臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去有許多學者研究投資與現金流量的敏感度，卻鮮少以集團為對象深入探討集團特性對投資與現金流量敏感度的影響。在台灣，2012年的上市櫃集團企業占總上市櫃公司家數約為三成，然而上市櫃集團企業的市值市占率卻高達六成，其投資決策必定對台灣的經濟造成重要的影響，實有探討之必要性。
本研究著重於台灣集團內部資本市場及股權結構對投資與現金流量敏感度的影響。不同於以往研究，我們綜合性地將關係人交易活動納入集團內部資本市場之衡量，包含應付關係人融資、受關係人背書保證金額、關係人應付帳款與票據、關係人股利收入與發放。再者，我們更細緻地將集團股權變數區分為被控制股東直接持股、被金字塔持股、被交叉持股，並以此延伸出控制股東的董事席次率、董事控制權與所有權之偏離。
本研究樣本包含1997、2002、2007及2012共計四年的台灣上市櫃公司，其中四個年度共有1279家集團企業及4718家獨立企業。
實證結果發現，集團企業相較於獨立企業有較低的投資與現金流量敏感度。集團內部資本市場為集團企業帶來融資利益(Financing advantage)優勢，在內部資本市場受益程度愈高的集團企業，投資得以較不依賴現金流量。在集團股權結構中，被控制股東直接持股較高(增加)的集團企業，因控制股東與小股東利益一致，降低投資與現金流量的敏感度，符合利益收斂假說(Convergence-of-interest hypothesis)。被金字塔持股的高低對投資與現金流量敏感度結果並不顯著，然而若被金字塔持股過去五年間增加，會增強投資與現金流量敏感度，支持代理人問題引發的過度投資假說(Overinvestment hypothesis)。此外，被交叉持股高(增加)、控制股東董事控制權與所有權偏離程度高(增加)，控制股東傾向過度投資。

Previous studies have made a lot contributions to the investment-cash flow sensitivities; however, few papers focus on the relationship between business groups and the investment-cash flow sensitivities. In Taiwan, around one in third of firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange are affiliated firms, yet they account for around 60% of the market shares according to their market value in 2012. Affiliated firms plays an important role in the performance of Taiwan’s Economy.
Our study focus on the internal capital markets and ownership structure of business groups in Taiwan. We acquire 1279 listed affiliated firms and 4718 listed unaffiliated firms in total four years including 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012.
Our empirical results shows that affiliated firms have lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than unaffiliated ones have. The internal capital markets of affiliated firms function as a role of financing advantage so that the more resources received from internal capital markets, the less reliance of investments on cash flow. Concerning ownership structure of affiliated firms, higher (increased) insider’s direct shareholdings decrease the sensitivities between investment and cash flow. An increase in insider’s pyramid shareholdings, higher (increased) cross-shareholdings, and higher (increased) divergence between board control rights and cash flow rights lead to overinvestment due to the agency costs.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 7
第一節 研究動機與背景 7
第二節 研究目的 8
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第一節 集團與獨立企業 9
第二節 集團內部資本市場 10
第三節 集團股權結構 11
第四節 投資與現金流量敏感度 13
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 樣本 15
第二節 變數定義 17
第三節 實證模型 23
第四章 實證結果 27
第一節 敘述統計量 27
第二節 平均數差異檢定 30
第三節 相關係數分析 32
第四節 迴歸分析結果 35
第五章 結論與貢獻 43
參考文獻 44
附錄一、股權結構與內部資本市場之交互作用 47
附錄二、股權結構與融資限制之交互作用 49
附錄三、股權結構與未來平均股票報酬率迴歸分析 51

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中文參考文獻
黃銘傑(2001)。交叉持股vs.公司監控。臺大法學論叢，30(1)，201-247。doi: 10.6199/NTULJ.2001.30.01.06