Orbit, LEO）衛星通訊系統早已成為現今社會上不可或缺的關鍵基礎設施。透過LEO衛星，我們得以讓行動裝置、遠端感測器與無人載具等設備與網路控制中心（Network Control Center, NCC）之間取得聯繫，以建立低延遲、高頻寬、覆蓋全球的高速網路服務。然而確保資料傳輸的安全至關重要，如何在不安全的傳輸通道上確保資訊的機密性、完整性、可用性與身份認證，已成為當前資訊安全的核心課題。過去的安全協定裡，金鑰交換與身份認證大多依賴經典數論難題（如因數分解或離散對數問題）來建立安全的通訊。不過，隨著量子電腦計算的技術迅速發展，基於傳統因數分解或離散對數問題等數論難題之安全協定，因Shor演算法的出現對這些傳統加密基礎造成威脅，這使現有的通訊協定將可能遭到有效破解，存在著嚴重安全隱患而變得不再安全。為了解決上述問題，本研究提出一套基於ML-KEM技術之安全身份認證協定於低軌衛星通訊系統之方案。該技術採用美國國家標準技術研究院（National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST）所選定的後量子加密演算法CRYSTALS-Kyber演算法來作為金鑰封裝機制（Key Encapsulation Mechanism, KEM）。提出的方案除了具備抗量子攻擊之特性外，亦納入完美向前保密性（Perfect Forward Secrecy, PFS）設計原則，使每一次會話所使用的金鑰皆為獨立生成。縱使長期金鑰遭洩漏，先前通訊內容仍能保有機密性。透過本研究提出的ML-KEM方法，探討了該機制在LEO衛星實際部署上的可行性，並透過安全性分析驗證其系統抵抗已知現有攻擊之能力。因此，本研究不僅為LEO衛星通訊系統提供了一套具前瞻性與安全性的後量子密碼（Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQC）解決方案，也為量子電腦的時代建立了強韌的安全基礎。

In today's era of rapid advancements in communication technology, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communication systems have become indispensable critical infrastructure in modern society. Through LEO satellites, we enable connectivity between mobile devices, remote sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Network Control Center (NCC), establishing low-latency, high-bandwidth, global network services. However, ensuring data transmission security is paramount. Guaranteeing information confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication over insecure channels remains a core challenge in information security. Past security protocols largely relied on classical number theory problems such as factorization or discrete logarithms for secure communication. The swift development of quantum computing and Shor's algorithm now threaten these cryptographic foundations, rendering existing protocols vulnerable and insecure. To address this, this research proposes a secure authentication protocol for LEO satellite systems based on ML-KEM technology. It employs the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, selected by NIST, as its Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). This scheme provides post-quantum attack resistance and incorporates Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), ensuring independently generated session keys. Consequently, the confidentiality of previous communications is maintained even if long-term secret keys are compromised. The study investigates the feasibility of the practical deployment of LEO using the proposed ML-KEM method and verifies its resilience to known attacks through security analysis. Thus, this research delivers a progressive Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) solution for LEO satellite communications and builds a firm security basis for the quantum computing era.

摘要 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
致謝 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
目錄 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
圖目錄 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
表目錄 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
第一章 緒論 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 研究動機 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 研究目的 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 研究貢獻 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 章節提要 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
第二章 背景知識與相關技術 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 低軌衛星通訊系統 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 低軌衛星定義與特性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 低軌衛星通訊流程概述 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3 低軌衛星通訊安全需求 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4 低軌衛星通訊之攻擊者模型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 密碼學基礎 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 對稱式密碼系統 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 非對稱式密碼系統 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 會議金鑰 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.4 完美向前保密性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.5 金鑰衍生函數 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.6 量子計算對傳統密碼系統的威脅 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 後量子密碼學 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 後量子密碼學的動機與主要類型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 基於格的密碼學 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.3 容錯學習問題 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 CRYSTALS-Kyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1 演算法概述與安全目標 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 ML-KEM 核心演算法 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3 ML-KEM 所使用的對稱密碼原件 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 模糊提取器 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
第三章 文獻探討 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 基於憑證技術之衛星通訊協定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 基於非對稱密碼技術輕量化之衛星通訊協定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 基於 ECC 之安全強化衛星通訊協定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 基於後量子密碼學之衛星認證協定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
第四章 回顧 Kumar 與 Garg 提出的方案 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 符號說明 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 階段與步驟詳解 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.1 註冊階段 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.2 登入與身份認證階段 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 安全缺陷分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.1 缺陷一：不當的相互驗證流程設計 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.2 缺陷二：易遭受阻斷服務攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 安全缺陷總結與改進方案 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
第五章 研究方法 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1 符號說明 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2 註冊階段 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3 登入與身份認證階段 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
第六章 安全性分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1 非正式安全性分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.1 相互認證 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.2 使用者匿名性與不可追蹤性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.3 完美向前保密性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.4 抵抗重送攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.5 抵抗中間人攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.6 抵抗偽冒攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.7 抵抗阻斷服務攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.8 抵抗竊取驗證者攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.9 抵抗特權內部人員攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.10 多因子認證安全性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.11 抵抗智慧卡竊取攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.12 抵抗生物特徵竊取攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.13 抵抗密碼猜測攻擊 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2 正式安全性分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.1 安全性模型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.2 安全性定理 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.3 安全性證明 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
第七章 效能評估與比較 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.1 效能評估環境設定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2 計算與通訊成本分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.1 計算成本分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.2 通訊成本分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.3 安全性與效能綜合比較 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
第八章 結論與未來展望 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
參考文獻 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

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