臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文對當代美國的法律解釋發展做初步的探討。美國聯邦最高法院近30年來有意識地使用二種法律解釋方法來確認具歧義的法律條文的文義。第一種方法是立法目的主義，它主張法院可以使用各種立法史資料來探究立法者的原意與立法目的，以確認法律的本義。第二種方法是強硬文本主義，它主張法院只能通過法律制定當時的公民對法律的通常理解來發現法律的一般與客觀意義。在過去三十年，當處理不明確法律意義的問題時，這二種方法支配了美國聯邦最高法院的法律解釋論證。
由這二種方法所引發的論爭不僅涉及法律解釋，還涉及立法學與權力分立，這是為什麼它們會成為過去30年間美國法學者間持續爭論不休的議題的原因。我在這篇論文將展示這段論爭，也就是關於聯邦最高法院的判決發展史中的法律解釋的種種爭論，以及它們與立法學和權力分立問題的關聯。本論文使用二種分析方法來釐清以上立法目的主義與文本主義的論爭，它們是聯邦最高法院的判決發展史分析以及法律解釋概念發展史分析。此外我在分析過程中還加入了當代最具爭議的Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC案，使我的論證能夠將立法目的主義與文本主義的不同特性放大，並因而能清楚揭示它們之間的關聯。
在本論文第一章，我將提出二個案例，以說明立法目的主義與文本主義對於法律解釋如此重要的理由。在第二章，我介紹1980年代的制定法解釋發展史。我在第三章說明Chevron案，以及圍繞著Chevron案進行的法律解釋論爭。在第四章，我根據先前的分析成果對法律當代法律解釋論爭提出批判。而在作為結論的第五章，我指出強硬文本主義和強硬立法目的主義無法自足地解釋不明確法律，而對於這二個基礎主義法學，我們都應該謹慎看待，不要懷著不切實際的信心。

The thesis provides a preliminary inquiry for statutory interpretation in modern America. In recent decades in America, Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) intentionally used two types of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the ambiguous text of a law. The first is moderate purposivism, which contends that the court could use several materials of legislative history to confine the intent or purpose of the legislature so as to ascertain the appropriate meaning of a law. The second is textualism, which argues that the court could only find the ordinary and legitimate meaning of law from the perspectives of citizens when the law enacted. These two approaches have dominated the arguments of statutory interpretation at SCOTUS when she dealt with the cases which involved law with ambiguous text for more than thirty years.
The debates caused by these two approaches are not only on statutory interpretation but also legislation and separation of powers. This is the reason why they became the most controversial issues among the legal scholars of American for recently 30 years. In this thesis, I will present the debates of statutory interpretation at SCOTUS, and their connections with problems of legislation and separation of powers. The thesis uses two analytic approaches to clarify the debates of purposivism and textualism. These two approaches are the history of related decisions at SCOTUS and history of concepts of statutory interpretation. In addition, I add the most controversial case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC around the 1990s into the last analysis. Through Chevron, the thesis could amplify the different characters of purposivism and textualism, and hence to disclosure the correlations among them.
Chapter I proposes two examples in Taiwan to explain why purposivism and textualism are so important to statutory interpretation. Chapter II mentions the history of statutory interpretation at the 1980s. Chapter III resorts to Chevron and the debates about statutory interpretation encompass Chevron. Chapter IV offers some critical comments on above achievements of analysis. In the conclusion, I argue the hard textualism and purposivism are not self-sufficient to interpret the ambiguous text of a law, and we must carefully consider any version of foundationalism and its impacts.

壹、緒論 1
一、問題意識：不明確法律概念與法律解釋 1
（一）不明確法律概念一「知悉其得繼承」 1
（二）不明確法律概念二「違反其意願」 16
二、研究動機、背景、方法、架構 24
（一）研究動機 24
（二）研究背景 25
（三）研究方法 26
（四）研究架構 26
貳、90年代前的傳統制定法解釋進路 29
一、傳統立法目的主義 33
（一）立法目的主義發展 34
（二）立法目的主義作為主流解釋方法 43
二、剛性文本主義的興起 45
（一）對立法目的主義的批評 45
（二）剛性文本主義及其影響 51
（三）立法目的主義與剛性文本主義 57
參、90年代後的制定法解釋發展 59
一、Chevron與行政機關法律解釋 60
（一）Chevron之前的行政機關法律解釋審查 62
（二）Chevron論行政機關法律解釋 67
二、Chevron與制定法解釋論之發展 73
（一）Chevorn二階段審查的難題 75
（二）Chevron案件的發展 80
肆、美國制定法解釋論爭的批判 87
一、制定法解釋論爭與Chevron 87
（一）剛性文本主義興起與立法木主義衰微 88
（二）剛性文本主義興起與Chevrondoctrine衰微 90
二、制定法解釋論爭的批判 101
（一）權力分立批判的檢討 102
（二）法律實在論批判的檢討 106
三、基礎主義批判 109
伍、結論 119
陸、參考文獻 123

一、中文文獻
（一）論著
王皇玉（2013），〈強制手段與被害人受欺瞞的同意：以強制性交猥褻罪為中心〉，《臺大法學論叢》，第42卷第2期，頁381-432。
李佳玟（2010），〈違反罪刑法定的正義〉，《台灣法學雜誌》，第160期，頁1-3。
李聖傑（2004），〈妨礙性自主：第一講——保護法益〉，《月旦法學教室》，第19期，頁97-104。
李聖傑（2004），〈妨害性自主：第三講——類型闡述〉，《月旦法學教室》，第23期，頁99-106。
林志潔、金孟華（2012），〈「合理」的懷疑—以女性主義法學觀點檢視性侵害審判之偏見〉，《政大法學評論》，第127期，頁117-166。
吳佩君（2008），〈有關拋棄繼承期間之實務探討〉，《銘傳大學法學論叢》，第9期，頁55-84。
宮文祥（2010），〈初探科學在環境法發展上所扮演的角色—以美國法為例〉，《科技法學評論》，第7卷第2期，頁129-180。
宮文祥（2010），〈面對環境保護落石與環境政策型塑：試探美國聯邦最高法院當為及當守之分際—以作為我司法審查之參考〉，《司法新聲》，105期，頁26-40。
許玉秀（2012），〈重新學習性自主——勇敢面對問題〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，第200期，頁302-23。
高金桂（2011），〈強制性交罪的強制力行使——高雄地方法院九十九年度訴字第四二二號判決評析〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，第189期，頁251-262。
黃昭元（2002），〈抗多數困境與司法審查正當性--評Bickel教授的司法審查理論〉，《台灣憲法之縱剖橫切》，頁301-342，台北：元照。
黃丞儀（2007），〈鬆綁行政國家：從釋字第六一二號論「授權明確性原則」的典範變遷〉，李模務實法學基金會編，《判解研究彙編》，頁51-79，台北：李模務實法學基金會。
黃丞儀（2011），〈環境決策、司法審查與行政合理性—試析台灣與美國環境影響評估訴訟中行政判斷之合法性控制〉，黃丞儀主編，《2010行政管制與行政爭訟》，頁321-432。
黃丞儀（2015），〈潔淨空氣，如何解釋？- 從Duke Energy (2007) 與 Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)談美國行政法中立法目的、行政解釋和司法審查之關係〉，《臺大法學論叢》， 第44 卷第3期，頁____（預定於 2015 年 9 月出版）。
黃舒芃（2005），〈從普通法背景檢討美國司法違憲審查正當性的問題〉，《國立臺灣大學法學論叢》，第34卷第2期，頁63-122。
黃惠婷（2010），〈證明「違反意願」非強制性交罪之必要條件——簡評九十九年度台上字第第四八九四號判決與九十九年刑事庭第七次會議決議〉，《臺灣法學雜誌》，第161期，頁194-203。
黃銘輝（2014），〈論美國法上法院對行政行為的司法審查密度－以通訊傳播行政為中心〉，《臺北大學法學論叢》，第92期，頁187-252。
湯德宗（1987），〈美國空氣汙染管制策略之研究〉，《政大法學評論》，第35期，頁297-333。
湯德宗（1990），〈美國環境法體系概要〉，氏著，《美國環境法論集》，頁1-8，台北：自刊。
湯德宗（1990），〈美國清潔空氣法之理論與實際〉，氏著，《美國環境法論集》，頁33-58，台北：自刊。
湯德宗（1990），〈美國公害管制策略之檢討與經濟誘因理論之開發〉，氏著，《美國環境法論集》，頁75-90，台北：自刊。
葉俊榮（1990），〈論環境政策上的經濟誘因：理論依據〉，《臺大法學論叢》，第20卷第1期，頁87-111。
廖元豪（1999），〈行政程序法命令訂定程序之研究〉，《華岡法粹》，第27卷，頁301-338。
蔡聖偉（2011），〈論對幼童性交罪與強制性交罪的關係——評最高法院九十九第七次刑事庭決議〉，《月旦裁判時報》，第8期，頁65-69。
蔡聖偉（2012），〈性侵害未滿七歲幼童的案例審查示範〉，《月旦法學教室》，第115期，頁33-35。
錢建榮（2010），〈為恐龍法官喊冤——「強制性交罪」的爭議〉，《司法改革雜誌》，第83期，第17-19頁。
盧映潔（2010），〈「意不意願」很重要嗎？──評高雄地方法院99年度第422號判決暨最高法院99年度第7次刑庭決議〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，第186期，頁37-39。
盧映潔（2013），〈論智能障礙者的性自主自由〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，第125期，頁27-29。
甯應斌（2012），〈評女性主義在性侵修法爭議中的觀點〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，第205期，頁263-273。

（二）中華民國法院判決
91年度高等法院高雄分院上字第85號判決。
91年度桃園地方法院繼字第296號裁定。
93年度高等法院台南分院上字第64號判決。
94年度台南地方法院訴字第258號判決
94年度高等法院台中分院家抗字第8號裁定。
97年度臺灣高等法院高雄分院刑事判決上訴字第1008號。
99年度臺灣高雄地方法院訴字第422號刑事判決。
99年度最高法院刑事判決台上字第4894號。
101年度最高法院台上字第724號判決。
101年度最高法院台上字第1281號判決。

（三）其他
立法院公報第七十二卷第六十七期
立法院公報第八十八卷第十三期
立法院公報第九十六卷第七十九期
自由電子報2008年3月18日，認識遺產說 助姊妹拋棄繼承姑姑債務。
Facebook之粉絲網頁─支持邵燕玲法官，擷取於https://www.facebook.com/Justitia11
痞克邦PIXNET之部落格─天狼特區：白玫瑰要這種法官？擷取於http://sirius1701a.pixnet.net/blog/post/3044

二、英文文獻
（一）論著
BICKEL, ALEXANDER M., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 2d., (1986).
Bishin, William Robert, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965).
Black, Hugo, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION ON THE LAWS (1911).
Brest, Paul, The Misconceived Quest For The Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204, at 204-05 (1980).
Breyer, Stephen, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1991-1992).
TenBroek, Jacobus, Admissibility of Congressional Debates in Statutory Construction by the United States Supreme Court, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1937).
Corry, James Alexander, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN B. REV. 624 (1954).
Dickerson, Frederick Reed, A Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 IND. L. J. 206 (1975).
Diver, Colin S., Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985).
Easterbrook, Frank Hoover, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
Easterbrook, Frank Hoover, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. &; PUB. POL’Y 87 (1984).
Easterbrook, Frank Hoover, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. &; PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988).
Eskridge, William N. Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1989-1990).
Eskridge, William N. Jr., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
Eskridge, William N. Jr. and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083 (2007-2008).
Eskridge, William N. Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1989-1990).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li, liv-lxii (1994).
ESKRIDGE, WILLIAM N. JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY AND ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2000).
ESKRIDGE, WILLIAM N. JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY AND ELIZABETH GARRETT (EDS.), STATUTOTY INTERPRETATION STORIES (2011).
Farber, Daniel A., Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1546, 1546-47 (1996).
Farber, Daniel A. and Philip P. Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
Farber, Daniel A. and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
Farina, Cynthia R., Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
Fiorina, Morris P., Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J. L. ECON. &; ORG. 33 (1986).
Gluck, Abbe R. and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside―An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013).
Gluck, Abbe R. and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside―An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
HART, HENRY M. JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey (eds.) (1994).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1964).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 28 (1977).
Herz, Michael, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalla, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1991).
Holmes, Oliver Wendell Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899).
Landis, James McCauley, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
Manning, John F., Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517 (2013-2014).
MANNING, JOHN F. AND MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2010).
Merrill, Thomas W., Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L. J. 969 (1991-1992).
Merrill, Thomas W., Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 621 (1993-1994).
Merrill, Thomas W., Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1994).
Merrill, Thomas W., Marbury v. Madison as the First Great. Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481 (2004).
Merrill, Thomas W., The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 164-194 (2011).
Merrill, Thomas W. and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833 (2000-2001).
Mikva, Abner Joseph, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380 (1987).
Mikva, Abner Joseph, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
Nagle, John Copeland, Newt Gingrich: Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2209-11 (1995).
Pierce, Richard J. Jr., The Supreme Courts New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 752 (1995).
Pildes, Richard H., The Role of Legislation in the Field of Public Law, 7 N.Y.U. LEGIS. &; PUB. POL’Y 1, 2(2003-2004).
PLATO, STATESMAN, PHILEBUS, ION (Harold North Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb trans., 1st ed. Harvard University Press 1925).
Popkin, William D., An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992).
Pound, Roscoe, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907)
POSNER, RICHARD A., THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
Posner, Richard A., Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and The Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987)
Posner, Richard A., REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013).
Radin, Margaret Jane, Reconsidering The Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
Radin, Max, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
Randolph, A. Raymond, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. &; PUB. POL’Y 71 (1994).
Rehnquist, William H., The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
Riker, William H., The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 349 (1958).
RIKER, WILLIAM H., LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982).
RORTY, RICHARD, ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND ANALYSIS (1987).
Starr, Kenneth W., Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986).
Starr, Kenneth W., Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371 (1987).
Scalia, Antonin, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989).
Scalia, Antonin, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
Schauer, Frederick, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988)
Schauer, Frederick, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231 (1990).
Sunstein, Cass R., Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
Sunstein, Cass R., Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
VERMEULE, ADRIAN, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 41 (2006).
Wald, Patricia M., Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
Wald, Patricia M., The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).
Woodward, David R. &; Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 (1979).

（二）美國法院判決
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
Nix v. Heddon, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
Boston Sand &; Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928).
Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
Skidmore v. Swift &; Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
ASARCO Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In re Bergy, 596 F. 2d 952 (CCPA 1979).
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 66 (1983).
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln People’s Utility District, 467 U.S. 380 (1984).
Federal Election Commission v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986).
American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1988).
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988).
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
Chan v. Korean Air Line, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S., Inc. 116 (1990).
Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990)
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston &; Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992).
Boston &; Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
United States v. Thompson-Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151 (1993).
United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993).
South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2006 (1993).
Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905 (1993).
Bath Iron Works v. Director, OWCP, 113 S. Ct. 692 (1993).
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213 (1993).
Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151 (1993)
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, DOL v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
NLRB v. Health Care &; Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&;T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).

（三）其他
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989).