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研究生:鄒本然
論文名稱:考量規範性社會影響之意見動態模擬
論文名稱(外文):Opinion Dynamics Simulation:Take Normative Social Influence into Account
指導教授:孫春在孫春在引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chuen-Tsai Sun
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:資訊科學與工程研究所
學門:工程學門
學類:電資工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:88
中文關鍵詞:意見動態模型規範性社會影響從眾
外文關鍵詞:opinion dynamics modelnormative social influenceconformity
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
  • 點閱點閱:718
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:100
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
集體意見之動態是社會科學中一項重要的議題。二十世紀晚期,以多代理人為基礎之模擬逐漸被使用在研究意見動態上,企圖找出像投票、革命、流行風潮等社會現象背後淺在的法則。
本研究基於社會心理學的實驗以及理論來擴充過去的意見動態模型,在此新模型中的代理人和他人進行意見交換時會視情況考慮週遭的輿論,也就是所謂的「規範性社會影響」,而不像過去那樣不顧他人的看法任意表態。為了區分社會心理學中所謂的「表面順從」和「私下接納」這兩種效應,本研究將過去只有「意見」單一層的代理人擴充成含有「意見」和「態度」兩個層次,以期能更廣泛且真實地模擬社會上的意見互動情形。
經由模擬實驗,發現除了模擬基本的意見交換過程之外,我們的確能夠探討更複雜的議題,像是人眾無知、革命、少數者影響、新進者影響、思想控制、媒體等。相較於過去的模型,本研究模型率先嘗試以社會心理學之理論和實驗數據為依據來制定模型,以提高模型的參考價值,為社會科學領域的研究者提供一個觀察和實驗平台。
Dynamics of collective opinion is an important issue in social science. In the late 20th century, agent-based simulation was gradually adopted in researching opinion dynamics. By simulation, researchers attempted to find the rules behind some social phenomenon such as voting, revolution, fashion etc. In this thesis, I expand previous opinion dynamics models base on experiments and theories of social psychology. In my model, when agents exchange their opinions, they consider not only his own opinion but also his neighbor's reception, which is the so-called "normative social influence". In the previous models, agent is described by a single variable "opinion". In order to separate the effect of "public compliance" from the effect of "private acceptance", I propose the second variable attitude. In addition to basic opinion exchanging process, my model can simulate more complex social phenomenon such as pluralistic ignorance, revolution, minority influence, newcomer influence, mind control, media etc. Compared to previous models, this is the first thesis that based on experiments and theories to increase factuality and generality, which provide the social scientists a platform to observe and experiment.
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 viii
圖目錄 ix
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究問題 2
1.3 研究目標 2
1.4 名詞解釋 3
1.5 論文結構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 社會物理學(Social physics) 5
2.2 社會心理學(Social psychology) 6
2.2.1 從眾(Conformity) 8
代表性的從眾實驗 9
影響從眾的因素 12
2.2.2 認知失調理論(Cognitive dissonance theory) 14
2.2.3 自我知覺理論(Self-perception theory) 16
2.2.4認知失調論裡vs.自我知覺理論 17
2.2.5 理性行動理論(Theory of planned behavior) 18
2.2.6 人眾無知(Pluralistic ignorance) 19
2.3 意見動態模型(Opinion dynamics model) 20
2.3.1 有界信心模型(Bounded confidence model) 20
HK模型 21
D模型(又稱relative agreement model; RA model) 22
2.3.2 口耳相傳模型(Word-of-mouth model) 23
S模型 23
2.3.3 表決模型(Voting model) 24
G模型 24
2.4 研究定位 24
第三章 模型設計 26
3.1 基本設定及理念 26
3.1.1 議題、代理人 26
3.1.2 虛擬社會 27
3.1.3 用語 28
3.2 模型進行流程 28
3.2.1 初始化 28
3.2.2 意見更新機制 29
3.2.3 Subroutine1-將鄰居分群 31
3.2.4 Subroutine2-計算輿論強度 32
3.2.5 Subroutine3-考量輿論頻譜 35
3.3 模型特色 38
第四章 模擬實驗 41
4.1模型變數意義以及預設值說明 41
4.2比較和HK模型的異同 42
4.3探討意見和態度的落差 51
4.3.1一般性結果 51
4.3.2探討不確定度u的影響 59
4.3.3 探討參數G的影響 66
4.3.4探討表面從眾門檻red的影響 68
4.4探討代理人非同質之下的意見動態 69
4.4.1少數極端者影響 70
4.4.2意見的兩極化 76
4.4.3人眾無知的打破 78
4.4.4新進人口對社會規範的影響 80
4.5實驗總結 83
第五章 結論 84
5.1結論 84
5.2未來展望 84
參考文獻 86
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